'HSlVf  C 

Mt»o 


rnc  uisiYtKbUr  LIOHRKY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SAN  DIEGO 

LA  JOLI  A.  CALIFORNIA 


UNIVERSITY  OF ,9''V''P:i  Mr: jmf||iif||||l 

3  1822  02705  4295 


A  TREATISE 


CONCERNING 


The  Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge 


GEORGE  BERKELEY 


REPRINT  EDITION 


CHICAGO 
THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

LONDON  AGENTS 

Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  &  Co.,  Ltd. 

1904 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

Berkeley's  Treatise  Concerning  the  Principles  of  Human 
KnoTJuledge,  of  which  a  reprint  is  here  produced  as  the  fourth  of 
the  series  of  Philosophical  Classics  of  the  Religion  of  Science  Li- 
brary, was  first  published  in  Dublin  in  1710.  The  second  edition, 
the  last  of  the  author's  life-time,  appeared  in  London  in  1734,  in 
the  same  volume  with  the  third  edition  of  the  Three  Dialogm-s 
Beliucen  Hylas  and  Philonous,  a  reprint  of  which  has  also  been 
issued  in  this  series  as  a  companion- piece  to  the  Pri/iciplcs.  The 
text  of  both  reprints  embodies  all  the  essential  matter  of  the  edi- 
tions of  Berkeley's  life-time. 

The  Principles,  published  when  the  author  was  only  twenty- 
six,  is  the  most  systematic  of  all  of  Berkeley's  expositions  of  his 
theory  of  knowledge :  it  was  the  direct  outgrowth  of  the  Essay 
Tocuards  a  Neiv  Theory  of  Vision  (1709),  which  sought  to  ban- 
ish the  metaphysical  abstractions  of  Absolute  Space  and  Extension 
from  philosophy,  and  was  itself  mainly  concerned  with  the  aboli- 
tion of  Abstract  Matter  and  of  the  ontological  and  theological 
corollaries  of  that  concept.  The  Dialogues  treat  of  substantially 
the  same  subjects,  but  are  more  familiar  and  elegant  in  form  and 
are  devoted  in  the  main  to  the  refutation  of  the  most  plausible 
popular  and  philosophical  objections  to  the  new  doctrine.  The 
two  books  mark  a  distinctively  new  epoch  in  philosophy  and  sci- 
ence, and  together  afford  a  comprehensive  survey  of  Berkeley's 
doctrines,  placing  within  the  reach  of  every  reader  in  remarkably 
brief  compass  opinions  which  have  profoundly  influenced  the 
course  of  intellectual  history.  Works  of  this  kind  have  been  almost 
invariably  distinguished  by  their  brevity.  "I  had  no  inclination," 
is  Berkeley's  characteristic  remark,  "to  trouble  the  world  with 
large  volumes.  What  I  have  done  was  rather  with  the  view  of 
giving  hints  to  thinking  men,  who  have  leisure  and  curiosity  to  go 
to  the  bottom  of  things,  and  pursue  them  in  their  own  minds. 
Two  or  three  times  reading  these  small  tracts,  and  making  what  is 
read  the  occasion  of  thinking,  would,  I  believe,  render  the  whole 


iv  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

I  familiar  and  easy  to  the  mind,  and  take  off  that  shocking  appear- 
l  ance  which  hath  often  been  observed  to  attend  speculative  truths." 
/  Berkeley's  philosophy    having  been  the  victim  of  much  popu- 

lar, and  even  professional,  misapprehension,  it  shall  be  our  en- 
deavor in  these  prefatory  remarks  to  give  by  appropriate  quota- 
tions and  digests  a  synthesis  of  current  philosophical  opinion 
concerning  his  doctrines,  to  point  out  his  relation  to  his  predeces- 
sors, to  indicate  certain  peculiarities  of  terminology  and  thought 
necessary  to  the  understanding  of  his  theory,  and  to  show  finally 
wherein  certain  of  his  analyses  have  been  rendered  antiquated  by 
modern  scientific  inquiry.  We  shall  begin  by  reproducing  the 
sketch  of  his  life  and  aims  given  in  Lewes's  Biografhical  History 
of  rhilosoj^hy  [\?>j\^),  a  work  which,  though  on  technical  points 
partisan  and  not  always  trustworthy,  has  at  least  the  merit  of  a 
vivacious  style. 

LIFE   OF  BERKELEY. 

"There  are  few  men  of  whom  England  has  better  reason  to 
be  proud  than  of  George  Berkeley,  Bishop  of  Cloyne;  for  to  ex- 
traordinary merits  as  a  thinker  and  writer  he  united  the  most  ex- 
quisite purity  and  generosity  of  character;  and  it  is  still  a  m-oot 
point  whether  he  was  greater  in  head  or  heart. 

"He  was  born  on  the  12th  of  March,  1685,  at  Kilcrin,  in  the 
county  of  Kilkenny,  Ireland.  He  was  educated  at  Trinity  College, 
Dublin,  and  was  in  1707  admitted  as  a  fellow.  In  1709  he  pub- 
lished his  Essay  Tozvards  a  Nezv  Theory  of  Vision,  which 
made  an  epoch  in  science  ;*  and  the  year  after,  his  Priyicifles  of 
Iluinan  Knoivled^e,  which  made  an  epoch  in  metaphysics.  After 
this  he  came  to  London,  where  he  was  received  with  open  arms. 
Ancient  learning,  exact  science,  polished  society,  modern  litera- 
ture, and  the  fine  arts,  contributed  to  adorn  and  enrich  the  mind 


*This  statement  is  hardly  exact.  The  £M<y  Towards  a  Nrw  Theory  of 
Vision  was  a  psychological  rather  than  a  scientific  treatise.  The  work  has 
been  well  characterised  by  Prof.  A.  C.  Fraser  in  his  edition  of  the  collected 
works  of  Berkeley,  Vol.  I.,  page  5,  as  follows:  "The  treatise  is  a  professed 
account  of  the  facts,  the  whole  facts,  and  nothing  but  the  facts  of  which  we 
are  visually  conscious,  as  distinguished  from  pretended  facts  and  metaphys- 
ical abstractions,  which  confused  thought,  an  irregular  exercise  of  imagina- 
tion, or  an  abuse  of  words  had  substituted  for  them.  It  is  a  contribution  to 
the  psychological  analysis  of  the  fact  of  vision,  and  not  a  deduction  from 
merely  physical  experiments  in  optics  or  the  physiology  of  the  eye." — Editor. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  v 

of  this  accomplished  man.     All  his  contemporaries  agreed  with 
the  Satirist  in  ascribing 

To  Berkeley  every  virtue  under  heaven. 
Adverse  factions  and  hostile  wits  concurred  only  in  loving,  admir- 
ing, and  contributing  to  advance  him.  The  severe  sense  of  Swift 
endured  his  visions;  the  modest  Addison  endeavored  to  reconcile 
Clarke  to  his  ambitious  speculations.  His  character  converted  the 
satire  of  Pope  into  fervid  praise.  Even  the  discerning,  fastidious, 
and  turbulent  Atterbury  said,  after  an  interview  with  him,  "so 
much  learning,  so  much  knowledge,  so  much  innocence,  and  such 
humility,  I  did  not  think  had  been  the  portion  of  any  but  angels, 
till  I  saw  this  gentleman."  '* 

"  His  acquaintance  with  the  wits  led  to  his  contributing  to  the 
Guardian.  He  became  chaplain  and  afterwards  secretary  to  the 
Earl  of  Peterborough,  whom  he  accompanied  on  his  embassy  to 
Sicily.  He  subsequently  made  the  tour  of  Europe  with  Mr.  Ashe; 
and  at  Paris  met  Malebranche,  with  whom  he  had  an  animated 
discussion  on  the  ideal  theory.  In  1724  he  was  made  dean  of 
Derry.  This  was  worth  eleven  hundred  pounds  a  year  to  him; 
but  he  resigned  it  in  order  to  dedicate  his  life  to  the  conversion  of 
the  North  American  savages,  stipulating  only  with  the  Govern- 
ment for  a  salary  of  one  hundred  pounds  a  year.  On  this  roman- 
tic and  generous  expedition  he  was  accompanied  by  his  young 
wife.  He  set  sail  for  Rhode  Island,  carrying  with  him  a  valuable 
library  of  books  and  the  bulk  of  his  property.  But,  to  the  shame 
of  the  Government,  be  it  said,  the  promises  made  him  were  not 
fulfilled,  and  after  seven  years  of  single-handed  endeavour  he  was 
forced  to  return  to  England,  having  spent  the  greater  part  of  his 
fortune  in  vain. 

"  He  was  made  Bishop  of  Cloyne  in  1734.  When  he  wished 
to  resign,  the  King  would  not  permit  him  ;  and  being  keenly  alive 
to  the  evils  of  non-residence,  he  made  an  arrangement  before  leav- 
ing Cloyne  whereby  he  settled  200/.  a  year  during  his  absence  on 
the  poor.  In  1752  he  removed  to  Oxford,  where,  on  the  evening 
of  the  14th  January,  in  1753,  he  was  suddenly  seized,  while  read- 
ing, with  palsy  of  the  heart,  and  died  almost  instantaneously. 

"Of  his  numerous  writings  we  cannot  here  speak;  two  only 
belong  to  our  subject :  the  Principles  of  Ktioivledge,  and  the 
Dialogues  of  Hylas  and  Philonous.     [His  other  most  important 

*Sir  James  Mackintosh. 


vi  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

philosophical  work  was  Alcif>hron,  or  the  Minute  Philosofher 
(1733)]  We  hope  to  remove  some  of  the  errors  and  prejudices 
with  which  his  name  is  encrusted.  We  hope  to  show  that,  even  in 
what  are  called  his  wildest  moods,  Berkeley  was  a  plain,  sincere, 
deep-thinking  man,  not  a  sophist  playing  with  paradoxes  to  dis- 
play his  skill. 

THE  TRADITIONAL  MISCONCEPTION  OF  BERKELEY'S 
IDEALISM. 

'  'All  the  world  has  heard  of  Berkeley's  Idealism,  and  innumer- 
able 'coxcombs'  have  vanquished  it  'with  a  grin.'*  Ridicule  has 
not  been  sparing  of  it.  Argument  has  not  been  wanting.  It  has 
been  laughed  at,  written  at,  talked  at,  shrieked  at.  That  it  has 
been  understood  is  not  so  apparent.  Few  writers  seem  to  have 
honestly  read  and  appreciated  his  works ;  and  those  few  are  cer- 
tainly not  among  his  antagonists. f  In  reading  the  criticisms  upon 
his  theory  it  is  quite  ludicrous  to  notice  the  constant  iteration  of 
trivial  objections  which,  trivial  as  they  are,  Berkeley  had  often 
anticipated.  In  fact,  the  critics  misunderstood  him,  and  then  re- 
proached him  for  his  inconsistency — inconsistency,  not  with  his 
principles,  but  with  theirs.  They  force  a  meaning  upon  his  words 
which  he  had  expressly  rejected  ;  and  then  triumph  over  him  be- 
cause he  did  not  pursue  their  principles  to  the  extravagances  which 
would  have  resulted  from  them. 

"When  Berkeley  denied  the  existence  of  matter,  he  simply 
denied  the  existence  of  that  unknown  substratiityi,  the  existence 
of  which  Locke  had  declared  to  be  a  necessary  inference  from  our 
knowledge  of  qualities,  but  the  nature  of  which  must  ever  be  alto- 
gether hidden  from  us.  Philosophers  had  assumed  the  existence 
of  substance,  1.  e.,  of  a  notimenon  lying  underneath  2X\  fheno7netia 
— a  substratum  supporting  all  qualities — a  something  in  which  all 
accidents  inhere.  This  unknown  substance  Berkeley  denies.  It 
is  a  mere  abstraction,  he  says.     If  it  is  unknown,  unknowable,  it 


*"And  coxcombs  vanquish  Berkeley  with  a  grin," — Pope. 

tThese  words  were  written  in  1845-1846.  Since  then  Prof.  A.  Campbell 
Eraser's  magnificent  edition  of  Berkeley's  collected  works  (4  vols.  Clarendon 
Press.  1871)  and  his  exhaustive  dissertations  on  Berkeley's  doctrines,  together 
with  the  many  excellent  histories  of  philosophy  of  the  last  half  century,  have 
rendered  such  misunderstanding,  at  least  on  the  part  of  the  philosophical 
public,  almost  impossible. — Editor, 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  vii 

is  a  figment,  and  I  will  none  of  it ;  for  it  is  a  figment  worse  than 
useless;  it  is  pernicious,  as  the  basis  of  all  Atheism.  If  by  matter 
you  understand  i/iai  which  is  seen,  felt,  tasted,  and  touched,  then 
I  say  matter  exists  :  I  am  as  firm  a  believer  in  its  existence  as  any 
one  can  be,  and  herein  I  agree  zvith  the  vulgar.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, you  understand  by  matter  that  occult  substratum  which  is 
not  seen,  yiot  felt,  Jiot  tasted,  and  not  touched — that  of  which  the 
senses  do  not,  cannot,  inform  you — then  I  say  I  believe  not  in  the 
existence  of  matter,  and  herein  I  differ  zuith  the  fhilosofhers 
a7td  agree  ruith  the  vulgar. 

"  'I  am  not  changing  things  into  ideas,'  he  says,  'but  rather 
ideas  into  things ;  since  those  immediate  objects  of  ferceftion, 
which  according  to  you  (Berkeley  might  have  said,  according  to 
philosophers)  are  only  affearances  of  things,  I  take  to  be  the 
real  things  themselves. 

"  'Hylas:  Things!  you  may  pretend  what  you  please;  but  it 
is  certain  you  leave  us  nothing  but  the  empty  forms  of  things,  the 
outside  of  zthich  only  strikes  the  senses. 

"  'Philonous:  What  yoti  call  the  empty  forms  and  outside  of 
things  seem  to  tuc  the  very  things  themselves.  .  .  .  We  both  there- 
fore agree  in  this,  that  we  perceive  only  sensible  forms;  but  herein 
we  differ:  you  will  have  them  to  be  empty  appearances;  I,  real 
beings.     In  short,  you  do  not  trust  your  senses;  I  do. ' 

' '  Berkeley  is  always  accused  of  having  propounded  a  theory 
which  contradicts  the  evidence  of  the  senses.  That  a  man  who 
should  thus  disregard  the  senses  must  be  out  of  his,  was  a  ready 
answer ;  ridicule  was  not  slow  in  retort  :  declamation  gave  itself 
elbow-room,  and  exhibited  itself  in  a  triumphant  attitude.  It  was 
easy  to  declare  (Reid,  /ngui>'y)  that  '  the  man  who  seriously  enter- 
tains this  belief,  though  in  other  respects  he  may  be  a  very  good 
man,  as  a  man  may  be  who  believes  he  is  made  of  glass;  yet 
surely  he  hath  a  soft  place  in  his  understanding,  and  hath  been 
hurt  by  much  thinking.' 

"Unfortunately  for  the  critics,  Berkeley  did  not  contradict 
the  evidence  of  the  senses  ;  did  ?iot  propound  a  theory  at  variance 
in  this  point  with  the  ordinary  belief  of  mankind.  His  peculiarity 
is,  that  he  confined  himself  exclusively  to  the  evidence  of  the 
senses.  What  the  senses  informed  him  of,  that,  and  that  only, 
would  he  accept.  He  held  fast  to  the  facts  of  consciousness  ;  he 
placed  himself  resolutely  in  the  centre  of  the  instinctive  belief  of 


viii  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

mankind  :  there  he  took  up  his  stand,  leaving  to  philosophers  the 
region  of  supposition,  inference,  and  of  occult  substances. 

"The  reproach  made  to  him  is  really  the  reproach  he  made 
to  philosophers,  viz.,  that  they  would  not  trust  to  the  evidence  of 
their  senses;  that  over  and  above  what  the  senses  told  them,  they 
imagined  an  occult  something  of  which  the  senses  gave  no  indica- 
tion. 'Now  it  was  against  this  metaphysical  phantom  of  the  brain,' 
says  an  acute  critic  {Blackivood^ s  Magazine,  June,  1842,  p.  814) 
'this  crochet-work  of  philosophers,  and  against  it  alone,  that  all 
the  attacks  of  Berkeley  were  directed.  The  doctrine  that  the  real- 
ities of  things  were  not  made  for  man,  and  that  he  must  rest  satis- 
fied with  mere  appearances  was  regarded,  and  rightly,  by  him  as 
the  parent  of  scepticism  with  all  her  desolating  train.  He  saw 
that  philosophy,  in  giving  up  the  reality  immediately  within  her 
grasp,  in  favor  of  a  reality  supposed  to  be  less  delusive,  which  lay 
beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  resembled  the  dog  in  the  fable, 
who,  carrying  a  piece  of  meat  across  a  river,  let  the  substance  slip 
from  his  jaws,  while  with  foolish  greed  he  snatched  at  the  shadow 
in  the  stream.  The  dog  lost  his  dinner,  and  philosophy  let  go  her 
secure  hold  upon  truth.  He  therefore  sided  with  the  vulgar,  who 
recognise  no  distinction  between  the  reality  and  the  appearance  of 
objects,  and  repudiating  the  baseless  hypothesis  of  a  world  exist- 
ing unknown  and  unperceived,  he  resolutely  maintained  that  what 
are  called  the  sensible  shows  of  things  are  in  truth  the  very  things 
themselves.' 

"True  it  is  that  owing  to  the  ambiguities  of  language  Berke- 
ley's theory  does  not  seem  to  run  counter  to  the  ordinary  belief  of 
mankind,  because  by  Matter  men  commonly  understand  the  seen, 
the  tasted,  the  touched,  &c  ;  therefore  when  the  existence  of  Mat- 
ter is  denied,  people  naturally  suppose  that  the  existence  of  the 
seen,  the  tasted,  and  the  touched  is  denied,  never  suspecting  that 
Matter,  in  its  philosophical  sense,  is  not  seen,  not  tasted,  not 
touched.  Berkeley  has  not,  it  must  be  confessed,  sufiSciently 
guarded  against  all  ambiguity.  Thus  he  says  in  one  of  the  open- 
ing sections  of  his  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  that  "It  is 
indeed  an  opinion  strangely  prevailing  amongst  men  that 
houses,  mountains,  rivers,  and,  in  a  word,  all  sensible  objects 
have  an  existence,  natural  or  real,  distinct  from  their  being  per- 
ceived by  the  understanding.'  This  is  striking  the  key-note  false. 
It  rouses  the  reader  to  oppose  a  coming  paradox. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  ix 

"Yet  Berkeley  foresaw  and  answered  the  objections  which 
Wimpey,  Beattie,  Reid,  and  others  brought  forward.  He  was  not 
giving  utterance  to  a  caprice ;  he  was  not  spinning  an  ingenious 
theory,  knowing  all  the  while  that  it  was  no  more  than  an  ingenu- 
ity. He  was  an  earnest  thinker,  patient  in  the  search  after  truth. 
Anxious,  therefore,  that  his  speculations  should  not  be  regarded 
as  mere  dialectical  displays,  he  endeavoured  on  various  occasions 
to  guard  himself  from  misapprehension. 

"  '  I  do  not  argue  against  the  existence  of  any  one  thing  that 
we  can  apprehend  either  by  sensation  or  reflection.  That  the 
things  I  see  with  my  eyes  and  touch  with  my  hands  do  exist,  really 
exist,  I  make  not  the  least  question.  The  only  thing  whose  exist- 
ence I  deny  is  that  which  philosophers  call  Matter,  or  corporeal 
substance.  And  in  doing  this  there  is  no  damage  done  to  the  rest 
of  mankind,  who,  I  dare  say,  will  never  miss  it.  .  .  . 

"  '  If  any  man  thinks  we  detract  from  the  reality  of  existence 
of  things,  he  is  very  far  from  understanding  what  has  been  pre- 
mised in  the  plainest  terms  I  could  think  of.  .  .  .  It  will  be  urged 
that  thus  much  at  least  is  true,  viz.,  that  we  take  away  all  corpo- 
real substances.  To  this  my  answer  is,  that  if  the  word  substance 
be  taken  in  the  vulgar  sense  for  a  combination  of  sensible  quali- 
ties, such  as  extension,  solidity,  weight,  &c. ,  this  we  cannot  be  ac- 
cused of  taking  away.*  But  if  it  be  taken  in  the  philosophic  sense, 
for  the  support  of  accidents  or  qualities  without  the  mind  ;  then, 
indeed,  I  acknowledge  that  we  take  it  away,  if  one  may  be  said  to 
take  away  that  which  never  had  any  existence,  not  even  in  the  im- 
agination. 

"  '  But  say  what  we  can,  some  one  perhaps  may  be  apt  to  re- 
ply, he  will  still  believe  his  senses,  and  never  suffer  any  arguments, 
however  plausible,  to  prevail  over  the  certainty  of  them.  Be  it 
so ;  assert  the  evidence  of  sense  as  high  as  you  please,  zve  arc 
tuillhig  to  do  the  same.  That  what  I  see,  hear,  and  feel,  doth 
exist,  i.  e.,  is  perceived  by  me,  I  no  more  doubt  than  I  do  of  my 
own  being ;  but  I  do  not  see  how  the  testimony  of  sense  can  be 
alleged  as  a  proof  of  anything  which  is  not  perceived  by  sense. 'f 

"After  reading  these  passages  (and  more  of  a  similar  cast 
might  be  quoted)  in  what  terms  shall  we  speak  of  the  trash  written 


•An  answer  to  Dr.  Johnson's  peremptory  refutation  of  Berkeley,  viz., 
kicking  a  stone  :  as  if  Berkeley  ever  denied  that  what  we  call  stones  existed! 
^  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Sections  35,  36,  37,  40. 


X  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

to  refute  Idealism  ?  Where  was  the  acuteness  of  the  Reids  and 
Beatties,  when  they  tauntingly  asked  why  Berkeley  did  not  run 
his  head  against  a  post,  did  not  walk  over  precipices,  &c.,  as,  in 
accordance  with  his  theory,  no  pain,  no  broken  limbs,  could  re- 
sult?* Where  was  philosophical  acumen,  when  a  tribe  of  writers 
could  imagine  they  refuted  Berkeley  by  an  appeal  to  common 
sense — when  they  contrasted  the  instinctive  beliefs  of  mankind 
with  the  speculative  paradoxes  of  a  philosopher,  who  expressly 
took  his  stand  with  common  sense  against  philosophers? 

"Men  trained  in  metaphysical  speculations  may  find  it  difiS- 
cult  to  conceive  the  non-existence  of  an  invisible,  unknowable  sub- 
stratum; but  that  the  bulk  of  mankind  find  it  almost  impossible 
to  conceive  any  such  substratum  is  a  fact  which  the  slightest  in- 
quiry will  verify.  We  have  experienced  this  more  than  once.  We 
remember  a  discussion  which  lasted  an  entire  evening,  in  which 
by  no  power  of  illustration,  by  no  force  of  argument,  could  the 
idea  of  this  substance,  apart  from  its  sensible  qualities,  be  ren- 
dered conceivable. 

"Berkeley,  therefore,  in  denying  the  existence  of  matter, 
sided  with  common  sense.  He  thought  with  the  vulgar,  that  mat- 
ter was  that  of  which  his  senses  informed  him;  not  an  occult 
something  of  which  he  could  have  no  information.  The  table  he 
saw  before  him  certainly  existed  :  it  was  hard,  polished,  coloured, 
of  a  certain  figure,  and  cost  some  guineas.  But  there  was  no 
phantom  table  lying  underneath  the  affarcyit  table — there  was 
no  invisible  substance  supporting  that  table.  What  he  perceived 
was  a  table,  and  nothing  more ;  what  he  perceived  it  to  be,  he 
would  believe  it  to  be,  and  nothing  more.  His  starting-point  was 
thus  what  the  plain  dictates  of  his  senses  and  the  senses  of  all 
men  furnished." 

Berkeley's  place  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 

"In  the  philosophies  of  Descartes  (1596-1650)  and  Locke  (1632 
-1704),"  says  Professor  R.  Adamson  in  the  Eyicyclopccdia  Britan- 


*"  But  what  is  the  consequence?  I  resolve  not  to  believe  my  senses.  I 
break  my  head  against  a  post  that  comes  in  my  way ;  I  step  into  a  dirty  ken- 
nel ;  and  after  twenty  such  wise  and  rational  actions  I  am  taken  up  and  clapt 
into  a  madhouse.  Now  I  confess  I  had  rather  make  one  of  those  credulous 
fools  whom  nature  imposes  upon,  than  of  those  wise  and  rational  philoso- 
phers who  resolve  to  withhold  assent  at  all  this  expense." — Reid's  in^uirjf, 
ch.  vi.,  sec.  20.    This  one  passage  is  as  good  as  a  hundred. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  xi 

nica,  "a  large  share  of  attention  had  been  directed  to  the  idea  of 
matter,  which  was  held  to  be  the  abstract,  unperceived  background 
of  real  experience,  and  was  supposed  to  give  rise  to  our  ideas  of 
external  things  through  its  action  on  the  sentient  mind.  Knowl- 
edge, being  limited  to  the  ideas  produced,  could  never  extend  to  the 
unperceived  matter,  or  substance,  or  cause  which  produced  them, 
and  it  became  a  problem  for  speculative  science  to  determine  the 
grounds  for  the  very  belief  in  its  existence.  Philosophy  seemed 
about  to  end  in  scepticism  or  in  materialism.  Now  Berkeley  put 
this  whole  problem  in  a  new  light  by  pointing  out  that  a  prelimi- 
nary question  must  be  raised  and  answered.  Before  we  deduce 
results  from  such  abstract  ideas  as  cause,  substance,  matter,  we 
must  ask  what  in  reality  do  these  mean, — what  is  the  actual  con- 
tent of  consciousness  which  corresponds  to  these  words  ?  Do  not 
all  these  ideas,  when  held  to  represent  something  which  exists  ab- 
solutely apart  from  all  knowledge  of  it,  involve  a  contradiction  ? 
Are  they  not  truly,  when  so  regarded,  inconceivable,  and  mere 
arbitrary  figments  which  cannot  possibly  be  realised  in  conscious- 
ness ?  In  putting  this  question,  not  less  than  in  answering  it,  con- 
sists Berkeley's  distinct  originality  as  a  philosopher." 

This  is  what  Professor  Fraser  {L/fe  and  Letters  of  Berkeley, 
p.  364)  has  termed  the  "New  Question"  about  space  and  the  ma- 
terial v/orld,  for  which  Berkeley  tried  in  vain  to  get  a  hearing  his 
whole  life  long.  With  it,  according  to  the  same  author,  he  inaugu- 
rated a  "new  and  second  era  in  the  intellectual  revolution  which 
Descartes  set  agoing.  This  Second  Period  in  Modern  Philosophy 
has  been  marked  by  the  sceptical  phenomenalism  of  Hume  (now 
represented  by  Positivism);  the  Scotch  psychology  of  Common 
Sense;  and  the  German  critical  and  dialectical  philosophy  of 
Reason." 

Berkeley's  relations  to  Leibnitz  (1646-1716)  and  Malebranche 
(1638-17 1 5)  were  also  characteristic.  Knowing  the  agreement  ex- 
isting between  Locke  and  Spinoza,  the  champions  of  systems  so 
remote  as  empiricism  and  rationalism,  it  is  not  surprising,  remarks 
Dr.  A.  Weber  in  his  excellent  History  of  Fliilosophy*  "to  see 
a  disciple  of  the  English  philosopher  [Berkeley]  offering  the  hand 
of  friendship  to  Leibnitz  and  Malebranche,  the  champions  of  in- 
tellectualism  and  innate  ideas  across  the  sea.  Although  Locke  and 
his  opponents  differ  on  several  essential  points,  they  reach  practi- 


*Translated  by  Professor  Thilly,  New  York,  Scribner's,  i£ 


xii  liDITOK'S  I'RILPACE. 

cally  the  same  conclusions  concerning  the  world  of  sense.  Male- 
branche  and  Leibniz  spiritualise  matter  ;  they  explain  it  as  a  con- 
fused idea,  and  ultimately  assume  a  principle  endowed  with  desire 
and  perception,  that  is,  mind.  Locke's  criticism,  on  the  other 
hand,  does  not  wholly  reject  the  material  world ;  one  half  of  it  is 
retained.  Extension,  form,  and  motion  exist  outside  of  us;  but 
neither  colors,  nor  sounds,  nor  tastes,  nor  smells  exist  independ- 
ently of  our  sensations.  Moreover,  Locke  attacks  the  traditional 
notion  of  substance,  or  substratum,  and  defines  real  substance  as 
a  combination  of  qualities.  Indeed,  he  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that 
the  idea  of  corporeal  substance  or  matter  is  as  remote  from  our 
conceptions  and  apprehensions  as  that  of  spiritual  substance  or 
spirit  1  Hence,  all  that  was  needed  to  arrive  at  the  negation  of 
matter  or  absolute  spiritualism  was  to  efface  the  distinction  which 
he  had  drawn  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities,  and  to 
call  all  sensible  qualities  without  exception,  secondary.  This 
George  Berkeley  did." 

The  student  should  now  carefully  re-read  in  this  connexion 
sections  5,  6,  8,  22,  23,  28-36,  50,  86-94  of  the  Principles,  where 
Berkeley's  position  as  to  the  meaning  of  reality  is  defined  in  un- 
mistakable terms.  The  subjectivisation  of  reality,  which  seems 
absolute  at  the  start,  may  be  seen  gradually  to  develop  in  these 
sections  into  a  species  of  spiritualistic  objectification.  Sections 
25-27  on  causality  are  important  here  as  showing  "  that  voluntary 
mental  activity  is  the  only  Causation  in  the  universe, — that  all 
Power,  as  well  as  all  Substance,  is  essentially  mental."  Berkeley's 
system  is,  in  fact,  an  absolute,  Tnonistic  sfirittialism.,  in  which 
the  dualism  of  substances  has  been  completely  overcome.  "The 
universe  in  which  we  find  ourselves  is  a  universe  that  consists,  in 
the  last  analysis,  of  mind  conscious  of  ideas  or  fhenomena.  The 
ideas  of  sense  appear  in  an  order  which,  because  independent  of 
our  individual  will,  may  be  called  external  to  each  of  us;  and 
which,  being  uniform,  is  capable  of  being  interpreted."  (Fraser, 
L,  121.)  Berkeley's  theory  must  be  sharply  distinguished  from 
Fichte's  sttbjcctive  idealism.  Objectivity  has  not  suffered  in  Ber- 
keley's theory;  it  has  simply  been  displaced  from  the  realm  of 
unknozvable  matter  to  that  of  knozvable  mind.  This  is  a  most 
important  feature  of  Berkeley's  philosophy  and  one  that  has  been 
nearly  always  unrecognised. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  in  this  connexion  that  Berkeley's  sys- 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  xiii 

tem  is  primarily  directed  against  scepticism  and  irreligion,  and 
that  it  has  therefore  peculiarly  merited  from  both  a  religious  and 
philosophical  point  of  view  Professor  Eraser's  epithet  of  "Theo- 
logical or  Universalised  Sensationalism."  Berkeley's  argument 
and  position  on  this  point  and  his  relationship  to  Malebranche  (as 
to  existence  and  vision  in  God)  come  out  very  clearly  in  the  follow- 
ing quotation  from  the  Second  Dialogue  Between  Hylas  and  Phi- 
lonous : 

"Philonous.  I  deny  that  I  agreed  with  you  in  those  notions 
that  led  to  Scepticism.  You  indeed  said  the  reality  of  sensible 
things  consisted  in  an  absolute  existence  out  of  the  minds  of  spir- 
its, or  distinct  from  their  being  perceived.  And,  pursuant  to  this 
notion  of  reality,  you  are  obliged  to  deny  sensible  things  any  real 
existence :  that  is,  according  to  your  own  definition,  you  profess 
yourself  a  sceptic.  But  I  neither  said  nor  thought  the  reality  of 
sensible  things  was  to  be  defined  after  that  manner.  To  me  it  is 
evident,  for  the  reasons  you  allow  of,  that  sensible  things  cannot 
exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind  or  spirit.  Whence  I  conclude,  not 
that  they  have  no  real  existence,  but  that,  seeing  they  depend  not 
on  my  thought,  and  have  an  existence  distinct  from  being  per- 
ceived by  me,  there  must  be  some  other  mind  wherein  they  exist. 
As  sure,  therefore,  as  the  sensible  world  really  exists,  so  sure  is 
there  an  infinite  omnipresent  Spirit,  who  contains  and  supports  it. 

"Hylas.  What  I  this  is  no  more  than  I  and  all  Christians 
hold ;  nay,  and  all  others  too  who  believe  there  is  a  God,  and  that 
He  knows  and  comprehends  all  things. 

"Phil.  Aye,  but  here  lies  the  difference.  Men  commonly  be- 
lieve that  all  things  are  known  or  perceived  by  God,  because  they 
believe  the  being  of  a  God  ;  whereas  I,  on  the  other  side,  immedi- 
ately and  necessarily  conclude  the  being  of  a  God,  because  all 
sensible  things  must  be  perceived  by  him. 

"Hyl.  But  so  long  as  we  all  believe  the  same  thing,  what  mat- 
ter is  it  how  we  come  by  that  belief  ? 

"Phil.  But  neither  do  we  agree  in  the  same  opinion.  For 
philosophers,  though  they  acknowledge  all  corporeal  beings  to  be 
perceived  by  God,  yet  they  attribute  to  them  an  absolute  subsist- 
ence distinct  from  their  being  perceived  by  any  mind  whatever, 
which  I  do  not.  Besides,  is  there  no  difference  between  saying. 
There  is  a  God,  therefore  He  perceives  all  things ;  and  saying, 
Sensible  things  do  not  really  exist ;  and,  if  they  really  exist,  they 


xiv  EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

are  necessarily  perceived  by  an  infinite  mind  :  therefore  there  is 
an  infinite  mind,  or  God  ?  This  furnishes  you  with  a  direct  and 
immediate  demonstration,  from  a  most  evident  principle,  of  the 
hfiu^r  of  a  Cod.  Divines  and  philosophers  had  proved  beyond  all 
controversy,  from  the  beauty  and  usefulness  of  the  several  parts 
of  the  creation,  that  it  was  the  workmanship  of  God.  But  that — 
setting  aside  all  help  of  astronomy  and  natural  philosophy,  all 
contemplation  of  the  contrivance,  order,  and  adjustment  of  things 
— an  infinite  mind  should  be  necessarily  inferred  from  the  bare 
existence  of  the  sensible  world,  is  an  advantage  to  them  only  who 
have  made  this  easy  reflexion,  that  the  sensible  world  is  that  which 
we  perceive  by  our  several  senses;  and  that  nothing  is  perceived 
by  the  senses  beside  ideas ;  and  that  no  idea  or  an  archetype  of  an 
idea  can  exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind.  You  may  now,  without 
any  laborious  search  into  the  sciences,  without  any  subtlety  of 
reason,  or  tedious  length  of  discourse,  oppose  and  baffle  the  most 
strenuous  advocate  for  Atheism  ;  those  miserable  refuges,  whether 
in  an  eternal  succession  of  unthinking  causes  and  effects,  or  in  a 
fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms;  those  wild  imaginations  of  Vanini, 
Hobbes,  and  Spinoza  :  in  a  word,  the  whole  system  of  Atheism,  is 
it  not  entirely  overthrown,  by  this  single  reflexion  on  the  repug- 
nancy included  in  supposing  the  whole,  or  any  part,  even  the  most 
rude  and  shapeless,  of  the  visible  world,  to  exist  without  mind?" 
As  to  the  function  and  nature  of  abstraction  in  thought,  and 
the  reification  of  general  ideas  (see  the  Introduction),  Berkeley  s 
analysis  has  become  classical.  Further,  he  distinctly  anticipated, 
in  his  criticism  of  the  metaphysical  dogma  of  the  thing-in-itself  as 
existing  independently  of  the  phenomenon,  the  erroneous  and 
sceptical  conclusions  to  which  the  great  Kant  was  afterwards  so 
strangely  led  in  his  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  ;  and  in  his  ani- 
madversions on  the  notions  of  absolute  space,  time,  etc.,  upheld 
by  Newton  (sections  110-117),  he  has  in  part  adumbrated  the 
strictures  of  modern  scientists.*  In  his  reflexions  on  mathematics 
(sections  118  et  seq.)  he  has  not  been  so  fortunate.  The  diflSculties 
he  saw  in  the  fundamental  conceptions  of  the  Infinitesimal  Analy- 
sis have  since  been  cleared  up,  and  much  that  he  says  on  this  sub- 
ject has  now  historical  significance  only  ;  while  as  for  his  concep- 
tion of  the  nature  of  the  ego  and  spiritual  substance  (sections  137 


•See  Mach,  Mechanics  (Chicago,  1893),  pp.  226  et  seq.,  512. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE.  xv 

et  seq.),  these  have  been  rendered  altogether  nugatory  by  modern 
psychology.' 

MEANING  OF  THE  WORD   "IDEA"  IN    BERKELEY'S    SYSTEM. 

A  knowledge  of  Berkeley's  peculiar  use  of  the  word  "idea"  is 
necessary  to  a  perfect  understanding  of  his  philosophy,  and  we 
may  therefore  appropriately  conclude  with  a  quotation  explaining 
it.  "The  little  word  idea,"  says  Professor  Fraser  in  his  L(fe  and 
Letters  of  Berkeley  "(and  it  may  be  added  the  so  far  synonymous 
terms  sensation  and  fhe^iomenon — for  Berkeley  may  be  called  a 
Sensationalist,  or  a  Phenomenalist,  as  well  as  an  Idealist)  has  been 
a  formidable  obstruction  to  the  intelligibility  of  this  philosopher. 
With  him  it  means  both  fercept  and  image — not  pure  7iotion  of 
the  understanding.  And  it  is  with  ideas  as  actual  sensation-per- 
ceptions that  we  have  to  do  exclusively,  when  we  are  told  by  him 
that  the  sensible  world  is  composed  of  ideas.  Simply  to  recollect 
what  he  means  by  idea  is  almost  to  realise  his  conception  of  the 
universe.  When  ordinary  people  are  told  that  idea  is  the  stuff  or 
matter  of  which,  according  to  Berkeley,  the  real  things  of  the  sen- 
sible world  are  composed,  they  are  apt  to  take  this  for  an  assertion 
that  what  we  call  seeing  and  touching  is  only  fancying  ;  and  that 
what  is  seen  and  touched  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  subjective  or 
private  dream  of  the  person's  own  mind  who  has  the  ideas — that 
it  can  have  no  extension  or  solidity  or  permanence.  Now,  Berke- 
ley's ideas  include  hard  and  extended  facts,  and  are  not  mere 
fancies  of  which  we  are  conscious.  He  calls  them  ideas  because 
he  sees  it  to  be  self-evident  that  facts  cannot  exist  positively  with- 
out a  mind  to  be  percipient  of  them.  Nor  are  we,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  think  of  Berkeley's  ideas,  or  phenomena  perceived  in 
sense,  as  independent  entities  which  circulate  among  finite  spir- 
its; their  actual  or  intelligible  existence  consists  in  being  the  mat 
ter  of  the  experience  of  a  conscious  mind — a  sui  generis  sort  of 
dependent  existence.    But  no  doubt  his  language  is  vacillating." 

Thomas  J.  McCormack. 
La  Salle,  III. 


*See  Ribot's  summaries.  Diseases  of  Personality,  etc.,  and  the  discussions 
in  Dr.  Paul  Carus's  Whence  and  Whither,  The  Soul  of  Man,  and  the  Primer 
of  Philosophy  (all  published  by  the  Open  Court  Pub.  Co.,  Chicago). 


TREATISE 

Concerning  the 

PRINCIPLES 


OF 


Human   I^owlege. 


PART    I. 


Wherein  the  chief  Caufes  of  Error  and  Dif- 
ficulty in  the  Sciences,  with  the  Grounds 
of  Scepticifm,  Atheifm^  and  Irreligion^  are 
inquir*d  into. 


By  George  Berkeley^  M.A.  Fellow  of 
Trinity-College^  Dublin. 


DV  B  L  IN: 

Printed  by  Aaron  Rhames,  for  Jeremy 
Pepyat,  Bookfeller  in  Skinner-Row,  1 7 1  o. 


TO  THE  RIGHT  HONOURABLE* 
THOMAS,  EARL  OF  PEMBROKE,  &c., 

KNIGHT  OF  THE  MOST  NOBLE  ORDER  OF  THE  GARTER,  AND 
ONE  OF  THE  LORDS  OF  HER  MAJESTy's  MOST 

honourable  privy  council. 

My  Lord, 
You  will  perhaps  wonder  that  an  obscure  person, 
who  has  not  the  honour  to  be  known  to  your  lordship, 
should  presume  to  address  you  in  this  manner.  But 
that  a  man  who  has  written  something  with  a  design 
to  promote  Useful  Knowledge  and  Religion  in  the 
world  should  make  choice  of  your  lordship  for  his  pa- 
tron, will  not  be  thought  strange  by  any  one  that  is 
not  altogether  unacquainted  with  the  present  state  of 
the  church  and  learning,  and  consequently  ignorant 
how  great  an  ornament  and  support  you  are  to  both. 
Yet,  nothing  could  have  induced  me  to  make  you  this 
present  of  my  poor  endeavours,  were  I  not  encouraged 
by  that  candour  and  native  goodness  which  is  so  bright 
a  part  in  your  lordship's  character.  I  might  add,  my 
lord,  that  the  extraordinary  favour  and  bounty  you 
have  been  pleased  to  show  towards  our  Society  gave 
me  hopes  you  would  not  be  unwilling  to  countenance 
the  studies  of  one  of  its  members.  These  considera- 
tions determined  me  to  lay  this  treatise  at  your  lord- 

*This  dedication  was  not  published  in  the  second  edition 
(1734). 


2  DEDICATION. 

ship's  feet,  and  the  rather  because  I  was  ambitious  to 
have  it  known  that  I  am  with  the  truest  and  most  pro- 
found respect,  on  account  of  that  learning  and  virtue 
which  the  world  so  justly  admires  in  your  lordship, 
My  Lord, 

Your  lordship's   most   humble 
and  most  devoted  servant, 

GEORGE  BERKELEY. 


PREFACE.* 

What  I  here  make  pubhc  has,  after  a  long  and 
scrupulous  inquiry,  seemed  to  me  evidently  true  and 
not  unuseful  to  be  known — particularly  to  those  who 
are  tainted  with  Scepticism,  or  want  a  demonstration 
of  the  existence  and  immateriality  of  God,  or  the  nat- 
ural immortality  of  the  soul.  Whether  it  be  so  or 
no  I  am  content  the  reader  should  impartially  examine ; 
since  I  do  not  think  myself  any  farther  concerned  for 
the  success  of  what  I  have  written  than  as  it  is  agree- 
able to  truth.  But,  to  the  end  this  may  not  suffer, 
I  make  it  my  request  that  the  reader  suspend  his  judg- 
ment till  he  has  once  at  least  read  the  whole  through 
with  that  degree  of  attention  and  thought  which  the 
subject-matter  shall  seem  to  deserve.  For,  as  there 
are  some  passages  that,  taken  by  themselves,  are  very 
liable  (nor  could  it  be  remedied)  to  gross  misinterpre- 
tation, and  to  be  charged  with  most  absurd  conse- 
quences, which,  nevertheless,  upon  an  entire  perusal 
will  appear  not  to  follow  from  them ;  so  likewise, 
though  the  whole  should  be  read  over,  yet,  if  this  be 
done  transiently,  it  is  very  probable  my  sense  may  be 
mistaken ;  but  to  a  thinking  reader,  I  flatter  myself  it 
will  be  throughout  clear  and  obvious.  As  for  the 
characters  of  novelty  and  singularity  which  some  of 


*This  preface  was  not  published  in  the  edition  of  1734. 

3 


4  PREFACE. 

the  followinj2^  notions  may  seem  to  bear,  it  is,  I  hope, 
needless  to  make  any  apolog'y  on  that  account.  He 
must  surely  be  either  very  weak,  or  very  little  ac- 
quainted with  the  sciences,  who  shall  reject  a  truth 
that  is  capable  of  demonstration,  for  no  other  reason 
but  because  it  is  newly  known,  and  contrary  to  the  prej- 
udices of  mankind.  Thus  much  I  thous^ht  fit  to 
premise,  in  order  to  prevent,  if  possible,  the  hasty  cen- 
sures of  a  sort  of  men  who  are  too  apt  to  condemn  an 
opinion  before  they  rightly  comprehend  it. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Philosophy  being  nothing  else  but  the  study  of  wis- 
dom and  truth,  it  may  with  reason  be  expected  that 
those  who  have  spent  most  time  and  pains  in  it  should 
enjoy  a  greater  calm  and  serenity  of  mind,  a  greater 
clearness  and  evidence  of  knowledge,  and  be  less  dis- 
turbed with  doubts  and  difficulties  than  other  men. 
Yet  so  it  is,  we  see  the  illiterate  bulk  of  mankind  that 
walk  the  high-road  of  plain  common  sense,  and  are 
governed  by  the  dictates  of  nature,  for  the  most  part 
easy  and  undisturbed.  To  them  nothing  that  is  fa- 
miliar appears  unaccountable  or  difficult  to  comprehend. 
They  complain  not  of'  any  want  of  evidence  in  their 
senses,  and  are  out  of  all  danger  of  becoming  Scep- 
tics. But  no  sooner  do  we  depart  from  sense  and 
instinct  to  follow  the  light  of  a  superior  principle, 
to  reason,  meditate,  and  reflect  on  the  nature  of  things, 
but  a  thousand  scruples  spring  up  in  our  minds  con- 
cerning those  things  which  before  we  seemed  fully 
to  comprehend.  Prejudices  and  errors  of  sense  do 
from  all  parts  discover  themselves  to  our  view; and, en- 
deavouring to  correct  these  by  reason,  we  are  insensibly 
drawn  into  uncouth  paradoxes,  difficulties,  and  incon- 
sistencies, which  multiply  and  grow  upon  us  as  we  ad- 
vance in  speculation,  till  at  length,  having  wandered 
through  many  intricate  mazes,  we  find  ourselves  just 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

where  we  were,  or,  which  is  worse,  sit  clown  in  a  for- 
lorn Scepticism. 

2.  The  cause  of  this  is  thought  to  be  the  obscurity 
of  things,  or  the  natural  weakness  and  imperfection  of 
our  understandings.  It  is  said,  the  faculties  we  have 
arc  few,  and  those  designed  by  nature  for  the  support 
and  comfort  of  life,  and  not  to  penetrate  into  the  in- 
ward essence  and  constitution  of  things.  Besides,  the 
mind  of  man  being  finite,  when  it  treats  of  things 
which  partake  of  infinity,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
if  it  run  into  absurdities  and  contradictions,  out  of 
which  it  is  impossible  it  should  ever  extricate  itself,  it 
being  of  the  nature  of  infinite  not  to  be  comprehended 
by  that  which  is  finite. 

3.  But,  perhaps,  we  may  be  too  partial  to  ourselves 
in  placing  the  fault  originally  in  our  faculties,  and  not 
rather  in  the  wrong  use  we  make  of  them.  It  is  a  hard 
thing  to  suppose  that  right  deductions  from  true  prin- 
ciples should  ever  end  in  consequences  which  cannot 
be  maintained  or  made  consistent.  We  should  believe 
that  God  has  dealt  more  bountifully  with  the  sons  of 
men  than  to  give  them  a  strong  desire  for  that  know- 
ledge which  he  had  placed  quite  out  of  their  reach. 
This  were  not  agreeable  to  the  wonted  indulgent  meth- 
ods of  Providence,  which,  whatever  appetites  it  may 
have  implanted  in  the  creatures,  doth  usually  furnish 
them  with  such  means  as,  if  rightly  made  use  of,  will 
not  fail  to  satisfy  them.  Upon  the  whole,  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that  the  far  greater  part,  if  not  all,  of 
those  difficulties  which  have  hitherto  amused  philos- 
ophers, and  blocked  up  the  way  to  knowledge,  are  en- 
tirely owing  to  ourselves — that  we  have  first  raised  a 
dust  and  then  complain  we  cannot  see. 

4.  My  purpose  therefore  is,  to  try  if  I  can  discover 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

what  those  Principles  are  which  have  introduced  all 
that  doubtfulness  and  uncertainty,  those  absurdities 
and  contradictions,  into  the  several  sects  of  philosophy ; 
insomuch  that  the  wisest  men  have  thought  our  igno- 
rance incurable,  conceiving  it  to  arise  from  the  natural 
dulness  and  limitation  of  our  faculties.  And  surely 
it  is  a  work  well  deserving  our  pains  to  make  a  strict 
inquiry  concerning  the  First  Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge,  to  sift  and  examine  them  on  all  sides, 
especially  since  there  may  be  some  grounds  to  suspect 
that  those  lets  and  difficulties,  which  stay  and  em- 
barrass the  mind  in  its  search  after  truth,  do  not  spring 
from  any  darkness  and  intricacy  in  the  objects,  or  na- 
tural defect  in  the  understanding,  so  much  as  from 
false  Principles  which  have  been  insisted  on,  and  might 
have  been  avoided. 

5.  How  difficult  and  discouraging  soever  this  at- 
tempt may  seem,  when  I  consider  how  many  great  and 
extraordinary  men  have  gone  before  me  in  the  like 
designs,  yet  I  am  not  without  some  hopes — upon  the 
consideration  that  the  largest  views  are  not  always  the 
clearest,  and  that  he  who  is  short-sighted  will  be 
obliged  to  draw  the  object  nearer,  and  may,  perhaps, 
by  a  close  and  narrow  survey,  discern  that  which  had 
escaped  far  better  eyes. 

6.  In  order  to  prepare  the  mind  of  the  reader  for 
the  easier  conceiving  what  follows,  it  is  proper  to 
premise  somewhat,  by  way  of  Introduction,  concerning 
the  nature  and  abuse  of  Language.  But  the  unravel- 
ling this  matter  leads  me  in  some  measure  to  anticipate 
my  design,  by  taking  notice  of  what  seems  to  have  had 
a  chief  part  in  rendering  speculation  intricate  and  per- 
plexed, and  to  have  occasioned  innumerable  errors  and 
difficulties  in  almost  all  parts  of  knowledge.    And  that 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

is  the  opinion  that  the  mind  hath  a  power  of  framing 
abstract  ideas  or  notions  of  things.  He  who  is  not  a 
perfect  stranger  to  the  writings  and  disputes  of  philos- 
ophers must  needs  acknowledge  that  no  small  part  of 
them  arc  spent  about  abstract  ideas.  These  are  in  a 
more  especial  manner  thought  to  be  the  object  of  those 
sciences  which  go  by  the  name  of  Logic  and  Meta- 
physics, and  of  all  that  which  passes  under  the  notion 
of  the  most  abstracted  and  sublime  learning,  in  all 
which  one  shall  scarce  find  any  question  handled  in 
such  a  manner  as  does  not  suppose  their  existence  in 
the  mind,  and  that  it  is  well  acquainted  with  them. 

7.  It  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  the  qualities  or 
modes  of  things  do  never  really  exist  each  of  them 
apart  by  itself,  and  separated  from  all  others,  but  are 
mixed,  as  it  were,  and  blended  together,  several  in  the 
same  object.  But,  we  are  told,  the  mind  being  able  to 
consider  each  quality  singly,  or  abstracted  from  those 
other  qualities  with  which  it  is  united,  does  by  that 
means  frame  to  itself  abstract  ideas.  For  example, 
there  is  perceived  by  sight  an  object  extended,  col- 
oured, and  moved :  this  mixed  or  compound  idea  the 
mind  resolving  into  its  simple,  constituent  parts,  and 
viewing  each  by  itself,  exclusive  of  the  rest,  does  frame 
the  abstract  ideas  of  extension,  colour,  and  motion. 
Not  that  it  is  possible  for  colour  or  motion  to  exist 
without  extension  ;  but  only  that  the  mind  can  frame  to 
itself  by  abstraction  the  idea  of  colour  exclusive  of 
extension,  and  of  motion  exclusive  of  both  colour  and 
extension. 

8.  Again,  the  mind  having  observed  that  in  the  par- 
ticular extensions  perceived  by  sense  there  is  some- 
thing common  and  alike  in  all,  and  some  other  things 
peculiar,  as  this  or  that  figure  or  magnitude,  which 


INTRODUCTION.  g 

distinguish  them  one  from  another ;  it  considers  apart 
or  singles  out  by  itself  that  which  is  common,  making 
thereof  a  most  abstract  idea  of  extension,  which  is 
neither  line,  surface,  nor  solid,  nor  has  any  figure  or 
magnitude,  but  is  an  idea  entirely  prescinded  from  all 
these.  So  likewise  the  mind,  by  leaving  out  of  the 
particular  colours  perceived  by  sense  that  which  dis- 
tinguishes them  one  from  another,  and  retaining  that 
only  which  is  common  to  all,  makes  an  idea  of  colour 
in  abstract  which  is  neither  red,  nor  blue,  nor  white, 
nor  any  other  determinate  colour.  And,  in  like  man- 
ner, by  considering  motion  abstractedly  not  only  from 
the  body  moved,  but  likewise  from  the  figure  it  de- 
scribes, and  all  particular  directions  and  velocities,  the 
abstract  idea  of  motion  is  framed ;  which  equally  cor- 
responds to  all  particular  motions  whatsoever  that  may 
be  perceived  by  sense. 

9.  And  as  the  mind  frames  to  itself  abstract  ideas 
of  qualities  or  modes,  so  does  it,  by  the  same  precision 
or  mental  separation,  attain  abstract  ideas  of  the  more 
compounded  beings  which  include  several  coexistent 
qualities.  For  example,  the  mind  having  observed 
that  Peter,  James,  and  John  resemble  each  other  in 
certain  common  agreements  of  shape  and  other  quali- 
ties, leaves  out  of  the  complex  or  compounded  idea 
it  has  of  Peter,  James,  and  any  other  particular  man, 
that  which  is  peculiar  to  each,  retaining  only  what  is 
common  to  all,  and  so  makes  an  abstract  idea  wherein 
all  the  particulars  equally  partake — abstracting  en- 
tirely from  and  cutting  off  all  those  circumstances  and 
differences  which  might  determine  it  to  any  particular 
existence.  And  after  this  manner  it  is  said  we  come 
by  the  abstract  idea  of  man,  or,  if  you  please,  human- 
ity, or  human  nature ;  wherein  it  is  true  there  is  in- 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

eluded  colour,  because  there  is  no  man  but  has  some 
colour,  but  then  it  can  be  neither  white,  nor  black,  nor 
any  particular  colour,  because  there  is  no  one  particular 
colour  wherein  all  men  partake.  So  likewise  there  is  in- 
cluded stature,  but  then  it  is  neither  tall  stature,  nor 
low  stature,  nor  yet  middle  stature,  but  something 
abstracted  from  all  these.  And  so  of  the  rest.  More- 
over, their  being  a  great  variety  of  other  creatures 
that  partake  in  some  parts,  but  not  all,  of  the  complex 
idea  of  man,  the  mind,  leaving  out  those  parts  which 
are  peculiar  to  men,  and  retaining  those  only  which 
are  common  to  all  the  living  creatures,  frames  the 
idea  of  animal,  which  abstracts  not  only  from  all  par- 
ticular men,  but  also  all  birds,  beasts,  fishes,  and  in- 
sects. The  constituent  parts  of  the  abstract  idea  of 
animal  are  body,  life,  sense,  and  spontaneous  motion. 
By  body  is  meant  body  without  any  particular  shape 
or  figure,  there  being  no  one  shape  or  figure  common 
to  all  animals,  without  covering,  either  of  hair,  or 
feathers,  or  scales,  &c.,  nor  yet  naked :  hair,  feathers, 
scales,  and  nakedness  being  the  distinguishing  prop- 
erties of  particular  animals,  and  for  that  reason  left 
out  of  the  abstract  idea.  Upon  the  same  account  the 
spontaneous  motion  must  be  neither  walking,  nor  fly- 
ing, nor  creeping;  it  is  nevertheless  a  motion,  but 
what  that  motion  is  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive. 

lo.  Whether  others  have  this  wonderful  faculty 
of  abstracting  their  ideas,  they  best  can  tell :  for  my- 
self [I  dare  be  confident  I  have  it  not],*  I  find  indeed 
I  have  a  faculty  of  imagining,  or  representing  to  my- 
self, the  ideas  of  those  particular  things  I  have  per- 

*The  bracketed  words  were  omitted  in  the  second  edition 
(1734). 


INTRODUCTION.  ii 

ceived,  and  of  variously  compounding  and  dividing 
them.  I  can  imagine  a  man  with  two  heads,  or  the 
upper  parts  of  a  man  joined  to  the  body  of  a  horse. 
I  can  consider  the  hand,  the  eye,  the  nose,  each  by 
itself  abstracted  or  separated  from  the  rest  of  the 
body.  But  then  whatever  hand  or  eye  I  imagine,  it 
must  have  some  particular  shape  and  colour.  Likewise 
the  idea  of  man  that  I  frame  to  myself  must  be  either 
of  a  white,  or  a  black,  or  a  tawny,  a  straight,  or  a 
crooked,  a  tall,  or  a  low,  or  a  middle-sized  man.  I 
cannot  by  any  effort  of  thought  conceive  the  abstract 
idea  above  described.  And  it  is  equally  impossible 
for  me  to  form  the  abstract  idea  of  motion  distinct 
from  the  body  moving,  and  which  is  neither  swift  nor 
slow,  curvilinear  nor  rectilinear ;  and  the  like  may  be 
said  of  all  other  abstract  general  ideas  whatsoever. 
To  be  plain,  I  own  myself  able  to  abstract  in  one  sense, 
as  when  I  consider  some  particular  parts  or  qualities 
separated  from  others,  with  which,  though  they  are 
united  in  some  object,  yet  it  is  possible  they  may  really 
exist  without  them.  But  I  deny  that  I  can  abstract 
from  one  another,  or  conceive  separately,  those  quali- 
ties which  it  is  impossible  should  exist  so  separated ; 
or  that  I  can  frame  a  general  notion,  by  abstracting 
from  particulars  in  the  manner  aforesaid — which  last 
are  the  two  proper  acceptations  of  abstraction.  And 
there  are  grounds  to  think  most  men  will  acknowledge 
themselves  to  be  in  my  case.  The  generality  of  men 
which  are  simple  and  illiterate  never  pretend  to  ab- 
stract notions.  It  is  said  they  are  difficult  and  not  to 
be  attained  without  pains  and  study ;  we  may  therefore 
reasonably  conclude  that,  if  such  there  be,  they  are 
confined  only  to  the  learned. 

II.     I  proceed  to  examine  what  can  be  alleged  in 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

defence  of  the  doctrine  of  abstraction,  and  try  if  I  can 
discover  what  it  is  that  inclines  the  men  of  speculation 
to  cinhrace  an  opinion  so  remote  from  common  sense 
as  that  seems  to  be.  There  has  been  a  late  deservedly 
esteemed  jihilosopher  who,  no  doubt,  has  given  it  very 
nmch  countenance,  by  seeming  to  think  the  having 
abstract  general  ideas  is  what  puts  the  widest  differ- 
ence in  point  of  understanding  betwixt  man  and  beast. 
"The  having  of  general  ideas,"  saith  he,  "is  that 
which  puts  a  perfect  distinction  betwixt  man  and 
brutes,  and  is  an  excellency  which  the  faculties  of 
brutes  do  by  no  means  attain  unto.  For,  it  is  evident 
we  observe  no  foot-steps  in  them  of  making  use  of 
general  signs  for  universal  ideas ;  from  which  we 
have  reason  to  imagine  that  they  have  not  the  faculty 
of  abstracting,  or  making  general  ideas,  since  they 
have  no  use  of  words  or  any  other  general  signs." 
And  a  little  after:  "Therefore,  I  think,  we  may  sup- 
pose that  it  is  in  this  that  the  species  of  brutes  are 
discriminated  from  men,  and  it  is  that  proper  differ- 
ence wherein  they  are  wholly  separated,  and  which 
at  last  widens  to  so  wide  a  distance.  For,  if  they  have 
any  ideas  at  all,  and  are  not  bare  machines  (as  some 
would  have  them),  we  cannot  deny  them  to  have  some 
reason.  It  seems  as  evident  to  me  that  they  do,  some 
of  them,  in  certain  instances  reason  as  that  they  have 
sense;  but  it  is  only  in  particular  ideas,  just  as  they 
receive  them  from  their  senses.  They  are  the  best  of 
them  tied  up  within  those  narrow  bounds,  and  have  not 
(as  I  think)  the  faculty  to  enlarge  them  by  any  kind 
of  abstraction." — "Essay  on  Human  Understanding," 
B.  ii.  ch.  II.  s.io  and  ii.  I  readily  agree  with  this 
learned  author,  that  the  faculties  of  brutes  can  by  no 
means  attain  to  abstraction.    But  then  if  this  be  made 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

the  distinguishing  property  of  that  sort  of  animals, 
I  fear  a  great  many  of  those  that  pass  for  men  must 
be  reckoned  into  their  number.  The  reason  that  is 
here  assigned  why  we  have  no  grounds  to  think  brutes 
have  abstract  general  ideas  is,  that  we  observe  in  them 
no  use  of  words  or  any  other  general  signs ;  which  is 
built  on  this  supposition — that  the  making  use  of  words 
implies  the  having  general  ideas.  From  which  it  fol- 
lows that  men  who  use  language  are  able  to  abstract 
or  generalize  their  ideas.  That  this  is  the  sense  and 
arguing  of  the  author  will  further  appear  by  his  an- 
swering the  question  he  in  another  place  puts:  "Since 
all  things  that  exist  are  only  particulars,  how  come  we 
by  general  terms?"  His  answer  is:  "Words  become 
general  by  being  made  the  signs  of  general  ideas." — 
"Essay  on  Human  Understanding,"  B.  iii.  ch.  3  s.  6. 
But*  it  seems  that  a  word  becomes  general  by  being 
made  the  sign,  not  of  an  abstract  general  idea,  but  of 
several  particular  ideas,  any  one  of  which  it  indiffer- 
ently suggests  to  the  mind.  For  example,  when  it  is 
said  "the  change  of  motion  is  proportional  to  the  im- 
pressed force,"  or  that  "whatever  has  extension  is 
divisible,"  these  propositions  are  to  be  understood  of 
motion  and  extension  in  general ;  and  nevertheless  it 
will  not  follow  that  they  suggest  to  my  thoughts  an 
idea  of  motion  without  a  body  moved,  or  any  determi- 
nate direction  and  velocity,  or  that  I  must  conceive 
an  abstract  general  idea  of  extension,  which  is  neither 
line,  surface,  nor  solid,  neither  great  nor  small,  black, 
white,  nor  red,  nor  of  any  other  determinate  colour. 


*In  the  first  edition  (1710)  this  sentence  began  as  follows: 
"To  this  I  cannot  assent  being  of  opinion  that  a  word  becomes 
general,"  &c. 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

It  is  only  implied  that  whatever  particular  motion  I 
consider,  whether  it  be  swift  or  slow,  perpendicular, 
horizontal,  or  oblique,  or  in  whatever  object,  the  ax- 
iom concerning  it  holds  equally  true.  As  does  the 
other  of  every  particular  extension,  it  matters  not 
whether  line,  surface,  or  solid,  whether  of  this  or  that 
magnitude  or  figure. 

12.  By  observing  how  ideas  become  general  we  may 
the  better  judge  how  words  are  made  so.  And  here 
it  is  to  be  noted  that  I  do  not  deny  absolutely  there 
are  general  ideas,  but  only  that  there  are  any  abstract 
general  ideas ;  for,  in  the  passages  we  have  quoted 
wherein  there  is  mention  of  general  ideas,  it  is  always 
supposed  that  they  are  formed  by  abstraction,  after 
the  manner  set  forth  in  sections  8  and  9.  Now,  if  we 
will  annex  a  meaning  to  our  words,  and  speak  only  of 
what  we  can  conceive,  I  believe  we  shall  acknowledge 
that  an  idea  which,  considered  in  itself,  is  particular, 
becomes  general  by  being  made  to  represent  or  stand 
for  all  other  particular  ideas  of  the  same  sort.  To 
make  this  plain  by  an  example,  suppose  a  geometrician 
is  demonstrating  the  method  of  cutting  a  line  in  two 
equal  parts.  He  draws,  for  instance,  a  black  line  of 
an  inch  in  length :  this,  which  in  itself  is  a  particular 
line,  is  nevertheless  with  regard  to  its  signification 
general,  since,  as  it  is  there  used,  it  represents  all  par- 
ticular lines  whatsoever ;  so  that  what  is  demonstrated 
of  it  is  demonstrated  of  all  lines,  or,  in  other  words, 
of  a  line  in  general.  And,  as  that  particular  line  be- 
comes general  by  being  made  a  sign,  so  the  name 
"line,"  which  taken  absolutely  is  particular,  by  being  a 
sign  is  made  general.  And  as  the  former  owes  its  gen- 
erality not  to  its  being  the  sign  of  an  abstract  or  gen- 
eral line,  but  of  all  particular  right  lines  that  may  pos- 


INTRODUCTION.  iS 

sibly  exist,  so  the  latter  must  be  thought  to  derive  its 
generahty  from  the  same  cause,  namely,  the  various 
particular  lines  which  it  indifferently  denotes. 

13.  To  give  the  reader  a  yet  clearer  view  of  the 
nature  of  abstract  ideas,  and  the  uses  they  are  thought 
necessary  to,  I  shall  add  one  more  passage  out  of  the 
"Essay  on  Human  Understanding,"  which  is  as  fol- 
lows:  "Abstract  ideas  are  not  so  obvious  or  easy  to 
children  or  the  yet  unexercised  mind  as  particular  ones. 
If  they  seem  so  to  grown  men  it  is  only  because  by 
constant  and  familiar  use  they  are  made  so.  For,  when 
we  nicely  reflect  upon  them,  we  shall  find  that  general 
ideas  are  fictions  and  contrivances  of  the  mind,  that 
carry  difficulty  with  them,  and  do  not  so  easily  offer 
themselves  as  we  are  apt  to  imagine.  For  example, 
does  it  not  require  some  pains  and  skill  to  form  the 
general  idea  of  a  triangle  (which  is  yet  none  of  the 
most  abstract,  comprehensive,  and  difficult)  ;  for  it 
must  be  neither  oblique  nor  rectangle,  neither  equilat- 
eral, equicrural,  nor  scalenon,  but  all  and  none  of  these 
at  once?  In  effect,  it  is  something  imperfect  that  can- 
not exist,  an  idea  wherein  some  parts  of  several  dif- 
ferent and  inconsistent  ideas  are  put  together.  It  is 
true  the  mind  in  this  imperfect  state  has  need  of  such 
ideas,  ancj  makes  all  the  haste  to  them  it  can,  for  the 
conveniency  of  communication  and  enlargement  of 
knowledge,  to  both  which  it  is  naturally  very  much 
inclined.  But  yet  one  has  reason  to  suspect  such  ideas 
are  marks  of  our  imperfection.  At  least  this  is  enough 
to  show  that  the  most  abstract  and  general  ideas  are 
not  those  that  the  mind  is  first  and  most  easily  ac- 
quainted with,  nor  such  as  its  earliest  knowledge  is 
conversant  about." — B.  iv.  ch.  7.  s.  9.  If  any  man  has 
the  faculty  of  framing  in  his  mind  such  an  idea  of  a 


i6  INTRODUCTION. 

triangle  as  is  here  described,  it  is  in  vain  to  pretend 
to  dispute  him  out  of  it,  nor  would  I  go  about  it.  All 
I  desire  is  that  the  reader  would  fully  and  certainly 
inform  himself  whether  he  has  such  an  idea  or  no. 
And  this,  methinks,  can  be  no  hard  task  for  anyone  to 
perform.  What  more  easy  than  for  anyone  to  look  a 
little  into  his  own  thoughts,  and  there  try  whether  he 
has,  or  can  attain  to  have,  an  idea  that  shall  correspond 
with  the  description  that  is  here  given  of  the  general 
idea  of  a  triangle,  which  is  "neither  oblique  nor  rec- 
tangle, equilateral,  equicrural  nor  scalenon,  but  all  and 
none  of  these  at  once  ?" 

14.  Much  is  here  said  of  the  difficulty  that  abstract 
ideas  carry  with  them,  and  the  pains  and  skill  requisite 
to  the  forming  them.  And  it  is  on  all  hands  agreed 
that  there  is  need  of  great  toil  and  labour  of  the  mind, 
to  emancipate  our  thoughts  from  particular  objects, 
and  raise  them  to  those  sublime  speculations  that  are 
conversant  about  abstract  ideas.  From  all  which  the 
natural  consequence  should  seem  to  be,  that  so  difficult 
a  thing  as  the  forming  abstract  ideas  was  not  neces- 
sary for  communication,  which  is  so  easy  and  familiar 
to  all  sorts  of  men.  But,  we  are  told,  if  they  seem 
obvious  and  easy  to  grown  men,  it  is  only  because  by 
constant  and  familiar  use  they  are  made  so.  Now,  I 
would  fain  know  at  what  time  it  is  men  are  employed 
in  surmounting  that  difficulty,  and  furnishing  them- 
selves with  those  necessary  helps  for  discourse.  It 
cannot  be  when  they  are  grown  up,  for  then  it  seems 
they  are  not  conscious  of  any  such  painstaking;  it 
remains  therefore  to  be  the  business  of  their  childhood. 
And  surely  the  great  and  multiplied  labour  of  fram- 
ing abstract  notions  will  be  found  a  hard  task  for  that 
tender  age.    Is  it  not  a  hard  thing  to  imagine  that  a 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

couple  of  children  cannot  prate  together  of  their  sugar- 
plums and  rattles  and  the  rest  of  their  little  trinkets, 
till  they  have  first  tacked  together  numberless  incon- 
sistencies, and  so  framed  in  their  minds  abstract  gen- 
eral ideas,  and  annexed  them  to  every  common  name 
they  make  use  of? 

15.  Nor  do  I  think  them  a  whit  more  needful  for 
the  enlargement  of  knowledge  than  for  communication. 
It  is,  I  know,  a  point  much  insisted  on,  that  all  knowl- 
edge and  demonstration  are  about  universal  notions, 
to  which  I  fully  agree :  but  then  it  doth  not  appear  to 
me  that  those  notions  are  formed  by  abstraction  in  the 
manner  premised — universality,  so  far  as  I  can  com- 
prehend, not  consisting  in  the  absolute,  positive  nature 
or  conception  of  anything,  but  in  the  relation  it  bears 
to  the  particulars  signified  or  represented  by  it ;  by 
virtue  whereof  it  is  that  things,  names,  or  notions, 
being  in  their  own  nature  particular,  are  rendered  uni- 
versal. Thus,  when  I  demonstrate  any  proposition 
concerning  triangles,  it  is  to  be  supposed  that  I  have 
in  view  the  universal  idea  of  a  triangle ;  which  ought 
not  to  be  understood  as  if  I  could  frame  an  idea  of  a 
triangle  which  was  neither  equilateral,  nor  scalenon, 
nor  equicrural ;  but  only  that  the  particular  triangle  I 
consider,  whether  of  this  or  that  Sorjt  it  matters  not, 
doth  equally  stand  for  and  represent  all  rectilinear  tri- 
angles whatsoever,  and  is  in  that  sense  universal.  All 
which  seems  very  plain  and  not  to  include  any  diffi- 
culty in  it. 

16.  But  here  it  will  be  demanded,  how  we  can  know 
any  proposition  to  be  true  of  all  particular  triangles, 
except  we  have  first  seen  it  demonstrated  of  the  ab- 
stract idea  of  a  triangle  which  equally  agrees  to  all  ? 
For,  because  a  property  may  be  demonstrated  to  agree 


i8  INTRODUCTION. 

to  some  one  particular  triangle,  it  will  not  thence  fol- 
low that  it  equally  belongs  to  any  other  triangle,  which 
in  all  respects  is  not  the  same  with  it.  For  example, 
having  demonstrated  that  the  three  angles  of  an  iso- 
celes  rectangular  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  ones, 
I  cannot  therefore  conclude  this  affection  agrees  to  all 
other  triangles  which  have  neither  a  right  angle  nor 
two  equal  sides.  It  seems  therefore  that,  to  be  certain 
this  proposition  is  universally  true,  we  must  either 
make  a  particular  demonstration  for  every  particular 
triangle,  which  is  impossible,  or  once  for  all  demon- 
strate it  of  the  abstract  idea  of  a  triangle,  in  which  all 
the  particulars  do  indifferently  partake  and  by  which 
they  are  all  equally  represented.  To  which  I  answer, 
that,  though  the  idea  I  have  in  view  whilst  I  make  the 
demonstration  be,  for  instance,  that  of  an  isosceles 
rectangular  triangle  whose  sides  are  of  a  determinate 
length,  I  may  nevertheless  be  certain  it  extends  to  all 
other  rectilinear  triangles,  of  what  sort  or  bigness 
soever.  And  that  because  neither  the  right  angle,  nor 
the  equality,  nor  determinate  length  of  the  sides  are  at 
all  concerned  in  the  demonstration.  It  is  true  the  dia- 
gram I  have  in  view  includes  all  these  particulars,  but 
then  there  is  not  the  least  mention  made  of  them  in  the 
proof  of  the  proposition.  It  is  not  said  the  three  angles 
are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  because  one  of  them  is  a 
right  angle,  or  because  the  sides  comprehending  it  are 
of  the  same  length.  Which  sufficiently  shows  that  the 
right  angle  might  have  been  oblique,  and  the  sides  un- 
equal, and  for  all  that  the  demonstration  have  held 
good.  And  for  this  reason  it  is  that  I  conclude  that 
to  be  true  of  any  obliquangular  or  scalenon  which  I 
had  demonstrated  of  a  particular  right-angled  equi- 
crural  triangle,  and  not  because  I  demonstrated  the 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

proposition  of  the  abstract  idea  of  a  triangle.  [And 
here  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  a  man  may  consider 
a  figure  merely  as  triangular,  without  attending  to  the 
particular  qualities  of  the  angles,  or  relations  of  the 
sides.  So  far  he  may  abstract ;  but  this  will  never 
prove  that  he  can  frame  an  abstract,  general,  incon- 
sistent idea  of  a  triangle.  In  like  manner  we  may  con- 
sider Peter  so  far  forth  as  man,  or  so  far  forth  as  ani- 
mal, without  framing  the  forementioned  abstract  idea, 
either  of  man  or  of  animal,  inasmuch  as  all  that  is  per- 
ceived is  not  considered.*] 

17.  It  were  an  endless  as  well  as  an  useless  thing  to 
trace  the  Schoolmen,  those  great  masters  of  abstrac- 
tion, through  all  the  manifold  inextricable  labyrinths 
of  error  and  dispute  which  their  doctrine  of  abstract 
natures  and  notions  seems  to  have  led  them  into.  What 
bickerings  and  controversies,  and  what  a  learned  dust 
have  been  raised  about  those  matters,  and  what  mighty 
advantage  has  been  from  thence  derived  to  mankind, 
are  things  at  this  day  too  clearly  known  to  need  being 
insisted  on.  And  it  had  been  well  if  the  ill  effects  of 
that  doctrine  were  confined  to  those  only  who  make  the 
most  avowed  profession  of  it.  When  men  consider  the 
great  pains,  industry,  and  parts  that  have  for  so  many 
ages  been  laid  out  on  the  cultivation  and  advancement 
of  the  sciences,  and  that  notwithstanding  all  this  the  far 
greater  part  of  them  remains  full  of  darkness  and  un- 
certainty, and  disputes  that  are  like  never  to  have  an 
end,  and  even  those  that  are  thought  to  be  supported 
by  the  most  clear  and  cogent  demonstrations  contain 
in  them  paradoxes  which  are  perfectly  irreconcilable 

*The  bracketed  sentences  were  inserted  in  the  last  or  1734 
edition. 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

to  the  understandings  of  men,  and  that,  taking  all  to- 
gether, a  very  small  portion  of  them  does  supply  any 
real  benefit  to  mankind,  otherwise  than  by  being  an 
innocent  diversion  and  amusement — I  say  the  consider- 
ation of  all  this  is  apt  to  throw  them  into  a  despondency 
and  perfect  contempt  of  all  study.  But  this  may  per- 
haps cease  upon  a  view  of  the  false  principles  that  have 
obtained  in  the  world,  amongst  all  which  there  is  none, 
mcthinks,  hath  a  more  wide  and  extended  sway  over 
the  thoughts  of  speculative  men  than  this  of  abstract 
general  ideas. 

i8.  I  come  now  to  consider  the  source  of  this  pre- 
vailing notion,  and  that  seems  to  me  to  be  language. 
And  surely  nothing  of  less  extent  than  reason  itself 
could  have  been  the  source  of  an  opinion  so  universally 
received.  The  truth  of  this  appears  as  from  other 
reasons  so  also  from  the  plain  confession  of  the  ablest 
patrons  of  abstract  ideas,  who  acknowledge  that  they 
are  made  in  order  to  naming ;  from  which  it  is  a  clear 
consequence  that  if  there  had  been  no  such  thing  as 
speech  or  universal  signs  there  never  had  been  any 
thought  of  abstraction.  See  B.  iii,  ch.  6,  s.  39,  and 
elsewhere  of  the  "Essay  on  Human  Understanding." 
Let  us  examine  the  manner  wherein  words  have  con- 
tributed to  the  origin  of  that  mistake. — First  then,  it 
is  thought  that  every  name  has.  or  ought  to  have,  one 
only  precise  and  settled  signification,  which  inclines 
men  to  think  there  are  certain  abstract,  determinate  ideas 
that  constitute  the  true  and  only  immediate  signification 
of  each  general  name ;  and  that  it  is  by  the  mediation 
of  these  abstract  ideas  that  a  general  name  comes  to 
signify  any  particular  thing.  Whereas,  in  truth,  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  one  precise  and  definite  significa- 
tion annexed  to  any  general  name,  they  all  signifying 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

indifferently  a  great  number  of  particular  ideas.  All 
which  doth  evidently  follow  from  what  has  been  already 
said,  and  will  clearly  appear  to  anyone  by  a  little  reflex- 
ion. To  this  it  will  be  objected  that  every  name  that  has 
a  definition  is  thereby  restrained  to  one  certain  significa- 
tion. For  example,  a  triangle  is  defined  to  be  *'a  plain 
surface  comprehended  by  three  right  lines,"  by  which 
that  name  is  limited  to  denote  one  certain  idea  and  no 
other.  To  which  I  answer,  that"  in  the  definition  it  is 
not  said  whether  the  surface  be  great  or  small,  black 
or  white,  nor  whether  the  sides  are  long  or  short,  equal 
or  unequal,  nor  with  what  angles  they  are  inclined  to 
each  other ;  in  all  which  there  may  be  great  variety,  and 
consequently  there  is  no  one  settled  idea  which  limits 
the  signification  of  the  word  triangle.  It  is  one  thing 
for  to  keep  a  name  constantly  to  the  same  definition, 
and  another  ito  make  it  stand  everywhere  for  the  same 
idea ;  the  one  is  necessary,  the  other  useless  and  im- 
practicable. 

19.  But,  to  give  a  farther  account  how  words  came 
to  produce  the  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas,  it  must  be 
observed  that  it  is  a  received  opinion  that  language  has 
no  other  end  but  the  communicating  our  ideas,  and  that 
every  significant  name  stands  for  an  idea.  This  being 
so,  and  it  being  withal  certain  that  names  which  yet  are 
not  thought  altogether  insignificant  do  not  always  mark 
out  particular  conceivable  ideas,  it  is  straightway  con- 
cluded that  they  stand  for  abstract  notions.  That  there 
are  many  names  in  use  amongst  speculative  men  which 
do  not  always  suggest  to  others  determinate,  particular 
ideas,  or  in  truth  anything  at  all,  is  what  nobody  will 
deny.  And  a  little  attention  will  discover  that  it  is  not 
necessary  (even  in  the  strictest  reasonings)  significant 
names  which  stand  for  ideas  should,  every  time  they  are 


22  INTRODUCTION. 

tiscd,  excite  in  the  understanding  the  ideas  they  are 
made  to  stand  for — in  reading  and  discoursing,  names 
being  for  the  most  part  used  as  letters  are  in  Algebra, 
in  which,  though  a  particular  quantity  be  marked  by 
each  letter,  yet  to  proceed  right  it  is  not  requisite  that 
in  every  step  each  letter  suggest  to  your  thoughts  that 
particular  quantity  it  was  appointed  to  stand  for. 

20.  Besides,  the  communicating  of  ideas  marked  by 
words  is  not  the  chief  and  only  end  of  language,  as  is 
commonly  supposed.  There  are  other  ends,  as  the  rais- 
ing of  some  passion,  the  exciting  to  or  deterring  from, 
an  action,  the  putting  the  mind  in  some  particular  dis- 
position— to  which  the  former  is  in  many  cases  barely 
subservient,  and  sometimes  entirely  omitted,  when  these 
can  be  obtained  without  it,  as  I  think  does  not  unfre- 
quently  happen  in  the  familiar  use  of  language.  I 
entreat  the  reader  to  reflect  with  himself,  and  see  if  it 
doth  not  often  happen,  either  in  hearing  or  reading  a 
discourse,  that  the  passions  of  fear,  love,  hatred,  ad- 
miration, disdain,  and  the  like,  arise  immediately  in  his 
mind  upon  the  perception  of  certain  words,  without  any 
ideas  coming  between.  At  first,  indeed,  the  words 
might  have  occasioned  ideas  that  were  fitting  to  produce 
those  emotions ;  but,  if  I  mistake  not,  it  will  be  found 
that,  when  language  is  once  grown  familiar,  the  hearing 
of  the  sounds  or  sight  of  the  characters  is  oft  immedi- 
ately attended  with  those  passions  which  at  first  were 
wont  to  be  produced  by  the  intervention  of  ideas  that 
are  now  quite  omitted.  May  we  not,  for  example,  be 
aflfected  with  the  promise  of  a  good  thing,  though  we 
have  not  an  idea  of  what  it  is?  Or  is  not  the  being 
threatened  with  danger  sufficient  to  excite  a  dread, 
though  we  think  not  of  any  particular  evil  likely  to  befal 
us,  nor  yet  frame  to  ourselves  an  idea  of  danger  in  ab- 


INTRODUCTION.  23 

stract?  If  any  one  shall  join  ever  so  little  reflexion  of 
his  own  to  what  has  been  said,  I  believe  that  it  will 
evidently  appear  to  him  that  general  names  are  often 
used  in  the  propriety  of  language  without  the  speaker's 
designing  them  for  marks  of  ideas  in  his  own,  which 
he  would  have  them  raise  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer. 
Even  proper  names  themselves  do  not  seem  always 
spoken  with  a  design  to  bring  into  our  view  the  ideas 
of  those  individuals  that  are  supposed  to  be  marked  by 
them.  For  example,  when  a  schoolman  tells  me 
"Aristotle  hath  said  it,"  all  I  conceive  he  means  by  it 
is  to  dispose  me  to  embrace  his  opinion  with  the  defer- 
ence and  submission  which  custom  has  annexed  to  that 
name.  And  this  effect  is  often  so  instantly  produced 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  are  accustomed  to  resign 
their  judgment  to  authority  of  that  philosopher,  as  it 
is  impossible  any  idea  either  of  his  person,  writings,  or 
reputation  should  go  before.  [So  close  and  immediate  a 
connexion  may  custom  establish  betwixt  the  very  word 
Aristotle  and  the  motions  of  assent  and  reverence  in  the 
minds  of  some  men.]*  Innumerable  examples  of  this 
kind  may  be  given,  but  why  should  I  insist  on  those 
things  which  every  one's  experience  will,  I  doubt  not, 
plentifully  suggest  unto  him? 

21.  We  have,  I  think,  shewn  the  impossibility  of 
Abstract  Ideas.  We  have  considered  what  has  been 
said  for  them  by  their  ablest  patrons ;  and  endeavored 
to  show  they  are  of  no  use  for  those  ends  to  which  they 
are  thought  necessary.  And  lastly,  we  have  traced 
them  to  the  source  from  whence  they  flow,  which  ap- 
pears evidently  to  be    language. — It  cannot  be  denied 


*The  bracketed  words  were  omitted  in  the  second  edition 
(1734)- 


24  INTRODUCTION. 

that  words  are  of  excellent  use,  in  that  by  their  means 
all  that  stock  of  knowlcdgcc  which  has  been  purchased 
by  the  joint  labours  of  inquisitive  men  in  all  ages  and 
nations  may  be  drawn  into  the  view  and  made  the  pos- 
session of  one  single  person.  [But  at  the  same  time  it 
must  be  owned  that  most  parts  of  knowledge  have  been 
strangely  perplexed  and  darkened  by  the  abuse  of 
words,  and  general  ways  of  speech  wherein  they  are 
delivered.  Since  therefore  words  are  so  apt  to  impose  on 
the  understanding,]*  whatever  ideas  I  consider,  I  shall 
endeavour  to  take  them  bare  and  naked  into  my  view, 
keeping  out  of  my  thoughts  so  far  as  I  am  able,  those 
names  which  long  and  constant  use  hath  so  strictly 
united  with  them ;  from  which  I  may  expect  to  derive 
the  following  advantages : — 

22.  First,  I  shall  be  sure  to  get  clear  of  all  contro- 
versies purely  verbal — the  springing  up  of  which  weeds 
in  almost  all  the  sciences  has  been  a  main  hindrance. to 
the  growth  of  true  and  sound  knowledge.  Secondly, 
this  seems  to  be  a  sure  way  to  extricate  myself  out  of 
that  fine  and  subtle  net  of  abstract  id&as  which  has  so 
miserably  perplexed  and  entangled  the  minds  of  men ; 
and  that  with  this  peculiar  circumstance,  that  by  how 
much  the  finer  and  more  curious  was  the  wit  of  any 
man,  by  so  much  the  deeper  was  he  likely  to  be  ensnared 
and  faster  held  therein.     Thirdly,  so  long  as  I  confine 

*In  the  first  edition  (1710)  the  bracketed  passage  read  as 
follows :  "But  most  parts  of  knowledge  have  been  so  strangely 
perplexed  and  darkened  by  the  abuse  of  words,  and  general 
ways  of  speech  wherein  they  are  delivered,  that  it  may  almost 
be  made  a  question  whether  language  has  contributed  more  to 
hindrance  or  advancement  of  the  sciences.  Since  therefore 
words  are  so  apt  to  impose  on  the  understanding,  I  am  re- 
solved in  my  inquiries  to  make  as  little  use  of  them  as  possi- 
bly I  can :  whatever  ideas  I  consider,"  &c. 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

my  thoughts  to  my  own  ideas  divested  of  words,  I  do 
not  see  how  I  can  easily  be  mistaken.  The  objects  I 
consider,  I  clearly  and  adequately  know.  I  cannot  be 
deceived  in  thinking  I  have  an  idea  which  I  have  not. 
It  is  not  possible  for  me  to  imagine  that  any  of  my  own 
ideas  are  alike  or  unlike  that  are  not  truly  so.  To  dis- 
cern the  agreements  or  disagreements  there  are  be- 
tween my  ideas,  to  see  what  ideas  are  included  in  any 
compound  idea  and  what  not,  there  is  nothing  more 
requisite  than  an  attentive  preception  of  what  passes  in 
my  own  understanding. 

23.  But  the  attainment  of  all  these  advantages  doth 
presuppose  an  entire  deliverance  from  the  deception  of 
words,  which  I  dare  hardly  promise  myself;  so  difficult 
a  thing  it  is  to  dissolve  an  union  so  early  begun,  and 
confirmed  by  so  long  a  habit  as  that  betwixt  words  and 
ideas.  Which  difficulty  seems  to  have  been  very  much 
increased  by  the  doctrine  of  abstraction.  For,  so  long 
as  men  thought  abstract  ideas  were  annexed  to  their 
words,  it  doth  not  seem  strange  ithat  they  should  use 
words  for  ideas — it  being  found  an  impracticable  thing 
to  lay  aside  the  word,  and  retain  the  abstract  idea  in  the 
mind,  which  in  itself  was  perfectly  inconceivable.  This 
seems  to  me  the  principal  cause  why  those  men  who 
have  so  emphatically  recommended  to  others  the  lay- 
ing aside  all  use  of  words  in  their  meditations,  and  con- 
templating their  bare  ideas,  have  yet  failed  to  perform 
it  themselves.  Of  late  many  have  been  very  sensible  of 
the  absurd  opinons  and  insignificant  disputes  which 
grow  out  of  the  abuse  of  words.  And,  in  order  to 
remedy  these  evils,  they  advise  well,  that  we  attend  to 
the  ideas  signified,  and  draw  off  our  attention  from  the 
words  which  signify  them.  But,  how  good  soever  this 
advice  may  be  they  have  given  others,  it  is  plain  they 


26  INTRODUCTION. 

could  not  have  a  due  regard  to  it  themselves,  so  long  as 
they  thought  the  only  immediate  use  of  words  was  to 
signify  ideas,  and  that  the  immediate  signification  of 
every  general  name  was  a  determinate  abstract  idea. 

24.  But,  these  being  known  to  be  mistakes,  a  man 
may  with  greater  ease  prevent  his  being  imposed  on  by 
words.  He  that  knows  he  has  no  other  than  particular 
ideas,  will  not  puzzle  himself  in  vain  to  find  out  and 
conceive  the  abstract  idea  annexed  to  any  name.  And 
he  that  knows  names  do  not  always  stand  for  ideas  will 
spare  himself  the  labour  of  looking  for  ideas  where 
there  are  none  to  be  had.  It  were,  therefore,  to  be 
wished  that  everyone  would  use  his  utmost  endeavours 
to  obtain  a  clear  view  of  the  ideas  he  would  consider, 
separating  from  them  all  that  dress  and  incumbrance 
of  words  which  so  much  contribute  to  blind  the  judg- 
ment and  divide  the  attention.  In  vain  do  we  extend 
our  view  into  the  heavens  and  pry  into  the  entrails  of 
the  earth,  in  vain  do  we  consult  the  writings  of  learned 
men  and  trace  the  dark  footsteps  of  antiquity — we  need 
only  draw  the  curtain  of  words,  to  hold  the  fairest  tree 
of  knowledge,  whose  fruit  is  excellent,  and  within 
the  reach  of  our  hand. 

25.  Unless  we  take  care  to  clear  the  First  Principles 
of  Knowledge  from  the  embarras  and  delusion  of 
words,  we  may  make  infinite  reasonings  upon  them  to 
no  purpose ;  we  may  draw  consequences  from  conse- 
quences, and  be  never  the  wiser.  The  farther  we  go, 
we  shall  only  lose  ourselves  the  more  irrecoverably,  and 
be  the  deeper  entangled  in  difficulties  and  mistakes. 
Whoever  therefore  designs  to  read  the  following  sheets, 
I  entreat  him  to  make  my  words  the  occasion  of  his  own 
thinking,  and  endeavour  to  attain  the  same  train  of 
thoughts  in  reading  that  I  had  in  writing  them.    By  this 


INTRODUCTION.  27 

means  it  will  be  easy  for  him  to  discover  the  truth  or 
falsity  of  what  I  say.  He  will  be  out  of  all  danger  of 
being  deceived  by  my  words,  and  I  do  not  see  how  he 
can  be  led  into  an  error  by  considering  his  own  naked, 
undisguised  ideas. 


Of  the  Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge 

[PART  I.*] 

It  is  evident  to  any  one  who  takes  a  survey  of  the 
objects  of  human  knowledge,  that  they  are  either  ideas 
actually  imprinted  on  the  senses ;  or  else  such  as  are 
perceived  by  attending  to  the  passions  and  operations 
of  the  mind ;  or  lastly,  ideas  formed  by  help  of  memory 
and  imagination — either  compounding,  dividing,  or 
barely  representing  those  originally  perceived  in  the 
aforesaid  ways.  By  sight  I  have  the  ideas  of  light  and 
colours,  with  their  several  degrees  and  variations.  By 
touch  I  perceive  hard  and  soft,  heat  and  cold,  motion 
and  resistance,  and  of  all  these  more  and  less  either  as 
to  quantity  or  degree.  Smelling  furnishes  me  with 
odours ;  the  palate  with  tastes ;  and  hearing  conveys 
sounds  to  the  mind  in  all  their  variety  of  tone  and  com- 
position. And  as  several  of  these  are  observed  to  ac- 
company each  other,  they  come  to  be  marked  by  one 
name,  and  so  to  be  reputed  as  one  thing.  Thus,  for  ex- 
ample, a  certain  colour,  taste,  smell,  figure  and  con- 


*Omitted  from  the  title-page  of  the  seond  edition  (1734), 
but  retained  at  this  place.  The  promised  Second  Part  never 
appeared. 

29 


30  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

sistence  having  been  observed  to  go  together,  are  ac- 
counted one  distinct  thing,  signified  by  the  name  apple; 
other  collections  of  ideas  constitute  a  stone,  a  tree,  a 
book,  and  the  like  sensible  things — which  as  they  are 
pleasing  or  disagreeable  excite  the  passions  of  love, 
hatred,  joy,  grief,  and  so  forth. 

2.  But,  besides  all  that  endless  variety  of  ideas  or 
objects  of  knowledge,  there  is  likewise  something  which 
knows  or  perceives  them,  and  exercises  divers  opera- 
tions, as  willing,  imagining,  remembering,  about  them. 
This  perceiving,  active  being  is  what  I  call  mind,  spirit, 
soul,  or  myself.  By  which  words  I  do  not  denote  any 
one  of  my  ideas,  but  a  thing  entirely  distinct  from  them, 
wherein,  they  exist,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  where- 
by they  are  perceived — for  the  existence  of  an  idea  con- 
sists in  being  perceived. 

3.  That  neither  our  thoughts,  nor  passions,  nor  ideas 
formed  by  the  imagination,  exist  without  the  mind,  is 
what  everybody  will  allow.  And  it  seems  no  less  evi- 
dent that  the  various  sensations  or  ideas  imprinted  on 
the  sense,  however  blended  or  combined  together  (that 
is,  whatever  objects  they  compose),  cannot  exist  other- 
wise than  in  a  mind  perceiving  them. — I  think  an  in- 
tuitive knowledge  may  be  obtained  of  this  by  any  one 
that  shall  attend  to  what  is  meant  by  the  term  exists, 
when  applied  to  sensible  things.  The  table  I  write  on 
I  say  exists,  that  is,  I  see  and  feel  it ;  and  if  I  were  out 
of  my  study  I  should  say  it  existed — meaning  thereby 
that  if  I  was  in  my  study  I  might  perceive  it,  or  that 
some  other  spirit  actually  does  perceive  it.  There  was 
an  odour,  that  is,  it  was  smelt ;  there  was  a  sound,  that 
is,  it  was  heard  ;  a  colour  or  figure,  and  it  was  perceived 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  31 

by  sight  or  touch.  This  is  all  that  I  can  understand  by 
these  and  the  like  expressions.  For  as  to  what  is  said 
of  the  absolute  existence  of  unthinking  things  without 
any  relation  to  their  being  perceived,  that  seems  per- 
fectly unintelligible.  Their  esse  is  percipi,  nor  is  it 
possible  they  should  have  any  existence  out  of  the, 
minds  or  thinking  things  which  perceive  them.  ) 

4.  It  is  indeed  an  opinion  strangely  prevailing 
amongst  men,  that  houses,  mountains,  rivers,  and  in  a 
word  all  sensible  objects,  have  an  existence,  natural  or 
real,  distinct  from  their  being  perceived  by  the  under- 
standing. But,  with  how  great  an  assurance  and 
acquiescence  soever  this  principle  may  be  entertained  in 
the  world,  yet  whoever  shall  find  in  his  heart  to  call  it 
in  question  may,  if  I  mistake  not,  perceive  it  to  involve 
a  manifest  contradiction.  For,  what  are  the  fore-men- 
tioned objects  but  the  things  we  perceive  by  sense?  and 
what  do  we  perceive  besides  our  own  ideas  or  sensa- 
tions? and  is  it  not  plainly  repugnant  that  any  one  of 
these,  or  any  combination  of  them,  should  exist  un- 
perceived  ?  J 

5.  If  we  thoroughly  examine  this  tenet  it  will,  per- 
haps, be  found  at  bottom  to  depend  on  the  doctrine  of 
abstract  ideas.     For  can  there  be  a  nicer  strain  of  ab- 
straction than  to  distinguish  the  existence  of  sensible 
objects  from  their  being  perceived,  so  as  to  conceive 
them  existing  unperceived?     Light  and  colours,  heat 
and  cold,  extension  and  figures — in  a  word  the  things  y 
we  see  and  feel — what  are  they  but  so  many  sensations,  ' 
notions,  ideas,  or  impressions  on  the  sense?  and  is  it  f 
possible  to  separate,  even  in  thought,  any  of  these  from 
perception?     For  my  part,  I  might  as  easily  divide  a 
thing  from  itself.    I  may,  indeed,  divide  in  my  thoughts, 


32  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

or  conceive  apart  from  each  other,  those  things  which, 
perhaps  I  never  perceived  by  sense  so  divided.  Thus, 
I  imagine  the  trunk  of  a  human  body  without  the  Hmbs, 
or  conceive  the  smell  of  a  rose  without  thinking  on  the 
rose  itself.  So  far,  I  will  not  deny,  I  can  abstract — if 
that  may  properly  be  called  abstraction  which  extends 
only  to  the  conceiving  separately  such  objects  as  it  is 
possible  may  really  exist  or  be  actually  perceived 
asunder.  But  my  conceiving  or  imagining  power  does 
not  extend  beyond  the  possibility  of  real  existence  or 
perception.  Hence,  as  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  see  or 
feel  anything  without  an  actual  sensation  of  that  thing, 
so  is  it  impossible  for  me  to  conceive  in  my  thoughts 
any  sensible  thing  or  object  distinct  from  the  sensation 
or  perception  of  it.  [In  truth,  the  object  and  the  sensa- 
tion are  the  same  thing,  and  cannot  therefore  be  ab- 
stracted from  each  other.]* 

6.  Some  truths  there  are  so  near  and  obvious  to  the 
mind  that  a  man  need  only  open  his  eyes  to  see  them. 
Such  I  take  this  important  one  to  be,  viz.,  that  all  the 
choir  of  heaven  and  furniture  of  the  earth,  in  a  word 
all  those  bodies  which  compose  the  mighty  frame  of 
the  world,  have  not  any  subsistence  without  a  mind, 
that  their  being  is  to  be  perceived  or  known  ;  that  conse- 
quently so  long  as  they  are  not  actually  perceived  by  me, 
or  do  not  exist  in  my  mind  or  that  of  any  other  created 
spirit,  they  must  either  have  no  existence  at  all,  or  else 
subsist  in  the  mind  of  some  Eternal  Spirit — it  being 
perfectly  unintelligible,  and  involving  all  the  absurdity 
of  abstraction,  to  attribute  to  any  single  part  of  them 
an  existence  independent  of  a  spirit.  [To  be  convinced 
of  which,  the  reader  need  only  reflect,  and  try  to  sepa- 


♦Omitted  from  the  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  Zi 

rate  in  his  own  thoughts  the  being  of  a  sensible  thing 
from  its  being  perceived.]* 

7.  From  what  has  been  said  it  follows  there  is  not  any 
other  Substance  than  Spirit,  or  that  which  perceives. 
But,  for  the  fuller  proof  of  this  point,  let  it  be  consid- 
ered the  sensible  qualities  are  colour,  figure,  motion, 
smell,  taste,  etc.,  i.  e.  the  ideas  perceived  by  sense.  Now, 
for  an  idea  to  exist  in  an  unperceiving  thing  is  a  mani- 
fest contradiction,  for  to  have  an  idea  is  all  one  as  to 
perceive ;  that  therefore  wherein  colour,  figure,  and  the 
like  qualities  exist  must  perceive  them  ;  hence  it  is  clear 
there  can  be  no  unthinking  substance  or  substratum  of 
those  ideas. 

8.  But,  say  you,  though  the  ideas  themselves  do  not 
exist  without  the  mind,  yet  there  may  be  things  like 
them,  whereof  they  are  copies  or  resemblances,  which 
things  exist  without  the  mind  in  an  unthinking  sub- 
stance. I  answer,  an  idea  can  be  like  nothing  but  an 
idea ;  a  colour  or  figure  can  be  like  nothing  but  another 
colour  or  figure.  If  we  look  but  never  so  little  into  our 
thoughts,  we  shall  find  it  impossible  for  us  to  conceive 
a  likeness  except  only  between  our  ideas.  Again,  I  ask 
whether  those  supposed  originals  or  external  things,  of 
which  our  ideas  are  the  pictures  or  representations,  be 
themselves  perceivable  or  no  ?  If  they  are,  then  they  are 
ideas  and  we  have  gained  our  point ;  but  if  you  say  they 
are  not,  I  appeal  to  any  one  whether  it  be  sense  to  as- 


*In  the  first  edition  the  bracketed  sentence  is  not  found, 
but  in  its  place  we  have  the  following:  "To  make  this  ap- 
pear with  all  the  light  and  evidence  of  an  Axiom,  it  seems 
sufficient  if  I  can  but  awaken  the  reflexion  of  the  reader,  that 
he  may  take  an  impartial  view  of  his  own  meaning,  and  turn 
his  thoughts  upon  the  subject  itself,  free  and  disengaged  from 
all  embarras  of  words  and  prepossession  in  favour  of  received 
mistakes." 


34  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

sert  a  colour  is  like  something  which  is  invisible ;  hard 
or  soft,  like  something  which  is  intangible;  and  so  of 
the  rest. 

9.  Some  there  are  who  make  a  distinction  betwixt 
primary  and  secondary  qualities.  By  the  former  they 
mean  extension,  figure,  motion,  rest,  solidity  or  impene- 
trability, and  number ;  by  the  latter  they  denote  all  other 
sensible  qualities,  as  colours,  sounds,  tastes,  and  so 
forth.  The  ideas  we  have  of  these  they  acknowledge  not 
to  be  the  resemblances  of  anything  existing  without  the 
mind,  or  unperceived,  but  they  will  have  our  ideas  of 
the  primary  qualities  to  be  patterns  or  images  of  things 
which  exist  without  the  mind,  in  an  unthinking  sub- 
stance which  they  call  Matter.  By  Matter,  therefore, 
we  are  to  understand  an  inert,  senseless  substance,  in 
which  extension,  figure,  and  motion  do  actually  subsist. 
But  it  is  evident  from  what  we  have  already  shown, 
that  extension,  figure,  and  motion  are  only  ideas  exist- 
ing in  the  mind,  and  that  an  idea  can  be  like  nothing 
but  another  idea,  and  that  consequently  nefther  they  nor 
their  archetypes  can  exist  in  an  unperceiving  substance. 
Hence,  it  is  plain  that  the  very  notion  of  what  is  called 
Matter  or  corporeal  substance,  involves  a  contradiction 
in  it.* 

10.  They  who  assert  that  figure,  motion,  and  the 
rest  of  the  primary  or  original  qualities  do  exist  without 
the  mind  in  unthinking  substances,  do  at  the  same  time 

*In  the  first  edition  the  following  passage  ended  this  sec- 
tion :  "Insomuch  that  I  should  not  think  it  necessary  to  spend 
more  time  in  exposing  its  absurdity.  But,  because  the  tenet 
of  the  existence  of  Matter  seems  to  have  taken  so  deep  a  root 
in  the  minds  of  philosophers,  and  draws  after  it  so  many  ill 
consequences,  I  choose  rather  to  be  thought  prolix  and  tedious 
than  omit  anything  that  might  conduce  to  the  full  discovery 
and  extirpation  of  that  prejudice." 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  35 

acknowledge  that  colours,  sounds,  heat,  cold,  and  such- 
like secondary  qualities,  do  not — which  they  tell  us  are 
sensations  existing  in  the  mind  alone,  that  depend  on 
and  are  occasioned  by  the  different  size,  texture,  and 
motion  of  the  minute  particles  of  matter.  This  they 
take  for  an  undoubted  truth,  which  they  can  demonstrate 
beyond  all  exception.  Now,  if  it  be  certain  that  those 
original  qualities  are  inseparably  united  with  the  other 
sensible  qualities,  and  not,  even  in  thought,  capable  of 
being  abstracted  from  them,  it  plainly  follows  that  they 
exist  only  in  the  mind.  But  I  desire  any  one  to  reflect 
and  try  whether  he  can,  by  any  abstraction  of  thought, 
conceive  the  extension  and  motion  of  a  body  without 
all  other  sensible  qualities.  For  my  own  part,  I  see  evi- 
dently that  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  frame  an  idea  of  a 
body  extended  and  moving,  but  I  must  withal  give  it 
some  colour  or  other  sensible  quality  which  is  ac- 
knowledged to  exist  only  in  the  mind.  In  short,  exten- 
sion, figure,  and  motion,  abstracted  from  all  other  qual- 
ities, are  inconceivable.  Where  therefore  the  other 
sensible  qualities  are,  there  must  these  be  also,  to  wit, 
in  the  mind  and  nowhere  else. 

II.  Again,  great  and  small,  szvift  and  slow,  are  al- 
lowed to  exist  nowhere  without  the  mind,  being  en- 
tirely relative,  and  changing  as  the  frame  or  position  of 
the  organs  of  sense  varies.  The  extension  therefore 
which  exists  without  the  mind  is  neither  great  nor 
small,  the  motion  neither  swift  nor  slow,  that  is,  they 
are  nothing  at  all.  But,  say  you,  they  are  extension  in 
general,  and  motion  in  general :  thus  we  see  how  much 
the  tenet  of  extended  movable  substances  existing  with- 
out the  mind  depends  on  the  strange  doctrine  of  ab- 
stract ideas.  And  here  I  cannot  but  remark  how  nearly 
the  vague  and  indeterminate  description  of  Matter  or 


36  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

corporeal  substance,  which  the  modern  philosophers 
are  run  into  by  their  own  principles,  resembles  that  an- 
tiquated and  so  much  ridiculed  notion  of  materia  prima, 
to  be  met  with  in  Aristotle  and  his  followers.  Without 
extension  solidity  cannot  be  conceived ;  since  therefore 
it  has  been  shewn  that  extension  exists  not  in  an  un- 
thinking substance,  the  same  must  also  be  true  of  soHd- 
ity. 

12.  That  number  is  entirely  the  creature  of  the  mind, 
even  though  the  other  qualities  be  allowed  to  exist  with- 
out, will  be  evident  to  whoever  considers  that  the  same 
thing  bears  a  different  denomination  of  number  as  the 
mind  views  it  with  different  respects.  Thus,  the  same 
extension  is  one,  or  three,  or  thirty-six,  according  as 
the  mind  considers  it  with  reference  to  a  yard,  a  foot, 
or  an  inch.  Number  is  so  visibly  relative,  and  depend- 
ent on  men's  understanding,  that  it  is  strange  to  think 
how  any  one  should  give  it  an  absolute  existence  with- 
out the  mind.  We  say  one  book,  one  page,  one  line,  etc. ; 
all  these  are  equally  units,  though  some  contain  several 
of  the  others.  And  in  each  instance,  it  is  plain,  the  unit 
relates  to  some  particular  combination  of  ideas  arbi- 
trarily put  together  by  the  mind. 

13.  Unity  I  know  some  will  have  to  be  a  simple  or 
uncompounded  idea,  accompanying  all  other  ideas  into 
the  mind.  That  I  have  any  such  idea  answering  the 
word  unity  I  do  not  find ;  and  if  I  had,  methinks  I  could 
not  miss  finding  it:  on  the  contrary,  it  should  be  the 
most  familiar  to  my  understanding,  since  it  is  said  to 
accompany  all  other  ideas,  and  to  be  perceived  by  all  the 
ways  of  sensation  and  reflexion.  To  say  no  more,  it  is 
an  abstract  idea. 

14.  I  shall  farther  add,  that,  after  the  same  manner 
as  modern  philosophers  prove  certain  sensible  qualities 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  Z7 

to  have  no  existence  in  Matter,  or  without  the  mind, 
the  same  thing  may  be  likewise  proved  of  all  other  sen- 
sible qualities  whatsoever.  Thus,  for  instance,  it  is 
said  that  heat  and  cold  are  affections  only  of  the  mind, 
and  not  at  all  patterns  of  real  beings,  existing  in  the 
corporeal  substances  which  excite  them,  for  that  the 
same  body  which  appears  cold  to  one  hand  seems  warm 
to  another.  Now,  why  may  we  not  as  well  argue  that 
figure  and  extension  are  not  patterns  or  resemblances 
of  qualities  existing  in  Matter,  because  to  the  same  eye 
at  different  stations,  or  eyes  of  a  different  texture  at 
the  same  station,  they  appear  various,  and  cannot  there- 
fore be  the  images  of  anything  settled  and  determinate 
without  the  mind  ?  Again,  it  is  proved  that  sweetness 
is  not  really  in  the  sapid  thing,  because  the  thing  re- 
maining unaltered  the  sweetness  is  changed  into  bitter, 
as  in  case  of  a  fever  or  otherwise  vitiated  palate.  Is  it 
not  as  reasonable  to  say  that  motion  is  not  without  the 
mind,  since  if  the  succession  of  ideas  in  the  mind  become 
swifter,  the  motion,  it  is  acknowledged,  shall  appear 
slower  without  any  alteration  in  any  external  object?* 
15.  In  short,  let  any  one  consider  those  arguments 
which  are  thought  manifestly  to  prove  that  colours  and 
taste  exist  only  in  the  mind,  and  he  shall  find  they  may 
with  equal  force  be  brought  to  prove  the  same  thing  of 
extension,  figure,  and  motion.  Though  it  must  be  con- 
fessed this  method  of  arguing  does  not  so  much  prove 
that  there  is  no  extension  or  colour  in  an  outward  ob- 
ject, as  that  we  do  not  know  by  sense  which  is  the  true 
extension  or  colour  of  the  object.  But  the  arguments 
foregoing  plainly  show  it  to  be  impossible  that  any 
colour  or  extension  at  all,  or  other  sensible  quality 


*In  the  first  edition  the  last  seven  words  read :  "without  any 
external  alteration." 


38  01'  THE  PRlNCirLES 

whatsoever,  should  exist  in  an  unthinking  subject  with- 
out the  mind,  or  in  truth,  that  there  should  be  any  such 
thing  as  an  outward  object. 

i6.  But  let  us  examine  a  little  the  received  opinon. 
— It  is  said  extension  is  a  mode  or  accident  of  Matter, 
and  that  Matter  is  the  siibsfratiim  that  supports  it. 
Now  I  desire  that  you  would  explain  to  me  what  is 
meant  by  Matter's  supporting  extension.  Say  you,  I 
iiave  no  idea  of  Matter  and  therefore  cannot  explain  it. 
I  answer,  though  you  have  no  positive,  yet,  if  you  have 
any  meaning  at  all,  you  must  at  least  have  a  rel- 
ative idea  of  Matter ;  though  you  know  not  what  it  is, 
yet  you  must  be  supposed  to  know  what  relation  it  bears 
to  accidents,  and  what  is  meant  by  its  supporting  them. 
It  is  evident  "support"  cannot  here  be  taken  in  its  usual 
or  literal  sense — as  when  we  say  that  pillars  support  a 
building;  in  what  sense  therefore  must  it  be  taken?* 

17.  If  we  inquire  into  what  the  most  accurate 
philosophers  declare  themselves  to  mean  by  material 
substance,  we  shall  find  them  acknowledge  they  have  no 
other  meaning  annexed  to  those  sounds  but  the  idea  of 
Being  in  general,  together  with  the  relative  notion  of 
its  supporting  accidents.  The  general  idea  of  Being 
appeareth  to  me  the  most  abstract  and  incomprehensi- 
ble of  all  other ;  and  as  for  its  supporting  accidents,  this, 
as  we  have  just  now  observed,  cannot  be  understood 
in  the  common  sense  of  those  words ;  it  must  therefore 
be  taken  in  some  other  sense,  but  what  that  is  they  do 
not  explain.  So  that  when  I  consider  the  tw^o  parts  or 
branches  which  make  the  signification  of  the  words 
material  substance,  I  am  convinced  there  is  no  distinct 

*In  the  first  edition  the  following  sentence  occurred  here: 
"For  my  part,  I  am  not  able  to  discover  any  sense  at  all  that 
can  be  aplicable  to  it." 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  39 

meaning  annexed  to  them.  But  why  should  we  trouble 
ourselves  any  farther,  in  discussing  this  material  sub- 
stratum or  support  of  figure  and  motion,  and  other 
sensible  qualities?  Does  it  not  suppose  they  have  an 
existence  without  the  mind  ?  And  is  not  this  a  direct 
repugnancy,   and  altogether  inconceivable? 

18.  But,  though  it  were  possible  that  solid,  figured, 
movable  substances  may  exist  without  the  mind,  cor- 
responding to  the  ideas  we  have  of  bodies,  yet  how  is  it 
possible  for  us  to  know  this  ?  Either  we  must  know  it 
by  sense  or  by  reason.  As  for  our  senses,  by  them  we 
have  the  knowledge  only  of  our  sensations,  ideas,  or 
those  things  that  are  immediately  perceived  by  sense, 
call  them  what  you  will :  but  they  do  not  inform  us  that 
things  exist  without  the  mind,  or  unperceived,  like  to 
those  which  are  perceived.  This  the  materialists  them- 
selves acknowledge.  It  remains  therefore  that  if  we 
have  any  knowledge  at  all  of  external  things,  it  must 
be  by  reason,  inferring  their  existence  from  what  is  im- 
mediately perceived  by  sense.  But  what  reason  can  in- 
duce us  to  believe  the  existence  of  bodies  without  the 
mind,  from  what  we  perceive,  since  the  very  patrons  of 
Matter  themselves  do  not  pretend  there  is  any  necessary 
connexion  betwixt  them  and  our  ideas?  I  say  it  is 
granted  on  all  hands  (and  what  happens  in  dreams, 
phrensies,  and  the  like,  puts  it  beyond  dispute)  that  it  is 
possible  we  might  be  affected  with  all  the  ideas  we  have 
now,  though  there  were  no  bodies  existing  without 
resembling  them.  Hence,  it  is  evident  the  supposition 
of  external  bodies  is  not  necessary  for  the  producing 
our  ideas ;  since  it  is  granted  they  are  produced  some- 
times, and  might  possibly  be  produced  always  in  the 
same  order,  we  see  them  in  at  present,  without  their 
concurrence. 


40  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

19.  But,  though  vvc  might  possibly  have  all  our  sen- 
sations without  them,  yet  perhaps  it  may  be  thought 
easier  to  conceive  and  explain  the  manner  of  their  pro- 
duction, by  supposing  external  bodies  in  their  likeness 
rather  than  otherwise ;  and  so  it  might  be  at  least  prob- 
able there  are  such  things  as  bodies  that  excite  their 
ideas  in  our  minds.  But  neither  can  this  be  said ;  for, 
though  we  give  the  materialists  their  external  bodies, 
they  by  their  own  confession  are  never  the  nearer  know- 
ing how  our  ideas  are  produced ;  since  they  own  them- 
selves unable  to  comprehend  in  what  manner  body  can 
act  upon  spirit,  or  how  it  is  possible  it  should  imprint 
any  idea  in  the  mind.  Hence  it  is  evident  the  produc- 
tion of  ideas  or  sensations  in  our  minds  can  be  no  rea- 
son why  we  should  suppose  Matter  or  corporeal  sub- 
stances, since  that  is  acknowledged  to  remain  equally 
inexplicable  with  or  without  this  supposition.  If  there- 
fore it  were  possible  for  bodies  to  exist  without  the 
mind,  yet  to  hold  they  do  so,  must  needs  be  a  very  pre- 
carious opinion  ;  since  it  is  to  suppose,  without  any  rea- 
son at  all,  that  God  has  created  innumerable  beings 
that  are  entirely  useless,  and  serve  to  no  manner  of 
purpose. 

20.  In  short,  if  there  were  external  bodies,  it  is  im- 
possible we  should  ever  come  to  know  it ;  and  if  there 
were  not,  we  might  have  the  very  same  reasons  to  think 
there  were  that  we  have  now.  Suppose — what  no  one 
can  deny  possible — an  intelligence  without  the  help  of 
external  bodies,  to  be  affected  with  the  same  train  of 
sensations  or  ideas  that  you  are,  imprinted  in  the  same 
order  and  with  like  vividness  in  his  mind.  I  ask 
whether  that  intelligence  hath  not  all  the  reason  to  be- 
lieve the  existence  of  corporeal  substances,  represented 
by  his  ideas,  and  exciting  them  in  his  mind,  that  you 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  41 

can  possibly  have  for  believing  the  same  thing?  Of 
this  there  can  be  no  question — which  one  consideration 
were  enough  to  make  any  reasonable  person  suspect 
the  strength  of  whatever  arguments  he  may  think  him- 
self to  have,  for  the  existence  of  bodies  without  the 
mind. 

21.  Were  it  necessary  to  add  any  farther  proof 
against  the  existence  of  Matter  after  what  has  been  said, 
I  could  instance  several  of  those  errors  and  difficulties 
(not  to  mention  impieties)  which  have  sprung  from  that 
tenet.  It  has  occasioned  numberless  controversies  and 
disputes  in  philosophy,  and  not  a  few  of  far  greater 
moment  in  religion.  But  I  shall  not  enter  into  the  de- 
tail of  them  in  this  place,  as  well  because  I  think  argu- 
ments a  posteriori  are  unnecessary  for  confirming  what 
has  been,  if  I  mistake  not,  sufficiently  demonstrated  a 
priori,  as  because  I  shall  hereafter  find  occasion  to  speak 
somewhat  of  them. 

22.  I  am  afraid  I  have  given  cause  to  think  I  am 
needlessly  prolix  in  handling  this  subject.  For,  to  what 
purpose  is  it  to  dilate  on  that  which  may  be  demon- 
strated with  the  utmost  evidence  in  a  line  or  two,  to  any 
one  that  is  capable  of  the  least  reflexion  ?  It  is  but  look- 
ing into  your  own  thoughts,  and  so  trying  whether  you 
can  conceive  it  possible  for  a  sound,  or  figure,  or  mo- 
tion, or  colour  to  exist  without  the  mind  or  unperceived. 
This  easy  trial  may  perhaps  make  you  see  that  what 
you  contend  for  is  a  downright  contradiction.  In- 
somuch that  I  am  content  to  put  the  whole  upon  this 
issue : — If  you  can  but  conceive  it  possible  for  one  ex- 
tended movable  substance,  or,  in  general,  for  any  one 
idea,  or  anything  like  an  idea,  to  exist  otherwise  than 
in  a  mind  perceiving  it,  I  shall  readily  give  up  the  cause. 


42  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

And,  as  for  all  that  compages  of  external  bodies  you 
contend  for,  I  shall  grant  you  its  existence,  though  you 
cannot  cither  give  me  any  reason  why  you  believe  it 
exists,  or  assign  any  use  to  it  when  it  is  supposed  to 
exist.  I  say,  the  bare  possibility  of  your  opinions  being 
true  shall  pass  for  an  argument  that  it  is  so. 

27).  But,  say  you,  surely  there  is  nothing  easier  than 
for  me  to  imagine  trees,  for  instance,  in  a  park,  or 
books  existing  in  a  closet,  and  nobody  by  to  perceive 
them.  I  answer,  you  may  so,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  it ; 
but  what  is  all  this,  I  beseech  you,  more  than  framing 
in  your  mind  certain  ideas  which  you  call  books  and 
trees,  and  the  same  time  omitting  to  frame  the  idea 
of  any  one  that  may  perceive  them  ?  But  do  not  you 
yourself  perceive  or  think  of  them  all  the  while?  This 
therefore  is  nothing  to  the  purpose ;  it  only  shews  you 
have  the  power  of  imagining  or  forming  ideas  in  your 
mind  :  but  it  does  not  shew  that  you  can  conceive  it  pos- 
sible the  objects  of  your  thought  may  exist  without  the 
mind.  To  make  out  this,  it  is  necessary  that  you  con- 
ceive them  existing  unconceived  or  unthought  of,  which 
is  a  manifest  repugnancy.  When  we  do  our  utmost 
to  conceive  the  existence  of  external  bodies,  we  are  all 
the  while  only  contemplating  our  own  ideas.  But  the 
mind  taking  no  notice  of  itself,  is  deluded  to  think  it  can 
and  does  conceive  bodies  existing  unthought  of  or  with- 
out the  mind,  though  at  the  same  time  they  are  appre- 
hended by  or  exist  in  itself.  A  little  attention  will  dis- 
cover to  any  one  the  truth  and  evidence  of  what  is  here 
said,  and  make  it  unnecessary  to  insist  on  any  other 
proofs  against  the  existence  of  material  substance. 

24.  [Could  men  but  forbear  to  amuse  themselves 
with  words,  we  should,  I  believe,  soon  come  to  an 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  43 

agreement  in  this  point.]*  It  is  very  obvious,  upon  the 
least  inquiry  into  our  thoughts,  to  know  whether  it  is 
possible  for  us  to  understand  what  is  meant  by  the 
absolute  existence  of  sensible  objects  in  themselves,  or 
zvithout  the  mind.  To  me  it  is  evident  those  words  mark 
out  either  a  direct  contradiction,  or  else  nothing  at  all. 
And  to  convince  others  of  this,  I  know  no  readier  or 
fairer  way  than  to  entreat  they  would  calmly  attend  to 
their  own  thoughts ;  and  if  by  this  attention  the  empti- 
ness or  repugnancy  of  those  expressions  does  appear, 
surely  nothing  more  is  requisite  for  the  conviction.  It 
is  on  this  therefore  that  I  insist,  to  wit,  that  the  absolute 
existence  of  unthinking  things  are  words  without  a 
meaning,  or  which  include  a  contradiction.  This  is 
what  I  repeat  and  inculcate,  and  earnestly  recommend 
to  the  attentive  thoughts  of  the  reader. 

25.  All  our  ideas,  sensations,  notions,  or  the  things 
which  we  perceive,  by  whatsoever  names  they  may  be 
distinguished,  are  visibly  inactive — there  is  nothing  of 
power  or  agency  included  in  them.  So  that  one  idea  or 
object  of  thought  cannot  produce  or  make  any  altera- 
tion in  another.  To  be  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  this, 
there  is  nothing  else  requisite  but  a  bare  observation  of 
our  ideas.  For,  since  they  and  every  part  of  them  exist 
only  in  the  mind,  it  follows  that  there  is  nothing  in  them 
but  what  is  perceived :  but  whoever  shall  attend  to  his 
ideas,  whether  of  sense  or  reflexion,  will  not  perceive 
in  them  any  power  or  activity ;  there  is,  therefore,  no 
such  thing  contained  in  them.  A  little  attention  will 
discover  to  us  that  the  very  being  of  an  idea  implies 
passiveness  and  inertness  in  it,  insomuch  that  it  is  im- 


*The  bracketed  sentence  is  omitted  from  the  second  edition. 


44  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

possible  for  an  idea  to  do  anything,  or,  strictly  speak- 
ing, to  be  the  cause  of  anything :  neither  can  it  be  the 
resemblance  or  pattern  of  any  active  being,  as  is  evident 
from  sect.  8.  Whence  it  plainly  follows  that  extension, 
figure,  and  motion  cannot  be  the  cause  of  our  sensations. 
To  say,  therefore,  that  these  are  the  effects  of  powers 
resulting  from  the  configuration,  number,  motion,  and 
size  of  corpuscles,  must  certainly  be  false. 

26.  We  perceive  a  continual  succession  of  ideas, 
some  are  anew  excited,  others  are  changed  or  totally 
disappear.  There  is  therefore  some  cause  of  these  ideas, 
whereon  they  depend,  and  which  produces  and  changes 
them.  That  this  cause  cannot  be  any  quality  or  idea  or 
combination  of  ideas,  is  clear  from  the  preceding  sec- 
tion. It  must  therefore  be  a  substance ;  but  it  has  been 
shewn  that  there  is  no  corporeal  or  material  substance : 
it  remains  therefore  that  the  cause  of  ideas  is  an  in- 
corporeal active  substance  or  Spirit. 

27.  A  spirit  is  one  simple,  undivided,  active  being — 
as  it  perceives  ideas  it  is  called  the  understanding,  and 
as  it  produces  or  otherwise  operates  about  them  it  is 
called  the  zvill.  Hence  there  can  be  no  idea  formed  of 
a  soul  or  spirit ;  for  all  ideas  whatever,  being  passive 
and  inert  (Vide  sect.  25),  they  cannot  represent  unto 
us,  by  way  of  image  or  likeness,  that  which  acts.  A 
little  attention  will  make  it  plain  to  any  one,  that  to  have 
an  idea  which  shall  be  like  that  active  principle  of  mo- 
tion and  change  of  ideas  is  absolutely  impossible.  Such 
is  the  nature  of  spirit,  or  that  which  acts,  that  it  cannot 
be  of  itself  perceived,  but  only  by  the  effects  which  it 
produceth.  If  any  man  shall  doubt  of  the  truth  of  what 
is  here  delivered,  let  him  but  reflect  and  try  if  he  can 
frame  the  idea  of  any  power  or  active  being,  and  wheth- 
er he  has  ideas  of  two  principal  powers,  marked  by 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  45 

the  names  zmll  and  understanding,  distinct  from  each 
other  as  well  as  from  a  third  idea  of  Substance  or  Being 
in  general,  with  a  relative  notion  of  its  supporting  or  be- 
ing the  subject  of  the  aforesaid  powers — which  is  signi- 
fied by  the  name  soul  or  spirit.  This  is  what  some  hold ; 
but,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  the  words  zvill,  soul,  spirit,  do 
not  stand  for  different  ideas,  or,  in  truth,  for  any  idea 
at  all,  but  for  something  which  is  very  different  from 
ideas,  and  which,  being  an  agent,  cannot  be  like  unto, 
or  represented  by,  any  idea  whatsoever.  [Though  it 
must  be  owned  at  the  same  time  that  we  have  some 
notion  of  soul,  spirit,  and  the  operations  of  the  mind : 
such  as  willing,  loving,  hating — inasmuch  as  we  know 
or  understand  the  meaning  of  these  words.]* 

28.  I  find  I  can  excite  ideas  in  my  mind  at  pleasure, 
and  vary  and  shift  the  scene  as  oft  as  I  think  fit.  It 
is  no  more  than  willing,  and  straightway  this  or  that 
idea  arises  in  my  fancy ;  and  by  the  same  power  it  is 
obliterated  and  makes  way  for  another.  This  making 
and  unmaking  of  ideas  doth  very  properly  denominate 
the  mind  active.  Thus  much  is  certain  and  grounded 
on  experience  ;  but  when  we  think  of  unthinking  agents 
or  of  exciting  ideas  exclusive  of  volition,  we  only 
amuse  ourselves  with  words. 

29.  But,  whatever  power  I  may  have  over  my  own 
thoughts,  I  find  the  ideas  actually  perceived  by  Sense 
have  not  a  like  dependence  on  my  will.  When  in  broad 
daylight  I  open  my  eyes,  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  choose 
whether  I  shall  see  or  no,  or  to  determine  what  particu- 
lar objects  shall  present  themselves  to  my  view ;  and  so 
likewise  as  to  the  hearing  and  other  senses ;  the  ideas 
imprinted  on  them  are  not  creatures  of  my  will.    There 


*The  bracketed  sentence  was  added  to  the  last  edition. 


46  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

is  therefore  some  other  Will  or  Spirit  that  produces 
them. 

30.  The  ideas  of  Sense  are  more  strong,  lively,  and 
distinct  than  those  of  the  imagination ;  they  have  like- 
wise a  steadiness,  order,  and  coherence,  and  are  not 
excited  at  random,  as  those  which  are  the  effects  of  hu- 
man wills  often  are,  but  in  a  regular  train  or  series, 
the  admirable  connexion  whereof  sufficiently  testifies 
the  wisdom  and  benevolence  of  its  Author.  Now  the 
set  rules  or  established  methods  wherein  the  Mind  we 
depend  on  excites  in  us  the  ideas  of  sense,  are  called 
the  lazvs  of  nature;  and  these  we  learn  by  experience, 
which  teaches  us  that  such  and  such  ideas  are  attended 
with  such  and  such  other  ideas,  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  things. 

31.  This  gives  us  a  sort  of  foresight  which  enables 
us  to  regulate  our  actions  for  the  benefit  of  life.  And 
without  this  we  should  be  eternally  at  a  loss ;  we  could 
not  know  how  to  act  anything  that  might  procure  us 
the  least  pleasure,  or  remove  the  least  pain  of  sense. 
That  food  nourishes,  sleep  refreshes,  and  fire  warms 
us ;  that  to  sow  in  the  seed-time  is  the  way  to  reap  in 
the  harvest ;  and  in  general  that  to  obtain  such  or  such 
ends,  such  or  such  means  are  conducive — all  this  we 
know,  not  by  discovering  any  necessary  connexion 
between  our  ideas,  but  only  by  the  observation  of  the 
settled  laws  of  nature,  without  which  we  should  be  all 
in  uncertainty  and  confusion,  and  a  grown  man  no 
more  know  how  to  manage  himself  in  the  affairs  of  life 
than  an  infant  just  born. 

32.  And  yet  this  consistent  uniform  working, 
which  so  evidently  displays  the  goodness  and  wis- 
dom of  that  Governing  Spirit  whose  Will  constitutes 
the  laws  of  nature,  is  so  far  from  leading  our  thousrhts 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  a7 

to  Him,  that  it  rather  sends  them  wandering  after  sec- 
ond causes.  For,  when  we  perceive  certain  ideas  of 
Sense  constantly  followed  by  other  ideas  and  we  know 
this  is  not  of  our  own  doing,  we  forthwith  attribute 
power  and  agency  to  the  ideas  themselves,  and  make 
one  the  cause  of  another,  than  which  nothing  can  be 
more  absurd  and  unintelligible.  Thus,  for  example, 
having  observed  that  when  we  perceive  by  sight  a  cer- 
tain round  luminous  figure  we  at  the  same  time  per- 
ceive by  touch  the  idea  or  sensation  called  heat,  we  do 
from  thence  conclude  the  sun  to  be  the  cause  of  heat. 
And  in  like  manner  perceiving  the  motion  and  collision 
of  bodies  to  be  attended  with  sound,  we  are  inclined 
to  think  the  latter  the  effect  of  the  former. 

33.  The  ideas  imprinted  on  the  Senses  by  the  Author 
of  nature  are  called  real  things;  and  those  excited  in 
the  imagination  being  less  regular,  vivid,  and  constant, 
are  more  properly  termed  ideas,  or  images  of  things, 
which  they  copy  and  represent.  But  then  our  sensa- 
tions, be  they  never  so  vivid  and  distinct,  are  never- 
theless ideas,  that  is,  they  exist  in  the  mind,  or  are  per- 
ceived by  it,  as  truly  as  the  ideas  of  its  own  framing. 
The  ideas  of  Sense  are  allowed  to  have  more  reality 
in  them,  that  is,  to  be  more  strong,  orderly,  and  co- 
herent than  the  creatures  of  the  mind ;  but  this  is  no 
argument  that  they  exist  without  the  mind.  They  are 
also  less  dependent  on  the  spirit,  or  thinking  substance 
which  perceives  them,  in  that  they  are  excited  by  the 
will  of  another  and  more  powerful  spirit ;  yet  still  they 
are  ideas,  and  certainly  no  idea,  whether  faint  or  strong, 
can  exist  otherwise  than  in  a  mind  perceiving  it. 

34.  Before  we  proceed  any  farther  it  is  necessary  we 
spend  some  time  in  answering  objections  which  may 


48  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

probably  be  made  against  the  principles  we  have 
hitherto  laid  down.  In  doing  of  which,  if  I  seem  too 
prolix  to  those  of  quick  apprehensions,  I  hope  it  may 
be  pardoned,  since  all  men  do  not  equally  apprehend 
things  of  this  nature,  and  I  am  willing  to  be  under- 
stood by  every  one. 

First,  then,  it  will  be  objected  that  by  the  foregoing 
principles  all  that  is  real  and  substantial  in  nature  is 
banished  out  of  the  world,  and  instead  thereof  a  chi- 
merical scheme  of  ideas  takes  place.  All  things  that  ex- 
ist, exist  only  in  the  mind,  that  is,  they  are  purely  no- 
tional. What  therefore  becomes  of  the  sun,  moon  and 
stars?  What  must  we  think  of  houses,  rivers,  moun- 
tains, trees,  stones ;  nay,  even  of  our  own  bodies?  Are 
all  these  but  so  many  chimeras  and  illusions  on  the 
fancy?  To  all  which,  and  whatever  else  of  the  same 
sort  may  be  objected,  I  answer,  that  by  the  principles 
premised  we  are  not  deprived  of  any  one  thing  in  na- 
ture. Whatever  we  see,  feel,  hear,  or  anywise  conceive 
or  understand  remains  as  secure  as  ever,  and  is  as  real 
as  ever.  There  is  a  reriim  nat^ira,  and  the  distinction 
between  realities  and  chimeras  retains  its  full  force. 
This  is  evident  from  sect.  29,  30,  and  33,  where  we 
have  shewn  what  is  meant  by  real  things  in  opposition 
to  chimeras  or  ideas  of  our  own  framing ;  but  then  they 
both  equally  exist  in  the  mind,  and  in  that  sense  they 
are  alike  ideas. 

35.  I  do  not  argue  against  the  existence  of  any  one 
thing  that  we  can  apprehend  either  by  sense  or  re- 
flexion. That  the  things  I  see  with  my  eyes  and  touch 
with  my  hands  do  exist,  really  exist,  I  make  not  the  least 
question.  The  only  thing  whose  existence  we  deny  is  that 
which  philosophers  call  Matter  or  corporeal  substance. 
And  in  doing  of  this  there  is  no  damage  done  to  the 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  49 

rest  of  mankind,  who,  I  dare  say,  will  never  miss  it. 
Hie  Atheist  indeed  will  want  the  colour  of  an  empty 
name  to  support  his  impiety;  and  the  Philosophers 
may  possibly  find  they  have  lost  a  great  handle  for 
trifling  and  disputation.  [But  that  is  all  the  harm  that 
I  can  see  done.]* 

36.  If  any  man  thinks  this  detracts  from  the  exist- 
ence or  reality  of  things,  he  is  very  far  from  under- 
standing what  hath  been  premised  in  the  plainest  terms 
I  could  think  of.  Take  here  an  abstract  of  what  has 
been  said : — There  are  spiritual  substances,  minds,  or 
human  souls,  which  will  or  excite  ideas  in  themselves 
at  pleasure;  but  these  are  faint,  weak,  and  unsteady 
in  respect  of  others  they  perceive  by  sense — which, 
being  impressed  upon  them  according  to  certain  rules 
or  laws  of  nature,  speak  themselves  the  effects  of  a 
mind  more  powerful  and  wise  than  human  spirits. 
These  latter  are  said  to  have  more  reality  in  them  than 
the  former : — by  which  is  meant  that  they  are  more 
affecting,  orderly,  and  distinct,  and  that  they  are  not 
fictions  of  the  mind  perceiving  them.  And  in  this  sense 
the  sun  that  I  see  by  day  is  the  real  sun,  and  that  which 
I  imagine  by  night  is  the  idea  of  the  former.  In  the 
sense  here  given  of  reality  it  is  evident  that  every  veg- 
etable, star,  mineral,  and  in  general  each  part  of  the 
mundane  system,  is  as  much  a  real  being  by  our  prin- 
ciples as  by  any  other.  Whether  others  mean  anything 
by  the  term  reality  different  from  what  I  do,  I  entreat 
them  to  look  into  their  own  thoughts  and  see. 

37.  It  will  be  urged  that  thus  much  at  least  is  true, 
to  wit,  that  we  take  away  all  corporeal  substances.  To 
this  my  answer  is,  that  if  the  word  substance  be  taken 


*Omitted  from  second  edition. 


50  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

in  the  vulgar  sense — for  a  combination  of  sensible 
qualities,  such  as  extension,  solidity,  weight,  and  the 
like — this  we  cannot  be  accused  of  taking  away:  but 
if  it  be  taken  in  a  philosophic  sense — for  the  support  of 
accidents  or  qualities  without  the  mind — then  indeed 
I  acknowledge  that  we  take  it  away,  if  one  may  be  said 
to  take  away  that  which  never  had  any  existence,  not 
even  in  the  imagination. 

38.  But  after  all,  say  you,  it  sounds  very  harsh  to 
say  we  eat  and  drink  ideas,  and  are  clothed  with  ideas. 
I  acknowledge  it  does  so — the  word  idea  not  being  used 
in  common  discourse  to  signify  the  several  combina- 
tions of  sensible  qualities  which  are  called  things;  and 
it  is  certain  that  any  expression  which  varies  from  the 
familiar  use  of  language  will  seem  harsh  and  ridiculous. 
But  this  doth  not  concern  the  truth  of  the  proposition, 
which  in  other  words  is  no  more  than  to  say,  we  are  fed 
and  clothed  with  those  things  which  we  perceive  imme- 
diately by  our  senses.  The  hardness  or  softness,  the 
colour,  taste,  warmth,  figure,  or  suchlike  qualities, 
which  combined  together  constitute  the  several  sorts  of 
victuals  and  apparel,  have  been  shewn  to  exist  only  in 
the  mind  that  perceives  them ;  and  this  is  all  that  is 
meant  by  calling  them  ideas;  which  word  if  it  was  as  or- 
dinarily used  as  thing,  would  sound  no  harsher  nor 
more  ridiculous  than  it.  I  am  not  for  disputing 
about  the  propriety,  but  the  truth  of  the  expression.  If 
therefore  you  agree  with  me  that  we  eat  and  drink  and 
are  clad  with  the  immediate  objects  of  sense,  which 
cannot  exist  unperceived  or  without  the  mind,  I  shall 
readily  grant  it  is  more  proper  or  conformable  to  custom 
that  they  should  be  called  things  rather  than  ideas. 

39.  If  it  be  demanded  why  I  make  use  of  the  word 
idea,  and  do  not  rather  in  compliance  with  custom  call 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  Si 

them  things;  I  answer,  I  do  it  for  two  reasons : — first, 
because  the  term  thing  in  contradistinction  to  idea,  is 
generally  supposed  to  denote  somewhat  existing  with- 
out the  mind;  secondly,  because  thing  hath  a  more 
comprehensive  signification  than  idea,  including  spirit 
or  thinking  things  as  well  as  ideas.  Since  therefore 
the  objects  of  sense  exist  only  in  the  mind,  and  are 
withal  thoughtless  and  inactive,  I  chose  to  mark  them 
by  the  word  idea,  which  implies  those  properties. 

40.  But,  say  what  we  can,  some  one  perhaps  may  be 
apt  to  reply,  he  will  still  believe  his  senses,  and  never 
suffer  any  arguments,  how  plausible  soever,  to  pre- 
vail over  the  certainty  of  them.  Be  it  so ;  assert  the 
evidence  of  sense  as  high  as  you  please,  we  are  willing 
to  do  the  same.  That  what  I  see,  hear,  and  feel  doth  ex- 
ist, that  is  to  say,  is  perceived  by  me,  I  no  more  doubt 
than  I  do  of  my  own  being.  But  I  do  not  see  how  the 
testimony  of  sense  can  be  alleged  as  a  proof  for  the  ex- 
istence of  anything  which  is  not  perceived  by  sense. 
We  are  not  for  having  any  man  turn  sceptic  and  dis- 
believe his  senses ;  on  the  contrary,  we  give  them  all 
the  stress  and  assurance  imaginable ;  nor  are  there  any 
principles  more  opposite  to  Scepticism  than  those  we 
have  laid  down,  as  shall  be  hereafter  clearly  shewn. 

41.  Secondly,  it  will  be  objected  that  there  is  a  great 
difference  betwixt  real  fire  for  instance,  and  the  idea 
of  fire,  betwixt  dreaming  or  imagining  oneself  burnt, 
and  actually  being  so :  if  you  suspect  it  to  be  only  the 
idea  of  fire  which  you  see,  do  but  put  your  hand  into 
it  and  you  will  be  convinced  with  a  witness.  This 
and  the  like  may  be  urged  in  opposition  to  our  tenets. 
To  all  which  the  answer  is  evident  from  what  hath 
been  already  said;  and  I  shall  only  add  in  this  place, 


52  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

that  if  real  fire  be  very  different  from  the  idea  of  fire, 
so  also  is  the  real  pain  that  it  occasions  very  different 
from  the  idea  of  the  same  pain,  and  yet  nobody  will 
pretend  that  real  pain  either  is,  or  can  possibly  be,  in 
an  unpcrceiving  thing,  or  v^ithout  the  mind,  any  more 
than  its  idea. 

42.  Thirdly,  it  will  be  objected  that  we  see  things 
actually  without  or  at  distance  from  us,  and  which  con- 
sequently do  not  exist  in  the  mind ;  it  being  absurd  that 
those  things  which  are  seen  at  the  distance  of  several 
miles  should  be  as  near  to  us  as  our  own  thoughts.  In 
answer  to  this,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered  that  in  a 
dream  we  do  oft  perceive  things  as  existing  at  a  great 
distance  off,  and  yet  for  all  that,  those  things  are  ac- 
knowledged to  have  their  existence  only  in  the  mind. 

43.  But,  for  the  fuller  clearing  of  this  point,  it  may 
be  worth  while  to  consider  how  it  is  that  we  perceive 
distance  and  things  placed  at  a  distance  by  sight.  For, 
that  we  should  in  truth  see  external  space,  and  bodies 
actually  existing  in  it,  some  nearer,  others  farther 
off,  seems  to  carry  with  it  some  opposition  to  what 
hath  been  said  of  their  existing  nowhere  without  the 
mind.  The  consideration  of  this  difficulty  it  was  that 
gave  birth  to  my  "Essay  towards  a  New  Theory  of 
Vision,"  which  was  published  not  long  since,  wherein 
it  is  shewn  that  distance  or  outness  is  neither  immedi- 
ately of  itself  perceived  by  sight,  nor  yet  apprehended 
or  judged  of  by  lines  and  angles,  or  anything  that  hath 
a  necessary  connexion  with  it ;  but  that  it  is  only  sug- 
gested to  our  thoughts  by  certain  visible  ideas  and 
sensations  attending  vision,  which  in  their  own  nature 
have  no  manner  of  similitude  or  relation  either  with 
distance  or  things  placed  at  a  distance ;  but,  by  a  con- 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  53 

nexion  taught  us  by  experience,  they  come  to  signify 
and  suggest  them  to  us,  after  the  same  manner  that 
words  of  any  language  suggest  the  ideas  they  are  made 
to  stand  for ;  insomuch  that  a  man  born  bhnd  and  after- 
wards made  to  see,  would  not,  at  first  sight,  think  the 
things  he  saw  to  be  without  his  mind,  or  at  any  distance 
from  him.    See  sect.  41  of  the  forementioned  treatise. 

44.  The  ideas  of  sight  and  touch  make  two  species 
entirely  distinct  and  heterogeneous.  The  former  are 
marks  and  prognostics  of  the  latter.  That  the  proper 
objects  of  sight  neither  exist  without  mind,  nor  are  the 
images  of  external  things,  was  shewn  even  in  that 
treatise.  Though  throughout  the  same  the  contrary 
be  supposed  true  of  tangible  objects — not  that  to  sup- 
pose that  vulgar  error  was  necessary  for  establishing 
the  notion  therein  laid  down,  but  because  it  was  beside 
my  purpose  to  examine  and  refute  it  in  a  discourse  con- 
cerning Vision.  So  that  in  strict  truth  the  ideas  of 
^ight,  when  we  apprehend  by  them  distance  and  things 
placed  at  a  distance,  do  not  suggest  or  mark  out  to  U3 
things  actually  existing  at  a  distance,  but  only  admonish 
us  what  ideas  of  touch  will  be  imprinted  in  our  minds 
at  such  and  such  distances  of  time,  and  in  consequence 
of  such  or  such  actions.  It  is,  I  say,  evident  from 
what  has  been  said  in  the  foregoing  parts  of  this 
Treatise,  and  in  sect.  147  and  elsewhere  of  the  Essay 
concerning  Vision,  that  visible  ideas  are  the  Language 
whereby  the  Governing  Spirit  on  whom  we  depend  in- 
forms us  what  tangible  ideas  he  is  about  to  imprint 
upon  us,  in  case  we  excite  this  or  that  motion  in  our 
own  bodies.  But  for  a  fuller  information  in  this  point 
I  refer  to  the  Essay  itself. 

45.  Fourthly,  it  will  be  objected  that  from  the  fore- 


54  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

going  principles  it  follows  things  are  every  moment 
annihilated  and  created  anew.  The  objects  of  sense  ex- 
ist only  when  they  are  perceived ;  the  trees  therefore  are 
in  the  garden,  or  the  chairs  in  the  parlour,  no  longer 
than  while  there  is  somebody  by  to  perceive  them. 
Upon  shutting  my  eyes  all  the  furniture  in  the  room  is 
reduced  to  nothing,  and  barely  upon  opening  them 
it  is  again  created.  In  answer  to  all  which,  I  refer 
the  reader  to  what  has  been  said  in  sect.  3,  4,  &c.,  and 
desire  he  will  consider  whether  he  means  anything  by 
the  actual  existence  of  an  idea  distinct  from  its  being 
perceived.  For  my  part,  after  the  nicest  inquiry  I 
could  make,  I  am  not  able  to  discover  that  anything 
else  is  meant  by  those  words ;  and  I  once  more  entreat 
the  reader  to  sound  his  own  thoughts,  and  not  suffer 
himself  to  be  imposed  on  by  words.  If  he  can  con- 
ceive it  possible  either  for  his  ideas  or  their  archetypes 
to  exist  without  being  perceived,  then  I  give  up  the 
cause;  but  if  he  cannot,  he  will  acknowledge  it  is  un- 
reasonable for  him  to  stand  up  in  defence  of  he  knows 
not  what,  and  pretend  to  charge  on  me  as  an  absurdity 
the  not  assenting  to  those  propositions  which  at  bottom 
have  no  meaning  in  them. 

46.  It  will  not  be  amiss  to  observe  how  far  the  re- 
ceived principles  of  philosophy  are  themselves  charge- 
able with  those  pretended  absurdities.  It  is  thought 
strangely  absurd  that  upon  closing  my  eyelids  all  the 
visible  objects  around  me  should  be  reduced  to  nothing ; 
and  yet  is  not  this  what  philosophers  commonly  ac- 
knowledge, when  they  agree  on  all  hands  that  light 
and  colours,  which  alone  are  the  proper  and  immediate 
objects  of  sight,  are  mere  sensations  that  exist  no 
longer  than  they  are  perceived  ?  Again,  it  may  to  some 
perhaps  seem  very  incredible  that  things  should  be 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  55 

every  moment  creating,  yet  this  very  notion  is  com- 
monly taught  in  the  schools.  For  the  Schoolmen, 
though  they  acknowledge  the  existence  of  Matter,  and 
that  the  whole  mundane  fabric  is  framed  out  of  it, 
are  nevertheless  of  opinion  that  it  cannot  subsist  with- 
out the  divine  conservation,  which  by  them  is  ex- 
pounded to  be  a  continual  creation. 

47.  Farther,  a  little  thought  will  discover  to  us  that 
though  we  allow  the  existence  of  Matter  or  corporeal 
substance,  yet  it  will  unavoidably  follow,  from  the  prin- 
ciples which  are  now  generally  admitted,  that  the  par- 
ticular bodies,  of  what  kind  soever,  do  none  of  them 
exist  whilst  they  are  not  perceived.  For,  it  is  evident 
from  sect.  11  and  the  following  sections,  that  the 
Matter  philosophers  contend  for  is  an  incomprehensible 
somewhat,  which  hath  none  of  those  particular  quali- 
ties whereby  the  bodies  falling  under  our  senses  are 
distinguished  one  from  another.  But,  to  make  this 
more  plain,  it  must  be  remarked  that  the  infinite  divis- 
ibility of  Matter  is  now  universally  allowed,  at  least 
by  the  most  approved  and  considerable  philosophers, 
who  on  the  received  principles  demonstrate  it  beyond 
all  exception.  Hence,  it  follows  there  is  an  infinite 
number  of  parts  in  each  particle  of  Alatter  which  are 
not  perceived  by  sense.  The  reason  therefore  that  any 
particular  body  seems  to  be  of  a  finite  magnitude,  or 
exhibits  only  a  finite  number  of  parts  to  sense,  is,  not 
because  it  contains  no  more,  since  in  itself  it  contains 
an  infinite  number  of  parts,  but  because  the  sense 
is  not  acute  enough  to  discern  them.  In  propor- 
tion therefore  as  the  sense  is  rendered  more 
acute,  it  perceives  a  greater  number  of  parts  in  the 
object,  that  is,  the  object  appears  greater,  and  its  figure 
varies,  those  parts  in  its  extremities  which  were  before 


56  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

unpcrceivablc  appearing  now  to  bound  it  in  very  differ- 
ent lines  and  angles  from  those  perceived  by  an  obtuser 
sense.  And  at  length,  after  various  changes  of  size  and 
shape,  when  the  sense  becomes  infinitely  acute  the  body 
shall  seem  infinite.  During  all  which  there  is  no  alter- 
ation in  the  body,  but  only  in  the  sense.  Each  body 
therefore,  considered  in  itself,  is  infinitely  extended, 
and  consequently  void  of  all  shape  or  figure.  From 
which  it  follows  that,  though  we  should  grant  the  ex- 
istence of  Matter  to  be  never  so  certain,  yet  it  is  withal 
as  certain,  the  materialists  themselves  are  by  their  own 
principles  forced  to  acknowledge,  that  neither  the  par- 
ticular bodies  perceived  by  sense,  nor  anything  like 
them,  exists  without  the  mind.  Matter,  I  say,  and  each 
particle  thereof,  is  according  to  them  infinite  and  shape- 
less, and  it  is  the  mind  that  frames  all  that  variety  of 
bodies  which  compose  the  visible  world,  any  one  where- 
of does  not  exist  longer  than  it  is  perceived. 

48.  If  we  consider  it,  the  objection  proposed  in  sect. 
45  will  not  be  found  reasonably  charged  on  the  princi- 
ples we  have  premised,  so  as  in  truth  to  make  any  ob- 
jection at  all  against  our  notions.  For,  though  we  hold 
indeed  the  objects  of  sense  to  be  nothing  else  but  ideas 
/  (^  which  cannot  exist  unperceived ;  yet  we  may  not  hence 
conclude  they  have  no  existence  except  only  while  they 
are  perceived  by  us,  since  there  may  be  some  other 

'  spirit  that  perceives  them  though  we  do  not.  Wherever 
bodies  are  said  to  have  no  existence  without  the  mind, 
I  would  not  be  understood  to  mean  this  or  that  par- 
ticular mind,  but  all  minds  whatsoever.  It  does  not 
therefore  follow   from  the   foregoing  principles  that 

V,  bodies  are  annihilated  and  created  every  moment,  or 
/  exist  not  at  all  during  the  intervals  between  our  per- 

(     ception  of  them. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  57 

49.  Fifthly,  it  may  perhaps  be  objected  that  if  ex- 
tension and  figure  exist  only  in  the  mind,  it  follows 
that  the  mind  is  extended  and  figured ;  since  extension 
is  a  mode  or  attribute  which  (to  speak  with  the  schools) 
is  predicated  of  the  subject  in  which  it  exists.  I  answer, 
those  qualities  are  in  the  mind  only  as  they  are  per- 
ceived by  it — that  is,  not  by  way  of  mode  or  attribute, 
but  only  by  way  of  idea;  and  it  no  more  follows  the 
soul  or  mind  is  extended,  because  extension  exists  in 
it  alone,  than  it  does  that  it  is  red  or  blue,  because  those 
colours  are  on  all  hands  acknowledged  to  exist  in  it, 
and  nowhere  else.  As  to  what  philosophers  say  of 
subject  and  mode,  that  seems  very  groundless  and  un- 
intelligible. For  instance,  in  this  proposition  "a  die  is 
hard,  extended,  and  square,"  they  will  have  it  that  the 
word  die  denotes  a  subject  or  substance,  distinct  from 
the  hardness,  extension,  and  figure  which  are  predicated 
of  it,  and  in  which  they  exist.  This  I  cannot  compre- 
hend :  to  me  a  die  seems  to  be  nothing  distinct  from 
those  things  which  are  termed  its  modes  or  accidents. 
And,  to  say  a  die  is  hard,  extended,  and  square  is  not 
to  attribute  those  qualities  to  a  subject  distinct  from 
and  nowhere  else.  As  to  what  philosophers  say  of 
meaning  of  the  word  die. 

50.  Sixthly,  you  will  say  there  have  been  a  great 
many  things  explained  by  matter  and  motion ;  take 
away  these  and  you  destroy  the  whole  corpuscular 
philosophy,  and  undermine  those  mechanical  principles 
which  have  been  applied  with  so  much  success  to  ac- 
count for  the  phenomena.  In  short,  whatever  advances 
have  been  made,  either  by  ancient  or  modern  philoso- 
phers, in  the  study  of  nature  do  all  proceed  on  the  sup- 
position that  corporeal  substance  or  Matter  doth  really 


S8  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

exist.  To  this  I  answer  that  there  is  not  any  one  phe- 
nomenon explained  on  that  supposition  which  may  not 
as  well  be  explained  without  it,  as  might  easily  be  made 
appear  by  an  induction  of  particulars.  To  explain  the 
phenomena,  is  all  one  as  to  shew  why,  upon  such  and 
such  occasions,  we  are  affected  with  such  and  such 
ideas.  But  how  Matter  should  operate  on  a  Spirit,  or 
produce  any  idea  in  it,  is  what  no  philosopher  will  pre- 
tend to  explain ;  it  is  therefore  evident  there  can  be  no 
use  of  Matter  in  natural  philosophy.  Besides,  they 
who  attempt  to  account  for  things  do  it  not  by  corporeal 
substance,  but  by  figure,  motion,  and  other  qualities, 
which  are  in  truth  no  more  than  mere  ideas,  and,  there- 
fore, cannot  be  the  cause  of  anything,  as  hath  been 
already  shewn.    See  sect.  25. 

51.  Seventhly,  it  will  upon  this  be  demanded  whether 
it  does  not  seem  absurd  to  take  away  natural  causes, 
and  ascribe  everything  to  the  immediate  operation  of 
Spirits  ?  We  must  no  longer  say  upon  these  principles 
that  fire  heats,  or  water  cools,  but  that  a  Spirit  heats, 
and  so  forth.  Would  not  a  man  be  deservedly  laughed 
at,  who  should  talk  after  this  manner?  I  answer,  he 
would  so;  in  such  things  we  ought  to  "think  with  the 
learned,  and  speak  with  the  vulgar."  They  who  to 
demonstration  are  convinced  of  the  truth  of  the  Coper- 
nican  system  do  nevertheless  say  "the  sun  rises,"  "the 
sun  sets,"  or  "comes  to  the  meridian ;"  and  if  they 
affected  a  contrary  style  in  common  talk  it  would  with- 
out doubt  appear  very  ridiculous.  A  little  reflexion  on 
what  is  here  said  will  make  it  manifest  that  the  common 
use  of  language  would  receive  no  manner  of  alteration 
or  disturbance  from  the  admission  of  our  tenets. 

52,  In  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  any  phrases  may 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  59 

be  retained,  so  long  as  they  excite  in  us  proper  senti- 
ments, or  dispositions  to  act  in  such  a  manner  as  is 
necessary  for  our  well-being,  how  false  soever  they 
may  be  if  taken  in  a  strict  and  speculative  sense.  Nay, 
this  is  unavoidable,  since,  propriety  being  regulated 
by  custom,  language  is  suited  to  the  received  opinions, 
which  are  not  always  the  truest.  Hence  it  is  impossi- 
ble, even  in  the  most  rigid,  philosophic  reasonings,  so 
far  to  alter  the  bent  and  genius  of  the  tongue  we  speak, 
as  never  to  give  a  handle  for  cavillers  to  pretend  diffi- 
culties and  inconsistencies.  But,  a  fair  and  ingenuous 
reader  will  collect  the  sense  from  the  scope  and  tenor 
and  connexion  of  a  discourse,  making  allowances  for 
those  inaccurate  modes  of  speech  which  use  has  made 
inevitable. 

53.  As  to  the  opinion  that  there  are  no  Corporeal 
Causes,  this  has  been  heretofore  maintained  by  some 
of  the  Schoolmen,  as  it  is  of  late  by  others  among  the 
modern  philosophers,  who  though  they  allow  Matter 
to  exist,  yet  will  have  God  alone  to  be  the  immediate 
efficient  cause  of  all  things.  These  men  saw  that 
amongst  all  the  objects  of  sense  there  was  none  which 
had  any  power  or  activity  included  in  it ;  and  that  by 
consequence  this  was  likewise  true  of  whatever  bodies 
they  supposed  to  exist  without  the  mind,  like  unto  the 
immediate  objects  of  sense.  But  then,  that  they  should 
suppose  an  innumerable  multitude  of  created  beings, 
which  they  acknowledge  are  not  capable  of  producing 
any  one  eflfect  in  nature,  and  which  therefore  are  made 
to  no  manner  of  purpose,  since  God  might  have  done 
everything  as  well  without  them :  this  I  say,  though 
we  should  allow  it  possible,  must  yet  be  a  very  unac- 
countable and  extravagant  supposition. 

54.  In  the   eighth   place,   the   universal   concurrent 


6o  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

assent  of  mankind  may  be  thought  by  some  an  invinci- 
ble argument  in  behalf  of  Matter,  or  the  existence  of 
external  things.  Must  we  sujTpose  the  whole  world  to 
be  mistaken?  And  if  so,  what  cause  can  be  assigned 
of  so  widespread  and  predominant  an  error?  I  answer, 
first,  that,  upon  a  narrow  inquiry,  it  will  not  perhaps 
be  found  so  many  as  is  imagined  do  really  believe  the 
existence  of  Matter  or  things  without  the  mind. 
Strictly  speaking,  to  believe  that  which  involves  a  con- 
tradiction, or  has  no  meaning  in  it,  is  impossible ;  and 
whether  the  foregoing  expressions  are  not  of  that  sort, 
I  refer  it  to  the  impartial  examination  of  the  reader. 
In  one  sense,  indeed,  men  may  be  said  to  believe  that 
Matter  exists,  that  is,  they  act  as  if  the  immediate 
cause  of  their  sensations,  which  affects  them  every 
moment,  and  is  so  nearly  present  to  them,  were  some 
senseless  unthinking  being.  But,  that  they  should 
clearly  apprehend  any  meaning  marked  by  those  words, 
and  form  thereof  a  settled  speculative  opinion,  is  what 
I  am  not  able  to  conceive.  This  is  not  the  only  in- 
stance wherein  men  impose  upon  themselves,  by  imag- 
ining they  believe  those  propositions  which  they  have 
often  heard,  though  at  bottom  they  have  no  meaning 
in  them, 

55.  But  secondly,  though  we  should  grant  a  notion 
to  be  never  so  universally  and  steadfastly  adhered  to, 
yet  this  is  weak  argument  oi  its  truth  to  whoever  con- 
siders what  a  vast  number  of  prejudices  and  false 
opinions  are  everywhere  embraced  with  the  utmost 
tenaciousness,  by  the  unreflecting  (which  are  the  far 
greater)  part  of  mankind.  There  was  a  time  when 
the  antipodes  and  motion  of  the  earth  were  looked  upon 
as  monstrous  absurdities  even  by  men  of  learning :  and 
if  it  be  considered  what  a  small  proportion  they  bear 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  6i 

to  the  rest  of  mankind,  we  shall  find  that  at  this  day 
those  notions  have  gained  but  a  very  inconsiderable 
footing  in  the  world. 

56.  But  it  is  demanded  that  we  assign  a  cause  of  this 
prejudice,  and  account  for  its  obtaining  in  the  world. 
To  this  I  answer,  that  men  knowing  they  perceived 
several  ideas,  whereof  they  themselves  were  not  the 
authors — as  not  being  excited  from  within  nor  depend- 
ing on  the  operation  of  their  wills — this  made  them 
maintain  those  ideas,  or  objects  of  perception  had  an 
existence  independent  of  and  without  the  mind,  with- 
out ever  dreaming  that  a  contradiction  was  involved 
in  those  words.  But,  philosophers  having  plainly 
seen  that  the  immediate  objects  of  perception 
do  not  exist  without  the  mind,  they  in  some 
degree  corrected  the  mistake  of  the  vulgar ;  but 
at  the  same  time  run  into  another  which  seems 
no  less  absurd,  to  wit,  that  there  are  certain  objects 
really  existing  without  the  mind,  or  having  a  subsist- 
ence distinct  from  being  perceived,  of  which  our  ideas 
are  only  images  or  resemblances,  imprinted  by  those 
objects  on  the  mind.  And  this  notion  of  the  philoso- 
phers owes  its  origin  to  the  same  cause  with  the  former, 
namely,  their  being  conscious  that  they  were  not  the 
authors  of  their  own  sensations,  which  they  evidently 
knew  were  imprinted  from  without,  and  which  there- 
fore must  have  some  cause  distinct  from  the  minds  on 
which  they  are  imprinted. 

57.  But  why  they  should  suppose  the  ideas  of  sense 
to  be  excited  in  us  by  things  in  their  likeness,  and  not 
rather  have  recourse  to  Spirit  which  alone  can  act,  may 
be  accounted  for,  first,  because  they  were  not  aware 
of  the  repugnancy  there  is,  as  well  in  supposing  things 


62  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

like  unto  our  ideas  existing  without,  as  in  attributing 
to  them  power  or  activity.  Secondly,  because  the 
Supreme  Spirit  which  excites  those  ideas  in  our  minds, 
is  not  marked  out  and  limited  to  our  view  by  any  par- 
ticular finite  collection  of  sensible  ideas,  as  human 
agents  are  by  their  size,  complexion,  limbs,  and  mo- 
tions. And  thirdly,  because  His  operations  are  regular 
and  uniform.  Whenever  the  course  of  nature  is  inter- 
rupted by  a  miracle,  men  are  ready  to  own  the  presence 
of  a  superior  agent.  But,  when  we  see  things  go  on 
in  the  ordinary  course  they  do  not  excite  in  us  any 
reflexion ;  their  order  and  concatenation,  though  it  be 
an  argument  of  the  greatest  wisdom,  power,  and  good- 
ness in  their  creator,  is  yet  so  constant  and  familiar 
to  us  that  we  do  not  think  them  the  immediate  effects 
of  a  Free  Spirit;  especially  since  inconsistency  and 
mutability  in  acting,  though  it  be  an  imperfection,  is 
looked  on  as  a  mark  of  freedom. 

58.  Tenthly,  it  will  be  objected  that  the  notions  we 
advance  are  inconsistent  with  several  sound  truths  in 
philosophy  and  mathematics.  For  example,  the  motion 
of  the  earth  is  now  universally  admitted  by  astrono- 
mers as  a  truth  grounded  on  the  clearest  and  most  con- 
vincing reasons.  But,  on  the  foregoing  principles, 
there  can  be  no  such  thing.  For,  motion  being  only 
an  idea,  it  follows  that  if  it  be  not  perceived  it  exists 
not;  but  the  motion  of  the  earth  is  not  perceived  by 
sense.  I  answer,  that  tenet,  if  rightly  understood, 
will  be  found  to  agree  with  the  principles  we  have 
premised;  for,  the  question  whether  the  earth  moves 
or  no  amounts  in  reality  to  no  more  than  this,  to  wit, 
whether  we  have  reason  to  conclude,  from  what  has 
been  observed  by  astronomers,  that  if  we  were  placed 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  63 

in  such  and  such  circumstances,  and  such  or  such  a 
position  and  distance  both  from  the  earth  and  sun, 
we  should  perceive  the  former  to  move  among  the  choir 
of  the  planets,  and  appearing  in  all  respects  like  one  of 
them  ;  and  this,  by  the  established  rules  of  nature  which 
we  have  no  reason  to  mistrust,  is  reasonably  collected 
from  the  phenomena. 

59.  We  may,  from  the  experience  we  have  had  of 
the  train  and  succession  of  ideas  in  our  minds,  often 
make,  I  will  not  say  uncertain  conjectures,  but  sure 
and  well-grounded  predictions  concerning  the  ideas 
we  shall  be  affected  with  pursuant  to  a  great  train  of 
actions,  and  be  enabled  to  pass  a  right  judgment  of 
what  would  have  appeared  to  us,  in  case  we  were 
placed  in  circumstances  very  different  from  those  we 
are  in  at  present.  Herein  consists  the  knowledge  of 
nature,  which  may  preserve  its  use  and  certainty  very 
consistently  with  what  hath  been  said.  It  will  be  easy 
to  apply  this  to  whatever  objections  of  the  like  sort 
may  be  drawn  from  the  magnitude  of  the  stars,  or  any 
other  discoveries  in  astronomy  or  nature. 

60.  In  the  eleventh  place,  it  will  be  demanded  to  what 
purpose  serves  that  curious  organization  of  plants, 
and  the  animal  mechanism  in  the  parts  of  animals ; 
might  not  vegetables  grow,  and  shoot  forth  leaves  of 
blossoms,  and  animals  perform  all  their  motions  as 
well  without  as  with  all  that  variety  of  internal  parts 
so  elegantly  contrived  and  put  together;  which,  being 
ideas,  have  nothing  powerful  or  operative  in  them, 
nor  have  any  necessary  connexion  with  the  effects 
ascribed  to  them?  If  it  be  a  Spirit  that  immediately 
produces  every  effect  by  a  Hat  or  act  of  his  will,  we 
must  think  all  that  is  fine  and  artificial  in  the  works, 


64  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

whether  of  man  or  nature,  to  be  made  in  vain.  By  this 
doctrine,  though  an  artist  hath  made  the  spring  and 
wlieels,  and  every  movement  of  a  watch,  and  adjusted 
them  in  such  a  manner  as  he  knew  would  produce 
the  motions  he  designed,  yet  he  must  think  all  this  done 
to  no  purpose,  and  that  it  is  an  Intelligence  which  di- 
rects the  index,  and  points  to  the  hour  of  the  day.  If 
so,  why  may  not  the  Intelligence  do  it,  without  his 
being  at  the  pains  of  making  the  movements  and  put- 
ting them  together?  Why  does  not  an  empty  case 
serve  as  well  as  another?  And  how  comes  it  to  pass 
that  whenever  there  is  any  fault  in  the  going  of  a 
watch,  there  is  some  corresponding  disorder  to  be 
found  in  the  movements,  which  being  mended  by  a 
skilful  hand  all  is  right  again?  The  like  may  be  said 
of  all  the  clockwork  of  nature,  great  part  whereof  is 
so  wonderfully  fine  and  subtle  as  scarce  to  be  discerned 
by  the  best  microscope.  In  short,  it  will  be  asked, 
how,  upon  our  principles,  any  tolerable  account  can 
be  given,  or  any  final  cause  assigned  of  an  innumera- 
ble multitude  of  bodies  and  machines,  framed  with 
the  most  exquisite  art,  which  in  the  common  philosophy 
have  very  apposite  uses  assigned  them,  and  serve  to 
explain  abundance  of  phenomena? 

6i.  To  all  which  I  answer,  first,  that  though  there 
were  some  difficulties  relating  to  the  administration  of 
Providence,  and  the  Uses  by  it  assigned  to  the  several 
parts  of  nature,  w^hich  I  could  not  solve  by  the  fore- 
going principles,  yet  this  objection  could  be  of  small 
weight  against  the  truth  and  certainty  of  those  things 
which  may  be  proved  a  priori,  with  the  utmost  evi- 
dence and  rigor  of  demonstration.  Secondly,  but  neither 
are  the  received  principles  free  from  the  like  diffi- 
culties;  for,  it  mav  still  be  demanded  to  what  end 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  65 

God  should  take  those  roundabout  methods  of  effect- 
ing things  by  instruments  and  machines,  which  no 
one  can  deny  might  have  been  effected  by  the  mere 
command  of  His  will  without  all  that  apparatus ; 
nay,  if  we  narrowly  consider  it,  we  shall  find  the 
objection  may  be  retorted  with  greater  force  on 
those  who  hold  the  existence  of  those  machines  with- 
out of  mind;  for  it  has  been  made  evident  that 
solidity,  bulk,  figure,  motion,  and  the  like  have 
no  activity  or  efficacy  in  them,  so  as  to  be  capable  of 
producing  any  one  effect  in  nature.  See  sect.  25. 
Whoever  therefore  supposes  them  to  exist  (allowing 
the  supposition  possible)  when  they  are  not  perceived 
does  it  manifestly  to  no  purpose ;  since  the  only  use 
that  is  assigned  to  them,  as  they  exist  unperceived,  is 
that  they  produce  those  perceivable  effects  which  in 
truth  cannot  be  ascribed  to  anything  but  Spirit. 

62.  But,  to  come  nigher  the  difficulty,  it  must  be 
observed  that  though  the  fabrication  of  all  those  parts 
and  organs  be  not  absolutely  necessary  to  the  produc- 
ing any  effect,  yet  it  is  necessary  to  the  producing  of 
things  in  a  constant  regular  way  according  to  the  laws 
of  nature.  There  are  certain  general  laws  that  run 
through  the  whole  chain  of  natural  effects ;  these  are 
learned  by  the  observation  and  study  of  nature,  and  are 
by  men  applied  as  well  to  the  framing  artificial  things 
for  the  use  and  ornament  of  life  as  to  the  explaining 
various  phenomena — which  explication  consists  only 
in  shewing  the  conformity  any  particular  phenomenon 
hath  to  the  general  laws  of  nature,  or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  in  discovering  the  uniformity  there  is  in 
the  production  of  natural  effects ;  as  will  be  evident  to 
whoever  shall  attend  to  the  several  instances  wherein 
philosophers  pretend  to  account  for  appearances.  That 


66  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

there  is  a  great  and  conspicuous  use  in  these  regular 
constant  methods  of  working  observed  by  the  Supreme 
Agent  hath  been  shewn  in  sect.  31.  And  it  is  no  less 
visible  that  a  particular  size,  figure,  motion,  and  dis- 
position of  parts  are  necessary,  though  not  absolutely 
to  the  producing  any  effect,  yet  to  the  producing  it  ac- 
cording to  the  standing  mechanical  laws  of  nature. 
Thus,  for  instance,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  God,  or 
the  Intelligence  that  sustains  and  rules  the  ordinary 
course  of  things,  might  if  He  were  minded  to  produce 
a  miracle,  cause  all  the  motions  on  the  dial-plate  of  a 
watch,  though  nobody  had  ever  made  the  movements 
and  put  them  in  it :  but  yet,  if  He  will  act  agreeably 
to  the  rules  of  mechanism,  by  Him  for  wise  ends  es- 
tablished and  maintained  in  the  creation,  it  is  necessary 
that  those  actions  of  the  watchmaker,  whereby  he 
makes  the  movements  and  rightly  adjusts  them,  pre- 
cede the  production  of  the  aforesaid  motions ;  as  also 
that  any  disorder  in  them  be  attended  with  the  percep- 
tion of  some  corresponding  disorder  in  the  movements, 
which  being  once  corrected  all  is  right  again. 

63.  It  may  indeed  on  some  occasions  be  necessary 
that  the  Author  of  nature  display  His  overruling 
power  in  producing  some  appearance  out  of  the  ordi- 
nary series  of  things.  Such  exceptions  from  the  gen- 
eral rules  of  nature  are  proper  to  surprise  and  awe 
men  into  an  acknowledgement  of  the  Divine  Being; 
but  then  they  are  to  be  used  but  seldom,  otherwise 
there  is  a  plain  reason  why  they  should  fail  of  that 
effect.  Besides,  God  seems  to  choose  the  convinc- 
ing our  reason  of  His  attributes  by  the  works  of  na- 
ture, which  discover  so  much  harmony  and  contri- 
vance in  their  make,  and  are  such  plain  indications  of 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  67 

wisdom  and  beneficence  in  their  Author,  rather  than 
to  astonish  us  into  a  belief  of  His  Being  by  anomalous 
and  surprising  events. 

64.  To  set  this  matter  in  a  yet  clearer  light,  I  shall 
observe  that  what  has  been  objected  in  sect.  60 
amounts  in  reality  to  no  more  than  this  : — ideas  are  not 
anyhow  and  at  random  produced,  there  being  a  certain 
order  and  connexion  between  them,  like  to  that  of 
cause  and  effect;  there  are  also  several  combinations 
of  them  made  in  a  very  regular  and  artificial  manner, 
which  seem  like  so  many  instruments  in  the  hand  of 
nature  that,  being  hid  as  it  were  behind  the  scenes, 
have  a  secret  operation  in  producing  those  appearances 
which  are  seen  on  the  theatre  of  the  world,  being  them- 
selves discernible  only  to  the  curious  eye  of  the  phil- 
osopher. But,  since  one  idea  cannot  be  the  cause  of 
another,  to  what  purpose  is  that  connexion?  And, 
since  those  instruments,  being  barely  inefH&acions  per- 
ceptions in  the  mind,  are  not  subservient  to  the  pro- 
duction of  natural  effects,  it  is  demanded  why  they 
are  made ;  or,  in  other  words,  what  reason  can  be 
assigned  why  God  should  make  us,  upon  a  close  in- 
spection into  His  works,  behold  so  great  variety  of 
ideas  so  artfully  laid  together,  and  so  much  according 
to  rule;  it  not  being  [credible]*  that  He  would  be  at 
the  expense  (if  one  may  so  speak)  of  all  that  art  and 
regularity  to  no  purpose. 

65.  To  all  which  my  answer  is,  first,  that  the  con- 
nexion of  ideas  does  not  imply  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  but  only  of  a  mark  or  sign  with  the  thing 
signified.  The  fire  which  I  see  is  not  the  cause  of  the 
pain  I  suffer  upon  my  approaching  it,  but  the  mark 
that  forewarns  me  of  it.    In  like  manner  the  noise  that 


*"Imaginable"  in  the  first  edition. 


68  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

I  hear  is  not  the  effect  of  this  or  that  motion  or  col- 
lision of  the  ambient  bodies,  but  the  sign  thereof.  Sec- 
ondly, the  reason  why  ideas  are  formed  into  machines, 
that  is,  artificial  and  regular  combinations,  is  the  same 
with  that  for  combining  letters  into  words.  That  a 
few  original  ideas  may  be  made  to  signify  a  great  num- 
ber of  effects  and  actions,  it  is  necessary  they  be  vari- 
ously combined  together.  And,  to  the  end  their  use 
be  permanent  and  universal,  these  combinations  must 
be  made  by  mle,  and  with  imse  contrivance.  By  this 
means  abundance  of  information  is  conveyed  unto  us, 
concerning  what  we  are  to  expect  from  such  and  such 
actions  and  what  methods  are  proper  to  be  taken  for 
the  exciting  such  and  such  ideas ;  which  in  effect  is  all 
that  I  conceive  to  be  distinctly  meant  when  it  is  said 
that,  by  discerning  a  figure,  texture,  and  mechanism 
of  the  inward  parts  of  bodies,  whether  natural  or  arti- 
ficial, we  may  attain  to  know  the  several  uses  and 
properties  depending  thereon,  or  the  nature  of  the 
thing. 

66.  Hence,  it  is  evident  that  those  things  which, 
under  the  notion  of  a  cause  co-operating  or  concurring 
to  the  production  of  effects,  are  altogether  inexplicable, 
and  run  us  into  great  absurdities,  may  be  very  natur- 
ally explained,  and  have  a  proper  and  obvious  use 
assigned  to  them,  when  they  are  considered  only  as 
marks  or  signs  for  our  information.  And  it  is  the 
searching  after  and  endeavouring  to  understand  [those 
signs  instituted  by  the  Author  of  Nature]  *,  that  ought 
to  be  the  employment  of  the  natural  philosopher ;  and 
not  the  pretending  to  explain  things  by  corporeal 
causes,  which  doctrine  seems  to  have  too  much  es- 


*In  the  first  edition  the  bracketed  phrase  reads  as  follows: 
"this  Language  (if  I  may  so  call  it)  of  the  Author  of  Nature." 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  69 

tranged  the  minds  of  men  from  that  active  principle, 
that  supreme  and  wise  Spirit  "in  whom  we  Hve,  move, 
and  have  our  being." 

6y.  In  the  tivelfth  place,  it  may  perhaps  be  objected 
that — though  it  be  clear  from  what  has  been  said  that 
there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  an  inert,  senseless,  ex- 
tended, solid,  figured,  movable  substance  existing  with- 
out the  mind,  such  as  philosophers  describe  Matter — 
yet,  if  any  man  shall  leave  out  of  his  idea  of  matter 
the  positive  ideas  of  extension,  figure,  solidity  and 
motion,  and  say  that  he  means  only  by  that  word 
an  inert,  senseless  substance,  that  exists  without  the 
mind  or  unperceived,  which  is  the  occasion  of  our 
ideas,  or  at  the  presence  whereof  God  is  pleased  to 
excite  ideas  in  us :  it  doth  not  appear  but  that  Matter 
taken  in  this  sense  may  possibly  exist.  In  answer  to 
which  I  say,  first,  that  it  seems  no  less  absurd  to  sup- 
pose a  substance  without  accidents,  than  it  is  to  sup- 
pose accidents  without  a  substance.  But  secondly, 
though  we  should  grant  this  unknown  substance  may 
possibly  exist,  yet  where  can  it  be  supposed  to  be? 
That  it  exists  not  in  the  mind  is  agreed ;  and  that  it 
exists  not  in  place  is  no  less  certain — since  all  place  or 
extension  exists  only  in  the  mind,  as  hath  been  already 
proved.  It  remains  therefore  that  it  exists  nowhere  at 
all. 

68.  Let  us  examine  a  little  the  description  that  is 
here  given  us  of  matter.  It  neither  acts,  nor  perceives, 
nor  is  perceived ;  for  this  is  all  that  is  meant  by  saying 
it  is  an  inert,  senseless,  unknown  substance ;  which 
is  a  definition  entirely  made  up  of  negatives,  excepting 
only  the  relative  notion  of  its  standing  under  or  sup- 
porting. But  then  it  must  be  observed  that  it  supports 
nothing  at  all,  and  how  nearly  this  comes  to  the  do- 


70  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

scription  of  a  nonentity  I  desire  may  be  considered. 
But,  say  you,  it  is  the  unknown  occasion,  at  the  pres- 
ence of  which  ideas  are  excited  in  us  by  the  will  of 
God.  Now,  I  would  fain  know  how  anything  can  be 
present  to  us,  which  is  neither  perceivable  by  sense  nor 
reflexion,  nor  capable  of  producing  any  idea  in  our 
minds,  nor  is  at  all  extended,  nor  hath  any  form,  nor 
exists  in  any  place.  The  words  "to  be  present,"  when 
thus  applied,  must  needs  be  taken  in  some  abstract  and 
strange  meaning,  and  which  I  am  not  able  to  compre- 
hend. 

69.  Again,  let  us  examine  what  is  meant  by  occasion. 
So  far  as  I  can  gather  from  the  common  use  of  lan- 
guage, that  word  signifies  either  the  agent  which  pro- 
duces any  effect,  or  else  something  that  is  observed  to 
accompany  or  go  before  it  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
things.  But  when  it  is  applied  to  Matter  as  above  de- 
scribed, it  can  be  taken  in  neither  of  those  senses ;  for 
Matter  is  said  to  be  passive  and  inert,  and  so  cannot  be 
an  agent  or  efficient  cause.  It  is  also  unperceivable, 
as  being  devoid  of  all  sensible  qualities,  and  so  cannot 
be  the  occasion  of  our  perceptions  in  the  latter  sense : 
as  when  the  burning  my  finger  is  said  to  be  the  occa- 
sion of  the  pain  that  attends  it.  What  therefore  can 
be  meant  by  calling  matter  an  occasion  f  The  term  is 
either  used  in  no  sense  at  all,  or  else  in  some  very 
distant  from  its  received  signification. 

70.  You  will  perhaps  say  that  Matter,  though  it  be 
not  perceived  by  us,  is  nevertheless  perceived  by  God, 
to  whom  it  is  the  occasion  of  exciting  ideas  in  our 
minds.  For,  say  you,  since  we  observe  our  sensations 
to  be  imprinted  in  an  orderly  and  constant  manner,  it 
is  but  reasonable  to  suppose  there  are  certain  constant 
and  regular  occasions  of  their  being  produced.    That  is 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  71 

to  say,  that  there  are  certain  permanent  and  distinct 
parcels  of  Matter,  corresponding  to  our  ideas,  which, 
though  they  do  not  excite  them  in  our  minds,  or  any- 
wise immediately  affect  us,  as  being  altogether  passive 
and  unperceivable  to  us,  they  are  nevertheless  to  God, 
by  whom  they  art  perceived,  as  it  were  so  many  occa- 
sions to  remind  Him  when  and  what  ideas  to  imprint 
on  our  minds ;  that  so  things  may  go  on  in  a  constant 
uniform  manner, 

71.  In  answer  to  this,  I  observe  that,  as  the  notion 
of  Matter  is  here  stated,  the  question  is  no  longer  con- 
cerning the  existence  of  a  thing  distinct  from  Spirit 
and  idea,  from  perceiving  and  being  perceived ;  but 
whether  there  are  not  certain  ideas  of  I  know  not  what 
sort,  in  the  mind  of  God  which  are  so  many  marks  or 
notes  that  direct  Him  how  to  produce  sensations  in  our 
minds  in  a  constant  and  regular  method — much  after 
the  same  manner  as  a  musician  is  directed  by  the  notes 
of  music  to  produce  that  harmonious  train  and  compo- 
sition of  sound  which  is  called  a  tune,  though  they  who 
hear  the  music  do  not  perceive  the  notes,  and  may  be 
entirely  ignorant  of  them.  But,  this  notion  of  Matter 
[which  after  all  is  the  only  intelligible  one  that  I  can 
pick,  from  what  is  said  of  unknown  occasions]*  seems 
too  extravagant  to  deserve  a  confutation.  Be- 
sides, it  is  in  efifect  no  objection  against  what  we  have 
advanced,  viz.  that  there  is  no  senseless  unperceived 
substance. 

y2.  li  we  follow  the  light  of  reason,  we  shall,  from 
the  constant  uniform  method  of  our  sensations,  collect 
the  goodness  and  wisdom  of  the  Spirit  who  excites 


*The  bracketed  sentence  in  parentheses  was  omitted  in  the 
second  edition. 


•ji  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

them  in  our  minds;  but  this  is  all  that  I  can  see 
reasonably  concluded  from  thence.  To  me,  I  say,  it  is 
evident  that  the  being  of  a  spirit  infinitely  wise,  good, 
and  powerful  is  abundantly  sufficient  to  explain  all  the 
appearances  of  nature.  But,  as  for  inert,  senseless 
Matter,  nothing  that  I  perceive  has  any  the  least  con- 
nexion with  it,  or  leads  to  the  thoughts  of  it.  And  I 
would  fain  see  any  one  explain  any  the  meanest  phe- 
nomenon in  nature  by  it,  or  shew  any  manner  of 
reason,  though  in  the  lowest  rank  of  probability,  that 
he  can  have  for  its  existence,  or  even  make  any  toler- 
able sense  or  meaning  of  that  supposition.  For,  as  to 
its  being  an  occasion,  we  have,  I  think,  evidently  shewn 
that  with  regard  to  us  it  is  no  occasion.  It  remains 
therefore  that  it  must  be,  if  at  all,  the  occasion  to  God 
of  exciting  ideas  in  us;  and  what  this  amounts  to  we 
have  just  now  seen. 

73.  It  is  worth  while  to  reflect  a  little  on  the  motives 
which  induced  men  to  suppose  the  existence  of  material 
substance;  that  so  having  observed  the  gradual  ceasing 
and  expiration  of  those  motives  or  reasons,  we  may 
proportionably  withdraw  the  assent  that  was  grounded 
on  them.  First,  therefore,  it  was  thought  that  colour, 
figure,  motion,  and  the  rest  of  the  sensible  qualities  or 
accidents,  did  really  exist  without  the  mind ;  and  for 
this  reason  it  seemed  needful  to  suppose  some  unthink- 
ing substratum  or  substance  wherein  they  did  exist, 
since  they  could  not  be  conceived  to  exist  by  them- 
selves. Afterwards,  in  process  of  time,  men  being 
convinced  that  colours,  sounds,  and  the  rest  of 
the  sensible,  secondary  qualities  had  no  existence 
without  the  mind,  they  stripped  this  substratum  or 
material  substance  of  those  qualities,  leaving  only  the 
primary  ones,  figure,  motion,  and  suchlike,  which  they 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  73 

still  conceived  to  exist  without  the  mind,  and  conse- 
quently to  stand  in  need  of  a  material  support.  But, 
it  having  been  shewn  that  none  even  of  these  can  possi- 
bly exist  otherwise  than  in  a  Spirit  or  Mind  which 
perceives  them  it  follows  that  we  have  no  longer  any 
reason  to  suppose  the  being  of  Matter ;  nay,  that  it  is 
utterly  impossible  there  should  be  any  such  thing,  so 
long  as  that  word  is  taken  to  denote  an  unthinking 
substratum  of  qualities  or  accidents  wherein  they  exist 
without  the  mind. 

74.  But  though  it  be  allowed  by  the  materialists 
themselves  that  Matter  was  thought  of  only  for  the 
sake  of  supporting  accidents,  and,  the  reason  entirely 
ceasing,  one  might  expect  the  mind  should  naturally, 
and  without  any  reluctance  at  all,  quit  the  belief  of 
what  was  solely  grounded  thereon ;  yet  the  prejudice 
is  riveted  so  deeply  in  our  thoughts,  that  we  can  scarce 
tell  how  to  part  with  it,  and  are  therefore  inclined, 
since  the  thing  itself  is  indefensible,  at  least  to  retain 
the  name,  which  we  apply  to  I  know  not  what  ab- 
stracted and  indefinite  notions  of  being,  or  occasion, 
though  without  any  show  of  reason,  at  least  so  far  as 
I  can  see.  For,  what  is  there  on  our  part,  or  what  do 
we  perceive,  amongst  all  the  ideas,  sensations,  notions 
which  are  imprinted  on  our  minds,  either  by  sense  or 
reflexion,  from  whence  may  be  inferred  the  existence 
of  an  inert,  thoughtless,  unperceived  occasion?  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  on  the  part  of  an  All-sufficient  Spirit, 
what  can  there  be  that  should  make  us  believe  or  even 
suspect  He  is  directed  by  an  inert  occasion  to  excite 
ideas  in  our  minds? 

75.  It  is  a  very  extraordinary  instance  of  the  force 
of  prejudice,  and  much  to  be  lamented,  that  the  mind 
of  man  retains  so  great  a  fondness,  against  all  the 


74  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

evidence  of  reason,  for  a  stupid  thoughtless  somewhat, 
by  the  interposition  whereof  it  would  as  it  were  screen 
itself  from  the  Providence  of  God,  and  remove  it 
farther  off  from  the  affairs  of  the  world.  But,  though 
we  do  the  utmost  we  can  to  secure  the  belief  of  Matter, 
though,  when  reason  forsakes  us,  we  endeavour  to 
support  our  opinion  on  the  bare  possibility  of  the  thing, 
and  though  we  indulge  ourselves  in  the  full  scope  of 
an  imagination  not  regulated  by  reason  to  make  out 
that  poor  possibility,  yet  the  upshot  of  all  is,  that  there 
are  certain  unknown  Ideas  in  the  mind  of  God;  for 
this,  if  anything,  is  all  that  I  conceive  to  be  meant  by 
occasion  with  regard  to  God.  And  this  at  the  bottom 
is  no  longer  contending  for  the  thing,  but  for  the  name. 

76.  Whether  therefore  there  are  such  Ideas  in  the 
mind  of  God,  and  whether  they  may  be  called  by  the 
name  Matter,  I  shall  not  dispute.  But,  if  you  stick  to 
the  notion  of  an  unthinking  substance  or  support  of 
extension,  motion,  and  other  sensible  qualities,  then  to 
me  it  is  most  evidently  impossible  there  should  be  any 
such  thing;  since  it  is  a  plain  repugnancy  that  those 
qualities  should  exist  in  or  be  supported  by  an  unper- 
ceiving  substance. 

yy.  But,  say  you,  though  it  be  granted  that  there 
is  no  thoughtless  support  of  extension  and  the  other 
qualities  or  accidents  which  we  perceive,  yet  there  may 
perhaps  be  some  inert,  unperceiving  substance  or  suh- 
stratuni  of  some  other  qualities,  as  incomprehensible  to 
us  as  colours  are  to  a  man  born  blind,  because  we  have 
not  a  sense  adapted  to  them.  But,  if  we  had  a  new 
sense,  we  should  possibly  no  more  doubt  of  their  exist- 
ence than  a  blind  man  made  to  see  does  of  the  exist- 
ence of  light  and  colours.  I  answer,  first,  if  what  you 
mean  by  the  word  Matter  be  only  the  unknown  support 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  75 

of  unknown  qualities,  it  is  no  matter  whether  there  is 
such  a  thing  or  no,  since  it  no  way  concerns  us ;  and 
I  do  not  see  the  advantage  there  is  in  disputing  about 
what  we  know  not  what,  and  we  know  not  zvhy. 

78.  But,  secondly,  if  we  had  a  new  sense  it  could 
only  furnish  us  with  new  ideas  or  sensations ;  and  then 
we  should  have  the  same  reason  against  their  existing 
in  an  unperceiving  substance  that  has  been  already 
offered  with  relation  to  figure,  motion,  colour,  and  the 
like.  Qualities,  as  hath  been  shewn,  are  nothing  else 
but  sensations  or  ideas,  which  exist  only  in  a  mind 
perceiving  them ;  and  this  is  true  not  only  of  the  ideas 
we  are  acquainted  with  at  present,  but  likewise  of  all 
possible  ideas  whatsoever. 

79  But,  you  will  insist,  what  if  I  have  no  reason  to 
believe  the  existence  of  Matter?  what  if  I  cannot 
assign  any  use  to  it  or  explain  anything  by  it,  or  even 
conceive  what  is  meant  by  that  word?  yet  still  it  is  no 
contradiction  to  say  that  Matter  exists,  and  that  this 
Matter  is  in  general  a  substance,  or  occasion  of  ideas; 
though  indeed  to  go  about  to  unfold  the  meaning  or 
adhere  to  any  particular  explication  of  those  words 
may  be  attended  with  great  difficulties.  I  answer, 
when  words  are  used  without  a  meaning,  you  may  put 
them  together  as  you  please  without  danger  of  running 
into  a  contradiction.  You  may  say,  for  example,  that 
twice  two  is  equal  to  seven,  so  long  as  you  declare  you 
do  not  take  the  words  of  that  proposition  in  their  usual 
acceptation  but  for  marks  of  you  know  not  what.  And, 
by  the  same  reason,  you  may  say  there  is  an  inert 
thoughtless  substance  without  accidents  which  is  the 
occasion  of  our  ideas.  And  we  shall  understand  just 
as  much  by  one  proposition  as  the  other. 


^t  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

80.  In  the  last  place,  you  will  say,  what  if  we  give 
up  the  cause  of  material  Substance,  and  stand  to  it 
that  Matter  is  an  unknown  somezvhat — neither  sub- 
stance nor  accident,  spirit  nor  idea,  inert,  thoughtless, 
indivisible,  immovable,  unextended,  existing  in  no 
place.  For,  say  you,  whatever  may  be  urged  against 
substance  or  occasion,  or  any  other  positive  or  relative 
notion  of  Matter,  hath  no  place  at  all,  so  long  as  this 
negative  definition  of  Matter  is  adhered  to.  I  answer, 
you  may,  if  so  it  shall  seem  good,  use  the  word 
"Matter"  in  the  same  sense  as  other  men  use  "nothing," 
and  so  make  those  terms  convertible  in  your  style. 
For,  after  all,  this  is  what  appears  to  me  to  be  the 
result  of  that  definition,  the  parts  whereof  when  I 
consider  with  attention,  either  collectively  or  separate 
from  each  other,  I  do  not  find  that  there  is  any  kind  of 
efifect  or  impression  made  on  my  mind  different  from 
what  is  excited  by  the  term  nothing. 

81.  You  will  reply,  perhaps,  that  in  the  foresaid 
definition  is  included  what  doth  sufficiently  distinguish 
it  from  nothing — the  positive  abstract  idea  of  quiddity, 
entity,  or  existence.  I  own,  indeed,  that  those  who  pre- 
tend to  the  faculty  of  framing  abstract  general  ideas 
do  talk  as  if  they  had  such  an  idea,  which  is,  say  they, 
the  most  abstract  and  general  notion  of  all ;  that  is,  to 
me,  the  most  incomprehensible  of  all  others.  That 
there  are  a  great  variety  of  spirits  of  different  orders 
and  capacities,  whose  faculties  both  in  number  and  ex- 
tent are  far  exceeding  those  the  Author  of  my  being  has 
bestowed  on  me,  I  see  no  reason  to  deny.  And  for  me 
to  pretend  to  determine  by  my  own  few,  stinted 
narrow  inlets  of  perception,  what  ideas  the  inexhausti- 
ble power  of  the  Supreme  Spirit  may  imprint  upon 
them  were  certainly  the  utmost  folly  and  presumption 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  77 

— since  there  may  be,  for  aught  that  I  know,  innumer- 
able sorts  of  ideas  or  sensations,  as  different  from  one 
another,  and  from  all  that  I  have  perceived,  as  colours 
are  from  sounds.  But,  how  ready  soever  I  may  be  to 
acknowledge  the  scantiness  of  my  comprehension  with 
regard  to  the  endless  variety  of  spirits  and  ideas  that 
may  possibly  exist,  yet  for  any  one  to  pretend  to  a  no- 
tion of  Entity  or  Existence,  abstracted  from  spirit  and 
idea,  from  perceived  and  being  perceived,  is,  I  suspect, 
a  downright  repugnancy  and  trifling  with  words. — 
It  remains  that  we  consider  the  objections  which  may 
possibly  be  made  on  the  part  of  Religion. 

82.  Some  there  are  who  think  that,  though  the  argu- 
ments for  the  real  existence  of  bodies  which  are  drawn 
from  Reason  be  allowed  not  to  amount  to  demonstra- 
tion, yet  the  Holy  Scriptures  are  so  clear  in  the  point, 
as  will  sufficiently  convince  every  good  Christian  that 
bodies  do  really  exist^  and  are  something  more  than 
mere  ideas ;  there  being  in  Holy  Writ  innumerable 
facts  related  which  evidently  suppose  the  reality  of 
timber  and  stone,  mountains  and  rivers,  and  cities,  and 
human  bodies.  To  which  I  answer  that  no  sort  of 
writings  whatever,  sacred  or  profane,  which  use  those 
and  the  like  words  in  the  vulgar  acceptation,  or  so  as 
to  have  a  meaning  in  them,  are  in  danger  of  having 
their  truth  called  in  question  by  our  doctrine.  That  all 
those  things  do  really  exist,  that  there  are  bodies,  even 
corporeal  substances,  when  taken  in  the  vulgar  sense, 
has  been  shewn  to  be  agreeable  to  our  principles :  and 
the  difference  betwixt  things  and  ideas,  realities  and 
chimeras,  has  been  distinctly  explained.  See  sect.  29, 
30,  33,  36,  &c.     And  I  do  not  think  that  either  what 


78  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

philosophers  call  Matter,  or  the  existence  of  objects 
without  the  mind,  is  anywhere  mentioned  in  Scripture. 

83.  Again,  whether  there  can  be  or  be  not  external 
things,  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  the  proper  use  of 
words  is  the  marking  our  conceptions,  or  things  only 
as  they  are  known  and  perceived  by  us;  whence  it 
plainly  follows  that  in  the  tenets  we  have  laid  down 
there  is  nothing  inconsistent  with  the  right  use  and 
significancy  of  language,  and  that  discourse,  of  what 
kind  soever,  so  far  as  it  is  intelligible,  remains  undis- 
turbed. But  all  this  seems  so  manifest,  from  what  has 
been  largely  set  forth  in  the  premises,  that  it  is  needless 
to  insist  any  farther  on  it. 

84.  But,  it  will  be  urged  that  miracles  do,  at  least, 
lose  much  of  their  stress  and  import  by  our  principles. 
What  must  we  think  of  Moses'  rod?  was  it  not  really 
turned  into  a  serpent;  or  was  there  only  a  change  of 
ideas  in  the  minds  of  the  spectators?  And,  can  it  be 
supposed  that  our  Saviour  did  no  more  at  the  mar- 
riage-feast in  Cana  than  impose  on  the  sight,  and  smell, 
and  taste  of  the  guests,  so  as  to  create  in  them  the  ap- 
pearance or  idea  only  of  wine  ?  The  same  may  be  said 
of  all  other  miracles ;  which,  in  consequence  of  the  fore- 
going principles,  must  be  looked  upon  only  as  so  many 
cheats,  or  illusions  of  fancy.  To  this  I  reply,  that  the 
rod  was  changed  into  a  real  serpent,  and  the  water  into 
real  wine.  That  this  does  not  in  the  least  contradict 
what  I  have  elsewhere  said  will  be  evident  from  sect. 
34  and  35.  But  this  business  of  real  and  imaginary 
has  been  already  so  plainly  and  fully  explained,  and  so 
often  referred  to,  and  the  difficulties  about  it  are  so 
easily  answered  from  what  has  gone  before,  that  it 
were  an  affront  to  the  reader's  understanding  to  re- 
sume the  explication  of  it  in  its  place.     I  shall  only 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  79 

observe  that  if  at  table  all  who  were  present  should  see, 
and  smell,  and  taste,  and  drink  wine,  and  find  the 
effects  of  it,  with  me  there  could  be  no  doubt  of  its 
reality;  so  that  at  bottom  the  scruple  concerning  real 
miracles  has  no  place  at  all  on  ours,  but  only  on  the 
received  principles,  and  consequently  makes  rather  for 
than  against  what  has  been  said. 

85.  Having  done  with  the  Objections,  which  I  en- 
deavoured to  propose  in  the  clearest  light,  and  gave 
them  all  the  force  and  weight  I  could,  we  proceed  in 
the  next  place  to  take  a  view  of  our  tenets  in  their 
Consequences.  Some  of  these  appear  at  first  sight — 
as  that  several  difficult  and  obscure  questions,  on  which 
abundance  of  speculation  has  been  thrown  away,  are 
entirely  banished  from  philosophy.  "Whether  corpo- 
real substance  can  think,"  "whether  Matter  be  infi- 
nitely divisible,"  and  "how  it  operates  on  spirit" — 
these  and  like  inquiries  have  given  infinite  amusement 
to  philosophers  in  all  ages  ;  but,  depending  on  the  exist- 
ence of  Matter,  they  have  no  longer  any  place  on  our 
principles.  Many  other  advantages  there  are,  as  well 
with  regard  to  religion  as  the  sciences,  which  it  is  easy 
for  any  one  to  deduce  from  what  has  been  premised; 
but  this  will  appear  more  plainly  in  the  sequel. 

86.  From  the  principles  we  have  laid  down  it  fol- 
lows human  knowledge  may  naturally  be  reduced  to 
two  heads — that  of  ideas  and  that  of  spirits.  Of  each 
of  these  I  shall  treat  in  order. 

And  first  as  to  ideas  or  unthinking  things.  Our 
knowledge  of  these  hath  been  very  much  obscured  and 
confounded,  and  we  have  been  led  into  very  dangerous 
errors,  by  supposing  a  twofold  existence  of  the  objects 


8o  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

of  sense — the  one  intelligible  or  in  the  mind,  the  other 
real  and  without  the  mind ;  whereby  unthinking  things 
are  thought  to  have  a  natural  subsistence  of  their  own 
distinct  from  being  perceived  by  spirits.  This,  which, 
if  I  mistake  not,  hath  been  shewn  to  be  a  most  ground- 
less and  absurd  notion,  is  the  very  root  of  Scepticism ; 
for,  so  long  as  men  thought  that  real  things  subsisted 
without  the  mind,  and  that  their  knowledge  was  only 
so  far  forth  real  as  it  was  conformable  to  real  things, 
it  follows  they  could  not  be  certain  they  had  any  real 
knowledge  at  all.  For  how  can  it  be  known  that  the 
things  which  are  perceived  are  conformable  to  those 
which  are  not  perceived,  or  exist  without  the  mind  ? 

87.  Colour,  figure,  motion,  extension,  and  the  like, 
considered  only  as  so  many  sensations  in  the  mind,  are 
perfectly  known,  there  being  nothing  in  them  which 
is  not  perceived.  But,  if  they  are  looked  on  as  notes  or 
images,  referred  to  thi)igs  or  archetypes  existing  with- 
out the  mind,  then  are  we  involved  all  in  scepticism. 
We  see  only  the  appearances,  and  not  the  real  qualities 
of  things.  What  may  be  the  extension,  figure,  or  mo- 
tion of  anything  really  and  absolutely,  or  in  itself,  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  know,  but  only  the  proportion  or 
relation  they  bear  to  our  senses.  Things  remaining  the 
same,  our  ideas  vary,  and  which  of  them,  or  even 
whether  any  of  them,  at  all,  represent  the  true  quality 
really  existing  in  the  thing,  it  is  out  of  our  reach  to 
determine.  So  that,  for  aught  we  know,  all  we  see, 
hear,  and  feel  may  be  only  phantom  and  vain  chimera, 
and  not  at  all  agree  with  the  real  things  existing  in 
renim  natura.  All  this  scepticism*  follows  from  our 
supposing  a  difference  between  things  and  ideas,  and 
that  the  former  have  a  subsistence  without  the  mind  or 

*  "Sceptical  cant"  were  the  words  used  in  the  first  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  8i 

imperceived.  It  were  easy  to  dilate  on  this  subject, 
and  show  how  the  arguments  urged  by  sceptics  in  all 
ages  depend  on  the  supposition  of  external  objects. 
[But  this  is  too  obvious  to  need  being  insisted  upon.]* 

88.  So  long  as  we  attribute  a  real  existence  to  un- 
thinking things,  distinct  from  their  being  perceived, 
it  is  not  only  impossible  for  us  to  know  with  evidence 
the  nature  of  any  real  unthinking  being,  but  even  that 
it  exists.  Hence  it  is  that  we  see  philosophers  distrust 
their  senses,  and  doubt  of  the  existence  of  heaven  and 
earth,  of  everything  they  see  or  feel,  even  of  their  own 
bodies.  And,  after  all  their  labour  and  struggle  of 
thought,  they  are  forced  to  own  we  cannot  attain  to 
any  self-evident  or  demonstrative  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  sensible  things.  But,  all  this  doubtfulness, 
which  so  bewilders  and  confounds  the  mind  and  makes 
philosophy  ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  vanishes 
if  we  annex  a  meaning  to  our  words,  and  not  amuse 
ourselves  with  the  terms  "absolute,"  "external,"  "ex- 
ist," and  such  like,  signifying  we  know  not  what.  I 
can  as  well  doubt  of  my  own  being  as  of  the  being  of 
those  things  which  I  actually  perceive  by  sense ;  it 
being  a  manifest  contradiction  that  any  sensible  object 
should  be  immediately  perceived  by  sight  or  touch,  and 
at  the  same  time  have  no  existence  in  nature,  since  the 
very  existence  of  an  unthinking  being  consists  in  being 
perceived. 

89.  Nothing  seems  of  more  importance  towards 
erecting  a  firm  system  of  sound  and  real  knowledge, 
which  may  be  proof  against  the  assaults  of  Scepticism, 
than  to  lay  the  beginning  in  a  distinct  explication  of 
what  is  meant  by  thing,  reality,  existence;  for  in  vain 


*  Omitted   in  second  edition. 


8i  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

shall  we  dispute  concerning  the  real  existence  of 
things,  or  pretend  to  any  knowledge  thereof,  so  long  as 
we  have  not  fixed  the  meaning  of  those  words.  Thing 
or  Being  is  the  most  general  name  of  all;  it  compre- 
hends under  it  two  kinds  entirely  distinct  and  hetero- 
geneous, and  which  have  nothing  common  but  the 
name,  viz.  spirits  and  ideas.  The  former  are  active, 
indivisible  substances :  the  latter  are  inert,  fleeting,  de- 
pendent beings,  which  subsist  not  by  themselves,  but 
are  supported  by,  or  exist  in  minds  or  spiritual  sub- 
stances.* We  comprehend  our  own  existence  by  inward 
feeling  or  reflexion,  and  that  of  other  spirits  by  reason. 
We  may  be  said  to  have  some  knowledge  or  notion  of 
our  own  minds,  of  spirits  and  active  beings,  whereof 
in  a  strict  sense  we  have  not  ideas.  In  like  manner, 
we  know  and  have  a  notion  of  relations  between  things 
or  ideas — which  relations  are  distinct  from  the  ideas 
or  things  related,  inasmuch  as  the  latter  may  be  per- 
ceived by  us  without  our  perceiving  the  former.  To 
me  it  seems  that  ideas,  spirits,  and  relations  are  all  in 
their  respective  kinds  the  object  of  human  knowledge 
and  subject  of  discourse ;  and  that  the  term  idea  would 
be  improperly  extended  to  signify  everything  we  know 
or  have  any  notion  of. 

90.  Ideas  imprinted  on  the  senses  are  real  things, 
or  do  really  exist;  this  we  do  not  deny,  but  we  deny 
they  can  subsist  without  the  minds  which  perceive 
them,  or  that  they  are  resemblances  of  any  archetypes 
existing  without  the  mind ;  since  the  very  being  of  a 

*In  the  first  edition  section  89  ended  at  this  point,  and  its 
concluding  sentence  instead  of  as  it  here  stands  read  as  fol- 
lows :  "The  former  are  active,  indimsible,  incorruptible,  sub- 
stances :  the  latter  are  inert,  Heeling,  perishable  passions  or  de- 
pendent beings     .    .    .     spiritual  substances." 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  83 

sensation  or  idea  consists  in  being  perceived,  and  an 
idea  can  be  like  nothing  but  an  idea.  Again,  the  things 
perceived  by  sense  may  be  termed  external,  with  re- 
gard to  their  origin — in  that  they  are  not  generated 
from  within  by  the  mind  itself,  but  imprinted  by  a 
Spirit  distinct  from  that  which  perceives  them.  Sensi- 
ble objects  may  likewise  be  said  to  be  "without  the 
mind"  in  another  sense,  namely  when  they  exist  in 
some  other  mind ;  thus,  when  I  shut  my  eyes,  the  things 
I  saw  may  still  exist,  but  it  must  be  in  another  mind. 
91.  It  were  a  mistake  to  think  that  what  is  here  said 
derogates  in  the  least  from  the  reality  of  things.  It  is 
acknowledged,  on  the  received  principles,  that  exten- 
sion, motion,  and  in  a  word  all  sensible  qualities  have 
need  of  a  support,  as  not  being  able  to  subsist  by  them- 
selves. But  the  objects  perceived  by  sense  are  allowed 
to  be  nothing  but  combinations  of  those  qualities,  and 
consequently  cannot  subsist  by  themselves.  Thus  far  it 
is  agreed  on  all  hand.  So  that  in  denying  the  things 
perceived  by  sense  an  existence  independent  of  a  sub- 
stance of  support  wherein  they  may  exist,  we  detract 
nothing  from  the  received  opinion  of  their  reality,  and 
are  guilty  of  no  innovation  in  that  respect.  All  the 
difference  is  that,  according  to  us,  the  unthinking  be- 
ings perceived  by  sense  have  no  existence  distinct  from 
being  perceived,  and  cannot  therefore  exist  in  any 
other  substance  than  those  unextended  indivisible  sub- 
stances or  spirits  which  act  and  think  and  perceive 
them  ;  whereas  philosophers  vulgarly  hold  tliat  the  sen- 
sible qualities  do  exist  in  an  inert,  extended,  unperceiv- 
ing  substance  which  they  call  Matter,  to  which  they 
attribute  a  natural  subsistence,  exterior  to  all  thinking 
beings,  or  distinct  from  being  perceived  by  any  mind 
whatsoever,  even  the  eternal   mind   of  the  Creator, 


84  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

wherein  they  suppose  only  ideas  of  the  corporeal  sul> 
stances  created  by  him;  if  indeed  they  allow  them  to 
be  at  all  created. 

92.  For,  as  we  have  shewn  the  doctrine  of  Matter 
or  corporeal  substance  to  have  been  the  main  pillar 
and  support  of  Scepticism,  so  likewise  upon  the  same 
foundation  have  been  raised  all  the  impious  schemes 
of  Atheism  and  Irreligion.  Nay,  so  great  a  difficulty 
has  it  been  thought  to  conceive  Matter  produced  out  of 
nothing,  that  the  most  celebrated  among  the  ancient 
philosophers,  even  of  those  who  maintained  the  being 
of  a  God,  have  thought  Matter  to  be  uncreated  and 
coeternal  with  Him.  How  great  a  friend  material  sub- 
stance has  been  to  Atheists  in  all  ages  were  needless  to 
relate.  All  their  monstrous  systems  have  so  visible 
and  necessary  a  dependence  on  it  that,  when  this  cor- 
ner-stone is  once  removed,  the  whole  fabric  cannot 
choose  but  fall  to  the  ground,  insomuch  that  it  is  no 
longer  worth  while  to  bestow  a  particular  consideration 
on  the  absurdities  of  every  wretched  sect  of  Atheists. 

93.  That  impious  and  profane  persons  should  read- 
ily fall  in  with  those  systems  which  favour  their  incli- 
nations, by  deriding  immaterial  substance,  and  suppos- 
ing the  soul  to  be  divisible  and  subject  to  corruption  as 
the  body ;  which  exclude  all  freedom,  intelligence,  and 
design  from  the  formation  of  things,  and  instead 
thereof  make  a  self-existent,  stupid,  unthinking  sub- 
stance the  root  and  origin  of  all  beings;  that  they 
should  hearken  to  those  who  deny  a  Providence,  or 
inspection  of  a  Superior  Mind  over  the  affairs  of  the 
world,  attributing  the  whole  series  of  events  either  to 
blind  chance  or  fatal  necessity  arising  from  the  impulse 
of  one  body  or  another — all  this  is  very  natural.    And, 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  85 

on  the  other  hand,  when  men  of  better  principles  ob- 
serve the  enemies  of  religion  lay  so  great  a  stress  on 
unthinking  Matter,  and  all  of  them  use  so  much  indus- 
try and  artifice  to  reduce  everything  to  it,  methinks 
they  should  rejoice  to  see  them  deprived  of  their  grand 
support,  and  driven  from  that  only  fortress,  without 
which  your  Epicureans,  Hobbists,  and  the  like,  have 
not  even  the  shadow  of  a  pretence,  but  become  the  most 
cheap  and  easy  triumph  in  the  world. 

94.  The  existence  of  Matter,  or  bodies  unperceived, 
has  not  only  been  the  main  support  of  Atheists  and 
Fatalists,  but  on  the  same  principle  doth  Idolatry  like- 
wise in  all  its  various  forms  depend.  Did  men  but 
consider  that  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  and  every  other 
object  of  the  senses  are  only  so  many  sensations  in 
their  minds,  which  have  no  other  existence  but  barely 
being  perceived,  doubtless  they  would  never  fall  down 
and  worship  their  own  ideas,  but  rather  address  their 
homage  to  that  Eternal  Invisible  Mind  which  pro- 
duces and  sustains  all  things. 

95.  The  same  absurd  principle,  by  mingling  itself 
with  the  articles  of  our  faith,  has  occasioned  no  small 
difficulties  to  Christians.  For  example,  about  the 
Resurrection,  how  many  scruples  and  objections  have 
been  raised  by  Socinians  and  others?  But  do  not  the 
most  plausible  of  them  depend  on  the  suppositon  that 
a  body  is  denominated  the  same,  with  regard  not  to  the 
form  or  that  which  is  perceived  by  sense,  but  the  mate- 
rial substance,  which  remains  the  same  under  several 
forms?  Take  away  this  material  substance,  about  the 
identity  whereof  all  the  dispute  is,  and  mean  by  body 
what  every  plain  ordinary  person  means  by  that  word, 
to  wit,  that  which  is  immediately  seen  and  felt,  which 
is  only  a  combination  of  sensible  qualities  or  ideas,  and 


86  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

then  their  most  unanswerable  objections  come  to  noth- 
ing. 

96.  Matter  being  once  expelled  out  of  nature  drags 
with  it  so  many  sceptical  and  impious  notions,  such  an 
incredible  number  of  disputes  and  puzzling  questions, 
which  have  been  thorns  in  the  sides  of  divines  as  well 
as  philosophers,  and  made  so  much  fruitless  work  for 
mankind,  that  if  the  arguments  we  have  produced 
against  it  are  not  found  equal  to  demonstration  (as  to 
me  they  evidently  seem),  yet  I  am  sure  all  friends  to 
knowledge,  peace,  and  religion  have  reason  to  wish 
they  were. 

97.  Beside  the  external  existence  of  the  objects  of 
perception,  another  great  source  of  errors  and  difficul- 
ties with  regard  to  ideal  knowledge  is  the  doctrine  of 
abstract  ideas,  such  as  it  hath  been  set  forth  in  the 
Introduction.  The  plainest  things  in  the  world,  those 
we  are  most  intimately  acquainted  with  and  perfectly 
know,  when  they  are  considered  in  an  abstract  way, 
appear  strangely  difficult  and  incomprehensible..  Time, 
place,  and  motion,  taken  in  particular  or  concrete,  are 
what  everybody  knows,  but,  having  passed  through  the 
hands  of  a  metaphysician,  they  become  too  abstract  and 
fine  to  be  apprehended  by  men  of  ordinary  sense.  Bid 
your  servant  meet  you  at  such  a  time  in  such  a  place, 
and  he  shall  never  stay  to  deliberate  on  the  meaning  of 
those  words;  in  conceiving  that  particular  time  and 
place,  or  the  motion  by  which  he  is  to  get  thither,  he 
finds  not  the  least  difficulty.  But  if  time  be  taken  ex- 
clusive of  all  those  particular  actions  and  ideas  that 
diversify  the  day,  merely  for  the  continuation  of  exist- 
ence or  duration  in  abstract,  then  it  will  perhaps  gravel 
even  a  philosopher  to  comprehend  it. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  87 

98.  For  my  own  part,  whenever  I  attempt  to  frame  a 
simple  idea  of  time,  abstracted  from  the  succession  of 
ideas  in  my  mind,  which  flows  uniformly  and  is  par- 
ticipated by  all  beings^  I  am  lost  and  embrangled  in  in- 
extricable difficulties.  I  have  no  notion  of  it  at  all,  only 
I  hear  others  say  it  is  infinitely  divisible,  and  speak  of 
it  in  such  a  manner  as  leads  me  to  entertain  odd 
thoughts  of  my  existence ;  since  that  doctrine  lays  one 
under  an  absolute  necessity  of  thinking,  either  that  he 
passes  away  innumerable  ages  without  a  thought,  or 
else  that  he  is  annihilated  every  moment  of  his  life,  both 
which  seem  equally  absurd.  Time  therefore  being 
nothing,  abstracted  from  the  sucession  of  ideas  in  our 
minds,  it  follows  that  the  duration  of  any  finite  spirit 
must  be  estimated  by  the  number  of  ideas  or  actions 
succeeding  each  other  in  that  same  spirit  or  mind. 
Hence,  it  is  a  plain  consequence  that  the  soul  always 
thinks ;  and  in  truth  whoever  shall  go  about  to  divide 
in  his  thoughts,  or  abstract  the  existence  of  a  spirit 
from  its  cogitation,  will,  I  believe,  find  it  no  easy  task. 

99.  So  likewise  when  we  attempt  to  abtract  exten- 
sion and  motion  from  all  other  qualities,  and  consider 
them  by  themselves,  we  presently  lose  sight  of  them, 
and  run  into  great  extravagances.  [Hence  spring  those 
odd  paradoxes,  that  the  "fire  is  not  hot,"  nor  "the  wall 
white,"  &c.,  or  that  heat  and  colour  are  in  the  objects 
nothing  but  figure  and  motion.]*  All  which  depend 
on  a  twofold  abstraction;  first,  it  is  supposed  that 
extension,  for  example,  may  be  abstracted  from  all 
other  sensible  qualities ;  and  secondly,  that  the  entity 
of  extension  may  be  abstracted  from  its  being  per- 
ceived.    But,  whoever  shall  reflect,  and  take  care  to 


*Omitted  in  second  edition. 


88  OP  THE  PRINCIPLES 

understand  what  he  says,  will,  if  I  mistake  not, 
acknowledge  that  all  sensible  qualities  are  alike  sen- 
sations and  alike  real;  that  where  the  extension  is, 
there  is  the  colour,  too,  i.  c.,  in  his  mind,  and  that  their 
archetypes  can  exist  only  in  some  other  mind;  and 
that  the  objects  of  sense  are  nothing  but  those  sensa- 
tions combined,  blended,  or  (  if  one  may  so  speak) 
concreted  together ;  none  of  all  which  can  be  supposed 
to  exist  unperceived.  [And  that  consequently  the  wall 
is  as  truly  white  as  it  is  extended,  and  in  the  same 
sense.]* 

lOO.  What  it  is  for  a  man  to  be  happy,  or  an  object 
good,  every  one  may  think  he  knows.  But  to  frame 
an  abstract  idea  of  happiness,  prescinded  from  all 
particular  pleasure,  or  of  goodness  from  everything 
that  is  good,  this  is  what  few  can  pretend  to.  So  like- 
wise a  man  may  be  just  and  virtuous  without  having 
precise  ideas  of  justice  and  virtue.  The  opinion  that 
those  and  the  like  words  stand  for  general  notions, 
abstracted  from  all  particular  persons  and  actions, 
seems  to  have  rendered  morality  very  difficult,  and  the 
study  thereof  of  small  use  to  mankind.  And  in  effect 
[one  may  make  a  great  progress  in  school-ethics  with- 
out ever  being  the  wiser  or  better  man  for  it,  or  know- 
ing how  to  behave  himself  in  the  affairs  of  life  more 
to  the  advantage  of  himself  or  his  neighbours  than  he 
did  before.  This  hint  may  suffice  to  let  any  one  see]j- 
the  doctrine  of  abstraction  has  not  a  little  contributed 
towards  spoiling  the  most  useful  parts  of  knowledge. 

loi.  The  two  great  provinces  of  speculative  science 
conversant  about  ideas  received  from  sense,  are  Natu- 

*The  bracketed  words  were  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 
fOmitted  in  the  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  89 

ral  Philosophy  and  Mathematics ;  with  regard  to  each 
of  these  I  shall  make  some  observations.  And  first  I 
shall  say  somewhat  of  Natural  Philosophy.  On  this 
subject  it  is  that  the  sceptics  triumph.  All  that  stock 
of  arguments  they  produce  to  depreciate  our  faculties 
and  make  mankind  appear  ignorant  and  low,  are 
drawn  principally  from  this  head,  namely,  that  we  are 
under  an  invincible  blindness  as  to  the  true  and  real 
nature  of  things.  This  they  exaggerate,  and  love  to 
enlarge  on.  We  are  miserably  bantered,  say  they,  by 
our  senses,  and  amused  only  with  the  outside  and  show 
of  things.  The  real  essence,  the  internal  qualities  and 
constitution  of  every  the  meanest  object,  is  hid  from 
our  view ;  something  there  is  in  every  drop  of  water, 
every  grain  of  sand,  which  it  is  beyond  the  power  of 
human  understanding  to  fathom  or  comprehend.  But, 
it  is  evident  from  what  has  been  shewn  that  all  this 
complaint  is  groundless,  and  that  we  are  influenced  by 
false  principles  to  that  degree  as  to  mistrust  our  senses, 
and  think  we  know  nothing  of  those  things  which  we 
perfectly  comprehend. 

102.  One  great  inducement  to  our  pronouncing  our- 
selves ignorant  of  the  nature  of  things  is  the  current 
opinion  that  everything  includes  within  itself  the  cause 
of  its  properties ;  or  that  there  is  in  each  object  an 
inward  essence  which  is  the  source  whence  its  dis- 
cernible qualities  flow,  and  whereon  they  depend. 
Some  have  pretended  to  account  for  appearances  by 
occult  qualities,  but  of  late  they  are  mostly  resolved 
into  mechanical  causes,  to  wit,  the  figure,  motion, 
weight,  and  suchlike  qualities,  of  insensible  particles; 
whereas,  in  truth,  there  is  no  other  agent  or  efficient 
cause  than  spirit,  it  being  evident  that  motion,  as  well 
as  all  other  ideas,  is    perfectly    inert.     See    sect.  25. 


90  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

Hence,  to  endeavour  to  explain  the  production  of  col- 
ours or  sounds,  by  figure,  motion,  magnitude,  and  the 
like,  must  needs  be  labour  in  vain.  And  accordingly 
we  see  the  attempts  of  that  kind  are  not  at  all  satis- 
factory. Which  may  be  said  in  general  of  those 
instances  wherein  one  idea  or  quality  is  assigned  for 
the  cause  of  another.  I  need  not  say  how  many 
hypotheses  and  speculations  are  left  out,  and  how 
much  the  study  of  nature  is  abridged  by  this  doctrine. 

103.  The  great  mechanical  principle  now  in  vogue 
is  attraction.  That  a  stone  falls  to  the  earth,  or  the 
sea  swells  towards  the  moon,  may  to  some  appear  suf- 
ficiently explained  thereby.  But  how  are  we  enlight- 
ened by  being  told  this  is  done  by  attraction?  Is  it 
that  that  word  signifies  the  manner  of  the  tendency, 
and  that  it  is  by  the  mutual  drawing  of  bodies  instead 
of  their  being  impelled  or  protruded  towards  each 
other?  But,  nothing  is  determined  of  the  manner  or 
action,  and  it  may  as  truly  (for  aught  we  know)  be 
termed  "impulse,"  or  "protrusion,"  as  "attraction." 
Again,  the  parts  of  steel  we  see  cohere  firmly  together, 
and  this  also  is  accounted  for  by  attraction;  but,  in 
this  as  in  the  other  instances,  I  do  not  perceive  that  any- 
thing is  signified  besides  the  effect  itself;  for  as  to 
the  manner  of  the  action  whereby  it  is  produced,  or  the 
cause  which  produces  it,  these  are  not  so  much  as 
aimed  at. 

104.  Indeed,  if  we  take  a  view  of  the  several  phe- 
nomena, and  compare  them  together,  we  may  observe 
some  likeness  and  conformity  between  them.  For 
example,  in  the  falling  of  a  stone  to  the  ground,  in  the 
rising  of  the  sea  towards  the  moon,  in  cohesion,  crys- 
tallization, etc.,  there  is  something  alike,  namely,  an 
union  or  mutual  approach  of  bodies.    So  that  any  one 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  91 

of  these  or  the  like  phenomena  may  not  seem  strange 
or  surprising  to  a  man  who  has  nicely  observed  and 
compared  the  effects  of  nature.  For  that  only  is 
thought  so  which  is  uncommon,  or  a  thing  by  itself, 
and  out  of  the  ordinary  course  of  our  observation. 
That  bodies  should  tend  towards  the  centre  of  the 
earth  is  not  thought  strange,  because  it  is  what  we 
perceive  every  moment  of  our  lives.  But,  that  they 
should  have  a  like  gravitation  towards  the  centre  of 
the  moon  may  seem  odd  and  unaccountable  to  most 
men,  because  it  is  discerned  only  in  the  tides.  But 
a  philosopher,  whose  thoughts  take  in  a  larger  com- 
pass of  nature,  having  observed  a  certain  similitude 
of  appearances,  as  well  in  the  heavens  as  the  earth, 
that  argue  innumerable  bodies  to  have  a  mutual  ten- 
dency towards  each  other,  which  he  denotes  by  the 
general  name  "attraction,"  whatever  can  be  reduced 
to  that  he  thinks  justly  accounted  for.  Thus  he 
explains  the  tides  by  the  attraction  of  the  terraqueous 
globe  towards  the  moon,  which  to  him  does  not  appear 
odd  or  anomalous,  but  only  a  particular  example  of  a 
general  rule  or  law  of  nature. 

105.  If  therefore  we  consider  the  difference  there  is 
betwixt  natural  philosophers  and  other  men,  with 
regard  to  their  knowledge  of  the  phenomena,  we  shall 
find  it  consists  not  in  an  exacter  knowledge  of  the 
efficient  cause  that  produces  them — for  that  can  be 
no  other  than  the  will  of  a  spirit — but  only  in  a  greater 
largeness  of  comprehension,  whereby  analogies,  har- 
monies, and  agreements  are  discovered  in  the  works 
of  nature,  and  the  particular  effects  explained,  that 
is,  reduced  to  general  rules,  see  sect.  62,  which  rules, 
grounded  on  the  analogy  and  uniformness  observed  in 
the  production  of  natural  effects,  are  most  agreeable 


92  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

and  sought  after  by  the  mind;  for  that  they  extend 
our  prospect  beyond  what  is  present  and  near  to  us,  and 
enable  us  to  make  very  probable  conjectures  touching 
things  that  may  have  happened  at  very  great  distances 
of  time  and  place,  as  well  as  to  predict  things  to  come ; 
wliich  sort  of  endeavour  towards  omniscience  is  much 
affected  by  the  mind. 

io6.  But  we  should  proceed  warily  in  such  things,  for 
we  are  apt  to  lay  too  great  stress  on  analogies,  and,  to 
the  prejudice  of  truth,  humour  that  eagerness  of  the 
mind  whereby  it  is  carried  to  extend  its  knowledge  into 
general  theorems.  For  example,  in  the  business  of  grav- 
itation or  mutual  attraction,  because  it  appears  in  many 
instances,  some  are  straightway  for  pronouncing  it 
universal;  and  that  to  attract  and  be  attracted  by  every 
other  body  is  an  essential  quality  inherent  in  all  bodies 
whatsoever.  Whereas  it  is  evident  the  fixed  stars 
have  no  such  tendency  towards  each  other;  and,  so 
far  is  that  gravitation  from  being  essential  to  bodies 
that  in  some  instances  a  quite  contrary  principle  seems 
to  shew  itself;  as  in  the  perpendicular  growth  of 
plants,  and  the  elasticity  of  the  air.  There  is  nothing 
necessary  or  essential  in  the  case,  but  it  depends  entirely 
on  the  will  of  the  Governing  Spirit,  who  causes  cer- 
tain bodies  to  cleave  together  or  tend  towards  each 
other  according  to  various  laws,  whilst  He  keeps  oth- 
ers at  a  fixed  distance ;  and  to  some  He  gives  a  quite 
contrary  tendency  to  fly  asunder  just  as  He  sees  con- 
venient. 

107.  After  what  has  been  premised,  I  think  we  may 
lay  down  the  following  conclusions.  First,  it  is  plain 
philosophers  amuse  themselves  in  vain,  when  they 
inquire  for  any  natural  efficient  cause,  distinct  from  a 
mind  or  spirit.    Secondly,  considering  the  whole  crea- 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  93 

tion  is  the  workmanship  of  a  tvise  and  good  Agent, 
it  should  seem  to  become  philosophers  to  employ  their 
thoughts  (contrary  to  what  some  hold)  about  the  final 
causes  of  things;  [for,  besides  that  this  would  prove  a 
very  pleasing  entertainment  to  the  mind,  it  might  be 
of  great  advantage,  in  that  it  not  only  discovers  to  us 
the  attributes  of  the  Creator,  but  may  also  direct  us 
in  several  instances  to  the  proper  uses  and  applications 
of  things;]*  and  I  confess  I  see  no  reason  why  point- 
ing out  the  various  ends  to  which  natural  things  are 
adapted,  and  for  which  they  were  originally  with 
unspeakable  wisdom  contrived,  should  not  be  thought 
one  good  way  of  accounting  for  them,  and  altogether 
worthy  a  philosopher.  Thirdly,  from  what  has  been 
premised  no  reason  can  be  drawn  why  the  history  of 
nature  should  not  still  be  studied,  and  observations 
and  experiments  made,  which,  that  they  are  of  use 
to  mankind,  and  enable  us  to  draw  any  general  con- 
clusions, is  not  the  result  of  any  immutable  habitudes 
or  relations  between  things  themselves,  but  only  of 
God's  goodness  and  kindness  to  men  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  world.  See  sect.  30  and  31.  Fourthly, 
by  a  diligent  observation  of  the  phenomena  within 
our  view,  we  may  discover  the  general  laws  of  nature, 
and  from  them  deduce  the  other  phenomena ;  I  do  not 
say  demonstrate,  for  all  deductions  of  that  kind  depend 
on  a  supposition  that  the  Author  of  nature  always 
operates  uniformly,  and  in  a  constant  observance  of 
those  rules  we  take  for  principles:  which  we  cannot 
evidently  know. 

108.   [It  appears  from  sect.  66,  &c.,  that  the  steady 
consistent  methods  of  nature  may  not  unfitly  be  styled 
the  Language  of  its  Author,  whereby  He  discovers 
*Omitted  in  second  edition. 


94  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

His  attributes  to  our  view  and  directs  us  how  to  act 
for  the  convenience  and  fehcity  of  Hfe.  And  to  me]* 
those  men  who  frame  general  rules  from  the  phe- 
nomena and  afterwards  derive  the  phenomena  from 
those  rules,  seem  to  consider  signs  rather  than 
causes.  A  man  may  well  understand  natural  signs 
without  knowing  their  analogy,  or  being  able  to  say 
by  what  rule  a  thing  is  so  or  so.  And,  as  it  is  very 
possible  to  write  improperly,  through  too  strict  an 
observance  of  general  grammar  rules;  so,  in  arguing 
from  general  laws  of  nature,  it  is  not  impossible  we 
may  extend  the  analogy  too  far,  and  by  that  means  run 
into  mistakes. 

109.  As  in  reading  other  books  a  wise  man  will 
choose  to  fix  his  thoughts  on  the  sense  and  apply  it 
to  use,  rather  than  lay  them  out  in  grammatical 
remarks  on  the  language;  so,  in  perusing  the  volume 
of  nature,  it  seems  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  mind 
to  aflfect  an  exactness  in  reducing  each  particular  phe- 
nomenon to  general  rules,  or  shewing  how  it  follows 
from  them.  We  should  propose  to  ourselves  nobler 
views,  namely,  to  recreate  and  exalt  the  mind  with  a 
prospect  of  the  beauty,  order,  extent,  and  variety  of 
natural  things :  hence,  by  proper  inferences,  to  enlarge 
our  notions  of  the  grandeur,  wisdom,  and  beneficence 
of  the  Creator;  and  lastly,  to  make  the  several  parts 
of  the  creation,  so  far  as  in  us  lies,  subservient  to  the 
ends  they  were  designed  for,  God's  glory,  and  the 
sustentation  and  comfort  of  ourselves  and  fellow- 
creatures. 


*  The  bracketed  words  were  omitted  in  the  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  95 

no.*  The  best  key  for  the  aforesaid  analogy  or 
natural  Science  will  be  easily  acknowledged  to  be  a 
certain  celebrated  Treatise  of  Mechanics.  In  the 
entrance  of  which  justly  admired  treatise,  Time,  Space, 
and  Motion  are  distinguished  into  absolute  and  rcla^ 
five,  true  and  apparent,  mathematical  and  vulgar; 
which  distinction,  as  it  is  at  large  explained  by  the 
author,  does  suppose  these  quantities  to  have  an  exist- 
ence without  the  mind;  and  that  they  are  ordinarily 
conceived  with  relation  to  sensible  things,  to  which 
nevertheless  in  their  own  nature  they  bear  no  relation 
at  all. 

III.  As  for  Time,  as  it  is  there  taken  in  an  absolute 
or  abstracted  sense,  for  the  duration  or  perseverance 
of  the  existence  of  things,  I  have  nothing  more  to  add 
concerning  it  after  what  has  been  already  said  on  that 
subject.  Sect.  97  and  98.  For  the  rest,  this  celebrated 
author  holds  there  is  an  absolute  Space,  which,  being 
unperceivable  to  sense,  remains  in  itself  similar  and 
immovable ;  and  relative  space  to  be  the  measure 
thereof,  which,  being  movable  and  defined  by  its  situa- 
tion in  respect  of  sensible  bodies,  is  vulgarly  taken  for 
immovable  space.  Place  he  defines  to  be  that  part  of 
space  which  is  occupied  by  any  body;  and  according 

*  Section  1 10  in  the  first  edition  began  as  follows:  "The  best 
grammar  of  the  kind  we  are  speaking  of  will  be  easily  acknowl- 
edged to  be  a  treatise  of  Mechanics,  demonstrated  and  applied 
to  nature  by  a  philosopher  of  a  neighboring  nation  whom  all 
the  world  admire.  I  shall  not  take  upon  me  to  make  remarks 
on  the  performance  of  that  extraordinary  person :  only  some 
things  he  has  advanced  so  directly  opposite  to  the  doctrine  we 
have  hitherto  laid  down,  that  we  should  be  wanting  in  the 
regard  due  to  the  authority  of  so  great  a  man  did  we  not  take 
some  notice  of  them.  In  the  entrance,"  &c.  The  first  edition 
appeared  in  Ireland ;  hence  Newton  is  spoken  of  as  belonging 
to  a  "neighboring  nation." 


96  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

as  the  space  is  absolute  or  relative  so  also  is  the  place. 
Absolute  Motion  is  said  to  be  the  translation  of  a 
body  from  absolute  place  to  absolute  place,  as  relative 
motion  is  from  one  relative  place  to  another.  And, 
because  the  parts  of  absolute  space  do  not  fall  under 
our  senses,  instead  of  them  we  are  obliged  to  use  their 
sensible  measures,  and  so  define  both  place  and  motion 
with  respect  to  bodies  which  we  regard  as  immovable. 
But,  it  is  said  in  philosophical  matters  we  must  abstract 
from  our  senses,  since  it  may  be  that  none  of  those 
bodies  which  seem  to  be  quiescent  are  truly  so,  and  the 
same  thing  which  is  moved  relatively  may  be  really 
at  rest;  as  likewise  one  and  the  same  body  may  be  in 
relative  rest  and  motion,  or  even  moved  with  contrary 
relative  motions  at  the  same  time,  according  as  its 
place  is  variously  defined.  All  which  ambiguity  is  to 
be  found  in  the  apparent  motions,  but  not  at  all  in  the 
true  or  absolute,  which  should  therefore  be  alone 
regarded  in  philosophy.  And  the  true  as  we  are  told 
are  distinguished  from  apparent  or  relative  motions 
by  the  following  properties. — First,  in  true  or  absolute 
motion  all  parts  which  preserve  the  same  position  with 
respect  of  the  whole,  partake  of  the  motions  of  the 
whole.  Secondly,  the  place  being  moved,  that  which 
is  placed  therein  is  also  moved ;  so  that  a  body  mov- 
ing in  a  place  which  is  in  motion  doth  participate  the 
motion  of  its  place.  Thirdly,  true  motion  is  never 
generated  or  changed  otherwise  than  by  force 
impressed  on  the  body  itself.  Fourthly,  true  motion 
is  always  changed  by  force  impressed  on  the  body 
moved.  Fifthly,  in  circular  motion  barely  relative 
there  is  no  centrifugal  force,  which,  nevertheless,  in 
that  which  is  true  or  absolute,  is  proportional  to  the 
quantity  of  motion. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  97 

112.  But,  notwithstanding  what  has  been  said,  I 
must  confess  it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  there  can 
be  any  motion  other  than  relative;  so  that  to  conceive 
motion  there  must  be  at  least  conceived  two  bodies, 
whereof  the  distance  or  position  in  regard  to  each 
other  is  varied.  Hence,  if  there  was  one  only  body 
in  being  it  could  not  possibly  be  moved.  This  seems 
evident,  in  that  the  idea  I  have  of  motion  doth  neces- 
sarily include  relation.* 

113.  But,  though  in  every  motion  it  be  necessary  to 
conceive  more  bodies  than  one,  yet  it  may  be  that  one 
only  is  moved,  namely,  that  on  which  the  force  causing 
the  change  in  the  distance  or  situation  of  the  bodies, 
is  impressed.  For,  however  some  may  define  relative 
motion,  so  as  to  term  that  body  moved  which  changes 
its  distance  from  some  other  body,  f  whether  the  force 
or  action  causing  that  change  were  impressed  on  it 
or  no,  yet  as  relative  motion  is  that  which  is  perceived 
by  sense,  and  regarded  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life, 
it  should  seem  that  every  man  of  common  sense  knows 
what  it  is  as  well  as  the  best  philosopher.  Now,  I 
ask  any  one  whether,  in  his  sense  of  motion  as  he  walks 
along  the  streets,  the  stones  he  passes  over  may  be 
said  to  move,  because  they  change  distance  with  his 
feet?  To  me  it  appears  that  though  motion  includes 
a  relation  of  one  thing  to  another,  yet  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  each  term  of  the  relation  be  denominated 
from  it.     As  a  man  may  think  of  somewhat  which 


*  In  the  first  editfon  this  section  ended  with  the  following 
sentence :  "Whether  others  can  conceive  it  otherwise,  a  little 
attention  may  satisfy  them." 

t  In  the  first  edition  we  had  the  following:  "whether  the  force 
causing  that  change  were  impressed  on  it  or  no,  yet  I  cannot 
assent  to  this ;  for,  since  we  are  told  relative  motion,"  &c. 


98  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

does  not  think,  so  a  body  may  be  moved  to  or  from 
another  body  which  is  not  therefore  itself  in  motion. 
[I  mean  relative  motion,  for  other  I  am  not  able  to 
conceive.]* 

114.  As  the  place  happens  to  be  variously  defined, 
the  motion  which  is  related  to  it  varies.  A  man  in 
a  ship  may  be  said  to  be  quiescent  with  relation  to  the 
sides  of  the  vessel,  and  yet  move  with  relation  to  the 
land.  Or  he  may  move  eastward  in  respect  of  the  one, 
and  westward  in  respect  of  the  other.  In  the  com- 
mon affairs  of  life  men  never  go  beyond  the  earth  to 
define  the  place  of  any  body ;  and  what  is  quiescent 
in  respect  of  that  is  accounted  absolutely  to  be  so.  But 
philosophers,  who  have  a  greater  extent  of  thought, 
and  juster  notions  of  the  system  of  things,  discover 
even  the  earth  itself  to  be  moved.  In  order  therefore 
to  fix  their  notions  they  seem  to  conceive  the  corporeal 
world  as  finite,  and  the  utmost  unmoved  walls  or  shell 
thereof  to  be  the  place  whereby  they  estimate  true 
motions.  If  we  sound  our  own  conceptions,  I  believe 
we  may  find  all  the  absolute  motion  we  can  frame  an 
idea  of  to  be  at  bottom  no  other  than  relative  motion 
thus  defined.  For,  as  hath  been  already  observed, 
absolute  motion,  exclusive  of  all  external  relation,  is 
incomprehensible ;  and  to  this  kind  of  relative  motion 
all  the  above-mentioned  properties,  causes,  and  effects 
ascribed  to  absolute  motion  wall,  if  I  mistake  not,  be 
found  to  agree.  As  to  what  is  said  of  the  centrifugal 
force,  that  it  does  not  at  all  belong  to  circular  rela- 
tive motion,  I  do  not  see  how  this  follows  from  the 
experiment  which  is  brought  to  prove  it.  See  Philoso- 
phiae  Naturalis  Principia  Mathematica,  in  Schol.  Def. 


*Omitted  from  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  99 

VIII.  For  the  water  in  the  vessel  at  that  time  wherein 
it  is  said  to  have  the  greatest  relative  circular  motion, 
hath,  I  think,  no  motion  at  all;  as  is  plain  from  the 
foregoing  section. 

115.  For,  to  denominate  a  body  moved  it  is  requi- 
site, first,  that  it  change  its  distance  or  situation  with 
regard  to  some  other  body;  and  secondly,  that  the 
force  occasioning  that  change  be  applied  to  it.  If 
either  of  these  be  wanting,  I  do  not  think  that,  agree- 
ably to  the  sense  of  mankind,  or  the  propriety  of  lan- 
guage, a  body  can  be  said  to  be  in  motion.  I  grant 
indeed  that  it  is  possible  for  us  to  think  a  body  which 
we  see  change  its  distance  from  some  other  to  be 
moved,  though  it  have  no  force  applied  to  it  (in  which 
sense  there  may  be  apparent  motion),  but  then  it  is 
because  the  force  causing  the  change  of  distance  is 
imagined  by  us  to  be  applied  or  impressed  on  that 
body  thought  to  move ;  which  indeed  shews  we  are 
capable  of  mistaking  a  thing  to  be  in  motion  which  is 
not,  and  that  is  all,*  [which  is  not,  but  does  not  prove 
that,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  motion,  a  body  is 
moved  merely  because  it  changes  distance  from 
another ;  since  as  soon  as  we  are  undeceived,  and  find 
that  the  moving  force  was  not  communicated  to  it, 
we  no  longer  hold  it  to  be  moved.  So,  on  the  other 
hand,  when  only  one  body  (the  parts  whereof  preserve 
a  given  position  between  themselves)  is  imagined  to 
exist,  some  there  are  who  think  that  it  can  be  moved 
all  manner  of  ways,  though  without  any  change  of 
distance  or  situation  to  any  other  bodies ;  which  we 
should  not  deny  if  they  meant  only  that  it  might  have 
an  impressed  force,  which,  upon  the  bare  creation  of 


*In  the  first  edition  the  phrase  "and  that  is  all"  was  omitted, 
and  the  paragraph  closed  with  the  sentences  in  brackets. 


100  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

other  bodies,  would  produce  a  motion  of  some  certain 
quantity  and  determination.  But  that  an  actual  motion 
(distinct  from  the  impressed  force  or  power  productive 
of  change  of  place  in  case  there  were  bodies  present 
whereby  to  define  it)  can  exist  in  such  a  single  body, 
I  must  confess  I  am  not  able  to  comprehend]. 

1 1 6.  From  what  has  been  said  it  follows  that  the 
philosophic  consideration  of  motion  does  not  imply 
the  being  of  an  absolute  Space,  distinct  from  that 
which  is  perceived  by  sense  and  related  bodies ;  which 
that  it  cannot  exist  without  the  mind  is  clear  upon  the 
same  principles  that  demonstrate  the  like  of  all  other 
objects  of  sense.  And  perhaps,  if  we  enquire  nar- 
rowly, we  shall  find  we  cannot  even  frame  an  idea  of 
pure  Space  exclusive  of  all  body.  This  I  must  confess 
seems  impossible,  as  being  a  most  abstract  idea.  When 
I  excite  a  motion  in  some  part  of  my  body,  if  it  be  free 
or  without  resistance,  I  say  there  is  Space;  but  if  I 
find  a  resistance,  then  I  say  there  is  Body;  and  in  pro- 
portion as  the  resistance  to  motion  is  lesser  or  greater, 
I  say  the  space  is  more  or  less  pure.  So  that  when 
I  speak  of  pure  or  empty  space,  it  is  not  to  be  sup- 
posed that  the  word  "space"  stands  for  an  idea  distinct 
from  or  conceivable  without  body  and  motion — though 
indeed  we  are  apt  to  think  every  noun  substantive 
stands  for  a  distinct  idea  that  may  be  separated  from 
all  others ;  which  has  occasioned  infinite  mistakes. 
When,  therefore,  supposing  all  the  world  to  be  anni- 
hilated besides  my  own  body,  I  say  there  still  remains 
pure  Space,  thereby  nothing  else  is  meant  but  only 
that  I  conceive  it  possible  for  the  limbs  of  my  body  to 
be  moved  on  all  sides  without  the  least  resistance; 
but  if  that,  too,  were  annihilated  then  there  could  be 
no  motion,  and  consequently  no  Space.     Some,  per- 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  loi 

haps,  may  think  the  sense  of  seeing  doth  furnish  them 
with  the  idea  of  pure  space ;  but  it  is  plain  from  what 
we  have  elsewhere  shewn,  that  the  ideas  of  space  and 
distance  are  not  obtained  by  that  sense.    See  the  Essay  - 
concerning  Vision. 

117.  What  is  here  laid  down  seems  to  put  an  end 
to  all  those  disputes  and  difficulties  that  have  sprung 
up  amongst  the  learned  concerning  the  nature  of  pure 
Space.  But  the  chief  advantage  arising  from  it  is  that 
we  are  freed  from  that  dangerous  dilemma,  to  which 
several  who  have  employed  their  thoughts  on  that  sub- 
ject imagine  themselves  reduced,  to  wit,  of  thinking 
either  that  Real  Space  is  God,  or  else  that  there  is 
something  beside  God  which  is  eternal,  uncreated, 
infinite,  indivisible,  immutable.  Both  which  may  justly 
be  thought  pernicious  and  absurd  notions.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  not  a  few  divines,  as  well  as  philosophers  of 
great  note,  have,  from  the  difficulty  they  found  in  con- 
ceiving either  limits  or  annihilation  of  space,  concluded 
it  must  be  divine.  And  some  of  late  have  set  them- 
selves particularly  to  shew  the  incommunicable  attri- 
butes of  God  agree  to  it.  Which  doctrine,  how 
unworthy  soever  it  may  seem  of  the  Divine  Nature, 
yet  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  get  clear  of  it,  so  long  as 
we  adhere  to  the  received  opinions. 

118.  Hitherto  of  Natural  Philosophy:  we  come  now 
to  make  some  inquiry  concerning  that  other  great 
branch  of  speculative  knowledge,  to  wit,  Mathematics. 
These,  how  celebrated  soever  they  may  be  for  their 
clearness  and  certainty  of  demonstration,  which  is 
hardly  anywhere  else  to  be  found,  cannot  nevertheless 
be  supposed  altogether  free  from  mistakes,  if  in  their 
principles  there  lurks  some  secret  error  which  is  com- 


102  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

mon  to  the  professors  of  those  sciences  with  the  rest 
of  mankind.  Mathematicians,  though  they  deduce  their 
theorems  from  a  great  height  of  evidence,  yet  their 
first  principles  are  Hmited  by  the  consideration  of 
quantity :  and  they  do  not  ascend  into  any  inquiry 
concerning  those  transcendental  maxims  which  influ- 
ence all  the  particular  sciences,  each  part  whereof, 
Mathematics  not  excepted,  does  consequently  partici- 
pate of  the  errors  involved  in  them.  That  the  princi- 
ples laid  down  by  mathematicians  are  true,  and  their 
way  of  deduction  from  those  principles  clear  and 
incontestible,  we  do  not  deny ;  but,  we  hold  there  may 
be  certain  erroneous  maxims  of  greater  extent  than 
the  object  of  Mathematics,  and  for  that  reason  not 
expressly  mentioned,  though  tacitly  supposed  through- 
out the  whole  progress  of  that  science ;  and  that  the  ill 
effects  of  those  secret  unexamined  errors  are  diffused 
through  all  the  branches  thereof.  To  be  plain,  we 
suspect  the  mathematicians  are  as  well  as  other  men 
concerned  in  the  errors  arising  from  the  doctrine  of 
abstract  general  ideas,  and  the  existence  of  objects 
without  the  mind. 

119.  Arithmetic  has  been  thought  to  have  for  its 
object  abstract  ideas  of  Number;  of  which  to  under- 
stand the  properties  and  mutual  habitudes,  is  supposed 
no  mean  part  of  speculative  knowledge.  The  opinion 
of  the  pure  and  intellectual  nature  of  numbers  in 
abstract  has  made  them  in  esteem  with  those  philoso- 
phers who  seem  to  have  affected  an  uncommon  fine- 
ness and  elevation  of  thought.  It  hath  set  a  price 
on  the  most  trifling  numerical  speculations  which  in 
practice  are  of  no  use,  but  serve  only  for  amusement ; 
and  hath  therefore  so  far  infected  the  minds  of  some, 
that  they  have  dreamed  of  mighty  mysteries  involved 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  103 

in  numbers,  and  attempted  the  explication  of  natural 
things  by  them.  But,  if  we  inquire  into  our  own 
thoughts,  and  consider  what  has  been  premised,  we 
may  perhaps  entertain  a  low  opinion  of  those  high 
flights  and  abstractions,  and  look  on  all  inquiries,  about 
numbers  only  as  so  many  difficiles  niigac,  so  far  as 
they  are  not  subservient  to  practice,  and  promote  the 
benefit  of  life. 

120.  Unity  in  abstract  we  have  before  considered  in 
sect.  13,  from  which  and  what  has  been  said  in  the 
Introduction,  it  plainly  follows  there  is  not  any  such 
idea.  But,  number  being  defined  a  "collection  of 
units,"  we  may  conclude  that,  if  there  be  no  such 
thing  as  unity  or  unit  in  abstract,  there  are  no  ideas 
of  number  in  abstract  denoted  by  the  numeral  names 
and  figures.  The  theories  therefore  in  Arithmetic,  if 
they  are  abstracted  from  the  names  and  figures,  as 
likewise  from  all  use  and  practice,  as  well  as  from  the 
particular  things  numbered,  can  be  supposed  to  have 
nothing  at  all  for  their  object ;  hence  we  may  see  how 
entirely  the  science  of  numbers  is  subordinate  to  prac- 
tice, and  how  jejune  and  trifling  it  becomes  when  con- 
sidered as  a  matter  of  mere  speculation. 

121.  However,  since  there  may  be  some  who,  deluded 
by  the  specious  show  of  discovering  abstracted  veri- 
ties, waste  their  time  in  arithmetical  theorems  and 
problems  which  have  not  any  use,  it  will  not  be  amiss 
if  we  more  fully  consider  and  expose  the  vanity  of 
that  pretence ;  and  this  will  plainly  appear  by  taking 
a  view  of  Arithmetic  in  its  infancy,  and  observing 
what  it  was  that  originally  put  men  on  the  study  of 
that  science,  and  to  what  scope  they  directed  it.  It 
is  natural  to  think  that  at  first,  men,  for  ease  of  mem- 
ory and  help  of  computation,  made  use  of  counters, 


104  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

or  in  writing  of  single  strokes,  points,  or  the  like, 
each  whereof  was  made  to  signify  an  unit,  i.  c,  some 
one  thing  of  whatever  kind  they  had  occasion  to 
reckon.  Afterwards  they  found  out  the  more  com- 
pendious ways  of  making  one  character  stand  in  place 
of  several  strokes  or  points.  And,  lastly,  the  notation 
of  the  Arabians  or  Indians  came  into  use,  wherein, 
by  the  repetition  of  a  few  characters  or  figures,  and 
varying  the  signification  of  each  figure  according  to 
the  place  it  obtains,  all  numbers  may  be  most  aptly 
expressed ;  which  seems  to  have  been  done  in  imitation 
of  language,  so  that  an  exact  analogy  is  observed 
betwixt  the  notation  by  figures  and  names,  the  nine 
simple  figures  answering  the  nine  first  numeral  names 
and  places  in  the  former,  corresponding  to  denomina- 
tions in  the  latter.  And  agreeably  to  those  conditions 
of  the  simple  and  local  value  of  figures,  were  contrived 
methods  of  finding,  from  the  given  figures  or  marks 
of  the  parts,  what  figures  and  how  placed  are  proper 
to  denote  the  whole,  or  vice  versa.  And  having  found 
the  sought  figures,  the  same  rule  or  analogy  being 
observed  throughout,  it  is  easy  to  read  them  into 
words ;  and  so  the  number  becomes  perfectly  known. 
For  then  the  number  of  any  particular  things  is  said 
to  be  known^  when  we  know  the  name  or  figures  (with 
their  due  arrangement)  that  according  to  the  stand- 
ing analogy  belong  to  them.  For,  these  signs  being 
known,  we  can  by  the  operations  of  arithmetic  know 
the  signs  of  any  part  of  the  particular  sums  signified 
by  them;  and,  thus  computing  in  signs  (because  of  the 
connexion  established  betwixt  them  and  the  distinct 
multitudes  of  things  whereof  one  is  taken  for  an  unit), 
we  may  be  able  rightly  to  sum  up,  divide,  and  pro- 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  105 

portion  the  things  themselves  that  we  intend  to  num- 
ber. 

122.  In  Arithmetic,  therefore,  we  regard  not  the 
things,  but  the  signs,  which  nevertheless  are  not 
regarded  for  their  own  sake,  but  because  they  direct 
us  how  to  act  with  relation  to  things,  and  dispose 
rightly  of  them.  Now,  agreeably  to  what  we  have 
before  observed  of  words  in  general  (sect.  19,  Introd.) 
it  happens  here  likewise  that  abstract  ideas  are  thought 
to  be  signified  by  numeral  names  or  characters,  while 
they  do  not  suggest  ideas  of  particular  things  to  our 
minds.  I  shall  not  at  present  enter  into  a  more  par- 
ticular dissertation  on  this  subject,  but  only  observe 
that  it  is  evident  from  what  has  been  said,  those  things 
which  pass  for  abstract  truths  and  theorems  concern- 
ing numbers,  are  in  reality  conversant  about  no  object 
distinct  from  particular  numeral  things,  except  only 
names  and  characters,  which  originally  came  to  be 
considered  on  no  other  account  but  their  being  signs, 
or  capable  to  represent  aptly  whatever  particular  things 
men  had  need  to  compute.  Whence  it  follows  that  to 
study  them  for  their  own  sake  would  be  just  as  wise, 
and  to  as  good  purpose  as  if  a  man,  neglecting  the  true 
use  or  original  intention  and  subserviency  of  language, 
should  spend  his  time  in  impertinent  criticisms  upon 
words,  or  reasonings  and  controversies  purely  verbal. 

123.  From  numbers  we  proceed  to  speak  of  Exten- 
sion, which,  considered  as  relative,*  is  the  object  of 
Geometry.  The  infinite  divisibility  of  Unite  extension, 
though  it  is  not  expressly  laid  down  cither  as  an  axiom 
or  theorem  in  the  elements  of  that  science,  yet  is 
throughout  the  same  everywhere  supposed  and  thought 


*The  words  "considered  as  relative"  were  added  to  the  last 
edition. 


io6  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

to  have  so  inseparable  and  essential  a  connexion  with 
the  principles  and  demonstrations  in  Geometry,  that 
mathematicians  never  admit  it  into  doubt,  or  make 
the  least  question  of  it.  And,  as  this  notion  is  the 
source  from  whence  do  spring  all  those  amusing  geo- 
metrical paradoxes  which  have  such  a  direct  repug- 
nancy to  the  plain  common  sense  of  mankind,  and  are 
admitted  with  so  much  reluctance  into  a  mind  not  yet 
debauched  by  learning;  so  it  is  the  principal  occasion 
of  all  that  nice  and  extreme  subtilty  which  renders  the 
study  of  Mathematics  so  difficult  and  tedious.  Hence, 
if  we  can  make  it  appear  that  no  finite  extension  con- 
tains innumerable  parts,  or  is  infinitely  divisible,  it 
follows  that  we  shall  at  once  clear  the  science  of 
Geometry  from  a  great  number  of  difficulties  and  con- 
tradictions which  have  ever  been  esteemed  a  reproach 
to  human  reason,  and  withal  make  the  attainment 
thereof  a  business  of  much  less  time  and  pains  than  it 
hitherto  has  been. 

124.  Every  particular  finite  extension  which  may 
possibly  be  the  object  of  our  thought  is  an  idea  exist- 
ing only  in  the  mind,  and  consequently  each  part 
thereof  must  be  perceived.  If,  therefore,  I  cannot  per- 
ceive innumerable  parts  in  any  finite  extension  that  I 
consider,  it  is  certain  they  are  not  contained  in  it ;  but, 
it  is  evident  that  I  cannot  distinguish  innumerable 
parts  in  any  particular  line,  surface,  or  solid,  which  I 
either  perceive  by  sense,  or  figure  to  myself  in  my 
mind:  wherefore  I  conclude  they  are  not  contained 
in  it.  Nothing  can  be  plainer  to  me  than  that  the 
extensions  I  have  in  view  are  no  other  than  my^  own 
ideas ;  and  it  is  no  less  plain  that  I  cannot  resolve  any 
one  of  my  ideas  into  an  infinite  number  of  other  ideas, 
that  is,  that  they  are  not  infinitely  divisible.     If  by 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  107 

finite  extension  be  meant  something  distinct  from  a 
finite  idea,  I  declare  I  do  not  know  what  that  is,  and 
so  cannot  affirm  or  deny  anything  of  it.  But  if  the 
terms  "extension,"  "parts,"  &c.,  are  taken  in  any  sense 
conceivable,  that  is,  for  ideas,  then  to  say  a  finite  quan- 
tity or  extension  consists  of  parts  infinite  in  number 
is  so  manifest  a  contradiction,  that  every  one  at  first 
sight  acknowledges  it  to  be  so;  and  it  is  impossible  it 
should  ever  gain  the  assent  of  any  reasonable  creature 
who  is  not  brought  to  it  by  gentle  and  slow  degrees, 
as  a  converted  Gentile  to  the  belief  of  transubstantia- 
tion.  Ancient  and  rooted  prejudices  do  often  pass  into 
principles ;  and  those  propositions  which  once  obtain 
the  force  and  credit  of  a  principle,  are  not  only  them- 
selves, but  likewise  whatever  is  deduciblc  from  them, 
thought  privileged  from  all  examination.  And  there 
is  no  absurdity  so  gross,  which,  by  this  means,  the 
mind  of  man  may  not  be  prepared  to  swallow. 

125.  He  whose  understanding  is  possessed  with  the 
doctrine  of  abstract  general  ideas  may  be  persuaded 
that  (whatever  be  thought  of  the  ideas  of  sense) 
extension  in  abstract  is  infinitely  divisible.  And  one 
who  thinks  the  objects  of  sense  exist  without  the  mind 
will  perhaps  in  virtue  thereof  be  brought  to  admit  that 
a  line  but  an  inch  long  may  contain  innumerable 
parts — really  existing,  though  too  small  to  be  dis- 
cerned. These  errors  are  grafted  as  well  in  the  minds 
of  geometricians  as  of  other  men,  and  have  a  like 
influence  on  their  reasonings ;  and  it  were  no  difficult 
thing  to  shew  how  the  arguments  from  Geometry  made 
use  of  to  support  the  infinite  divisibility  of  extension 
are  bottomed  on  them.  [But  this,  if  it  be  thought  nec- 
essary, we  may  hereafter  find  a  proper  place  to  treat 


io8  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

of  in  a  particular  manner.]*  At  present  we  shall  only 
observe  in  general  whence  it  is  the  mathematicians 
are  all  so  fond  and  tenacious  of  that  doctrine. 

126.  It  hath  been  observed  in  another  place  that  the 
theorems  and  demonstrations  in  Geometry  are  con- 
versant about  universal  ideas  (sect.  15,  Introd.)  ;  where 
it  is  explained  in  what  sense  this  ought  to  be  under- 
stood, to  wit,  the  particular  lines  and  figures  included 
in  the  diagram  are  supposed  to  stand  for  innumerable 
others  of  different  sizes ;  or,  in  other  words,  the  geome- 
ter considers  them  abstracting  from  their  magnitude — 
which  does  not  imply  that  he  forms  an  abstract  idea, 
but  only  that  he  cares  not  what  the  particular  magni- 
tude is,  whether  great  or  small,  but  looks  on  that  as 
a  thing  different  to  the  demonstration.  Hence  it  fol- 
lows that  a  line  in  the  scheme  but  an  inch  long  must 
be  spoken  of  as  though  it  contained  ten  thousand  parts, 
since  it  is  regarded  not  in  itself,  but  as  it  is  universal ; 
and  it  is  universal  only  in  its  signification,  whereby  it 
represents  innumerable  lines  greater  than  itself,  in 
which  may  be  distinguished  ten  thousand  parts  or 
more,  though  there  may  not  be  above  an  inch  in  it. 
After  this  manner,  the  properties  of  the  lines  signified 
are  (by  a  very  usual  figure)  transferred  to  the  sign, 
and  thence,  through  mistake,  thought  to  appertain  to 
it  considered  in  its  own  nature. 

127.  Because  there  is  no  number  of  parts  so  great 
but  it  is  possible  there  may  be  a  line  containing  more, 
the  inch-line  is  said  to  contain  parts  more  than  any 
assignable  number ;  which  is  true,  not  of  the  inch  taken 
absolutely,  but  only  for  the  things  signified  by  it.  But 
men,  not  retaining  that  distinction  in  their  thoughts, 
slide  into  a  belief  that  the  small  particular  line  described 

*Omitted  in  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  109 

on  paper  contains  in  itself  parts  innumerable.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  the  ten  thousandth  part  of  an  inch  ; 
but  there  is  of  a  mile  or  diameter  of  the  earth,  which 
may  be  signified  by  that  inch.  When  therefore  I  delin- 
eate a  triangle  on  paper,  and  take  one  side  not  above 
an  inch,  for  example,  in  length  to  be  the  radius,  this 
I  consider  as  divided  into  10,000  or  100,000  parts  or 
more ;  for,  though  the  ten  thousandth  part  of  that  line 
considered  in  itself  is  nothing  at  all,  and  consequently 
may  be  neglected  without  an  error  or  inconveniency, 
yet  these  described  lines,  being  only  marks  standing  for 
greater  quantities,  whereof  it  may  be  the  ten  thou- 
sandth part  is  very  considerable,  it  follows  that,  to 
prevent  notable  errors  in  practice,  the  radius  must  be 
taken  of  10,000  parts  or  more. 

128.  From  what  has  been  said  the  reason  is  plain 
why,  to  the  end  any  theorem  become  universal  in  its 
use,  it  is  necessary  we  speak  of  the  lines  described  on 
paper  as  though  they  contained  parts  which  really  they 
do  not.  In  doing  of  which,  if  we  examine  the  matter 
thoroughly,  we  shall  perhaps  discover  that  we  cannot 
conceive  an  inch  itself  as  consisting  of,  or  being  divisi- 
ble into,  a  thousand  parts,  but  only  some  other  line 
which  is  far  greater  than  an  inch,  and  represented  by 
it ;  and  that  when  we  say  a  line  is  infinitely  divisible, 
we  must  mean*  a  line  which  is  infinitely  great.  What 
we  have  here  observed  seems  to  be  the  chief  cause 
why,  to  suppose  the  infinite  divisibility  of  finite  exten- 
sion has  been  thought  necessary  in  geometry. 

129.  The  several  absurdities  and  contradictions 
which  flowed    from  this    false    principle    might,  one 


*In  the  first  edition:  "we  mean   (if  we  mean  anything)   a 
line  which  is,"  &c. 


no  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

would  think,  have  been  esteemed  so  many  demonstra- 
tions against  it.  But,  by  I  know  not  what  logic,  it  is 
held  that  proofs  a  posteriori  are  not  to  be  admitted 
against  propositions  relating  to  infinity,  as  though  it 
were  not  impossible  even  for  an  infinite  mind  to  recon- 
cile contradictions ;  or  as  if  anything  absurd  and  repug- 
nant could  have  a  necessary  connexion  with  truth  or 
flow  from  it.  But,  whoever  considers  the  weakness 
of  this  pretence  will  think  it  was  contrived  on  purpose 
to  humour  the  laziness  of  the  mind  which  had  rather 
acquiesce  in  an  indolent  scepticism  than  be  at  the  pains 
to  go  through  with  a  severe  examination  of  those  prin- 
ciples it  has  ever  embraced  for  true. 

130.  Of  late  the  speculations  about  Infinites  have 
run  so  high,  and  grown  to  such  strange  notions,  as 
have  occasioned  no  small  scruples  and  disputes  among 
the  geometers  of  the  present  age.  Some  there  are  of 
great  note  who,  not  content  with  holding  that  finite 
lines  may  be  divided  into  an  infinite  number  of  parts, 
do  yet  farther  maintain  that  each  of  those  infinitesi- 
mals is  itself  subdivisible  into  an  infinity  of  other  parts 
or  infinitesimals  of  a  second  orderj  and  so  on  ad  infini- 
tum. These,  I  say,  assert  there  are  infinitesimals  of 
infinitesimals  of  infinitesimals,  &c.,  without  ever  coming 
to  an  end :  so  that  according  to  them  an  inch  does  not 
barely  contain  an  infinite  number  of  parts,  but  an 
infinity  of  an  infinity  of  an  infinity  ad  infinitum  of  parts. 
Others  there  be  who  hold  all  orders  of  infinitesimals 
below  the  first  to  be  nothing  at  all;  thinking  it  with 
good  reason  absurd  to  imagine  there  is  any  positive 
quantity  or  part  of  extension  which,  though  multiplied 
infinitely,  can  never  equal  the  smallest  given  extension. 
And  yet  on  the  other  hand  it  seems  no  less  absurd  to 
think  the  square,  cube  or  other  power  of  a  positive  real 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  iii 

root,  should  itself  be  nothing  at  all ;  which  they  who 
hold  infinitesimals  of  the  first  order,  denying  all  of  the 
subsequent  orders,  are  obliged  to  maintain. 

131.  Have  we  not  therefore  reason  to  conclude  they 
are  both  in  the  wrong,  and  that  there  is  in  effect  no 
such  thing  as  parts  infinitely  small,  or  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  parts  contained  in  any  finite  quantity  ?  But  you 
will  say  that  if  this  doctrine  obtains  it  will  follow  the 
very  foundations  of  Geometry  are  destroyed,  and  those 
great  men  who  have  raised  that  science  to  so  astonish- 
ing a  height,  have  been  all  the  while  building  a  castle 
in  the  air.  To  this  it  may  be  replied  that  whatever  is 
useful  in  geometry,  and  promotes  the  benefit  of  human 
life,  does  still  remain  firm  and  unshaken  on  our  princi- 
ples; that  science  considered  as  practical  will  rather 
receive  advantage  than  any  prejudice  from  what  has 
been  said.  But  to  set  this  in  a  due  light  [and  show 
how  lines  and  figures  may  be  measured,  and  their  prop- 
erties investigated,  without  supposing  finite  extension 
to  be  infinitely  divisible]*  may  be  the  proper  business 
of  another  place.  For  the  rest,  though  it  should  follow 
that  some  of  the  more  intricate  and  subtle  parts  of 
Speculative  Mathematics  may  be  pared  off  without  any 
prejudice  to  truth,  yet  I  do  not  see  what  damage  will 
be  thence  derived  to  mankind.  On  the  contrary,  I  think 
it  were  highly  to  be  wished  that  men  of  great  abilities 
and  obstinate  application  would  draw  off  their 
thoughts  from  those  amusements,  and  employ  them  in 
the  study  of  such  things  as  lie  nearer  the  concerns  of 
life,  or  have  a  more  direct  influence  on  the  manners. 

132.  If  it  be  said  that  several  theorems  undoubtedly 
true  are  discovered  by  methods  in  which  infinitesimals 


♦Omitted  in  second  edition. 


112  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

are  made  use  of,  which  could  never  have  been  if  their 
existence  included  a  contradiction  in  it ;  I  answer  that 
upon  a  thorough  examination  it  will  not  be  found  that 
in  any  instance  it  is  necessary  to  make  use  of  or  conceive 
infinitesimal  parts  of  finite  lines,  or  even  quantities  less 
than  the  minimum  sensible;  nay,  it  will  be  evident  this 
is  never  done,  it  being  impossible.  [And,  whatever 
mathematicians  may  think  of  fluxions,  or  the  differ- 
ential calculus  and  the  like,  a  little  reflexion  will  shew 
them  that,  in  working  by  those  methods,  they  do  not 
conceive  or  imagine  lines  or  surfaces  less  than  what 
are  perceivable  to  sense.  They  may  indeed  call  those 
little  and  almost  insensible  quantities  infinitesimals,  or 
infinitesimals  of  infinitesimals,  if  they  please ;  but  at 
bottom  this  is  all,  they  being  in  truth  finite ;  nor  does 
the  solution  of  problems  require  the  supposing  any 
other.  But  this  will  be  more  clearly  made  out  here- 
after.]* 

133.  By  what  we  have  premised,  it  is  plain  that  very 
numerous  and  important  errors  have  taken  their  rise 
from  those  false  Principles  which  were  impugned  in 
the  foregoing  parts  of  this  treatise ;  and  the  opposites  of 
those  erroneous  tenets  at  the  same  time  appear  to  be 
most  fruitful  Principles,  from  whence  do  flow  innu- 
merable consequences  highly  advantageous  to  true  phil- 
osophy, as  well  as  to  religion.  Particularly  Matter,  or 
the  absolute  existence  of  corporeal  objects,  hath  been 
shewn  to  be  that  wherein  the  most  avowed  and  perni- 
cious enemies  of  all  knowledge,  whether  human  or  di- 
vine, have  ever  placed  their  chief  strength  and  confi- 
dence.   And  surely,  if  by  distinguishing  the  real  exist- 


*Bracketed  sentences  omitted  in  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  113 

ence  of  unthinking  things  from  their  being  perceived, 
and  allowing  them  a  subsistance  of  their  own  out  of  the 
minds  of  spirits,  no  one  thing  is  explained  in  nature,  but 
on  the  contrary  a  great  many  inexplicable  difficulties 
arise ;  if  the  supposition  of  Matter  is  barely  precarious, 
as  not  being  grounded  on  so  much  as  one  single  reason ; 
if  its  consequences  cannot  endure  the  light  of  exami- 
nation and  free  inquiry,  but  screen  themselves  under 
the  dark  and  general  pretence  of  "infinites  being  in- 
comprehensible ;"  if  withal  the  removal  of  this  Matter 
be  not  attended  with  the  least  evil  consequence;  if  it 
be  not  even  missed  in  the  world,  but  everything  as  well, 
nay  much  easier  conceived  without  it;  if,  lastly,  both 
Sceptics  and  Atheists  are  for  ever  silenced  upon  sup- 
posing only  spirits  and  ideas,  and  this  scheme  of  things 
is  perfectly  agreeable  both  to  Reason  and  Religion : 
methinks  we  may  expect  it  should  be  admitted  and 
firmly  embraced,  though  it  were  proposed  only  as  an 
hypothesis,  and  the  existence  of  Matter  had  been  al- 
lowed possible,  which  yet  I  think  we  have  evidently 
demonstrated  that  it  is  not. 

134.  True  it  is  that,  in  consequence  of  the  foregoing 
principles,  several  disputes  and  speculations  which  are 
esteemed  no  mean  parts  of  learning,  are  rejected  as 
useless.*  But,  how  great  a  prejudice  soever  against 
our  notions  this  may  give  to  those  who  have  already 
been  deeply  engaged,  and  made  large  advances  in 
studies  of  that  nature,  yet  by  others  we  hope  it  will  not 
be  thought  any  just  ground  of  dislike  to  the  principles 
and  tenets  herein  laid  down,  that  they  abridge  the 
labour  of  study,  and  make  human  sciences  far  more 


♦"Useless  and  in  effect  conversant  about  nothing  at  all,"  in 
first  edition. 


114  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

clear,  compendious  and  attainable  than  they  were  be- 
fore. 

135.  Having  despatched  what  we  intended  to  say 
concerning  the  knowledge  of  Ideas,  the  method  we 
proposed  leads  us  in  the  next  place  to  treat  of  Spirits 
— with  regard  to  which,  perhaps,  human  knowledge  is 
not  so  deficient  as  is  vulgarly  imagined.  The  great 
reason  that  is  assigned  for  our  being  thought  ignorant 
of  the  nature  of  spirits  is  our  not  having  an  idea  of  it. 
But,  surely  it  ought  not  to  be  looked  on  as  a  defect  in 
a  human  understanding  that  it  does  not  perceive  the 
idea  of  spirit,  if  it  is  manifestly  impossible  there  should 
be  any  such  idea.  And  this  if  I  mistake  not  has  been 
demonstrated  in  section  27 ;  to  which  I  shall  here  add 
that  a  spirit  has  been  shewn  to  be  the  only  substance 
or  support  wherein  unthinking  beings  or  ideas  can 
exist;  but  that  this  substance  which  supports  or  per- 
ceives ideas  should  itself  be  an  idea  or  like  an  idea  is 
evidently  absurd. 

136.  It  will  perhaps  be  said  that  we  want  a  sense  (as 
some  have  imagined)  proper  to  know  substances  withal, 
which,  if  we  had,  we  might  know  our  own  soul  as  we 
do  a  triangle.  To  this  I  answer,  that,  in  case  we  had  a 
new  sense  bestowed  upon  us,  we  could  only  receive 
thereby  some  new  sensations  or  ideas  of  sense.  But  I 
believe  nobody  will  say  that  what  he  means  by  the 
terms  soul  and  substance  is  only  some  particular  sort 
of  idea  or  sensation.  We  may  therefore  infer  that,  all 
things  duly  considered,  it  is  not  more  reasonable  to 
think  our  faculties  defective,  in  that  they  do  not  furnish 
us  with  an  idea  of  spirit  or  active  thinking  substance, 
than  it  would  be  if  we  should  blame  them  for  not  be- 
ing able  to  comprehend  a  round  square. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  115 

137.  From  the  opinion  that  spirits  are  to  be  known 
after  the  manner  of  an  idea  or  sensation  have  risen 
many  absurd  and  heterodox  tenets,  and  much  scepti- 
cism about  the  nature  of  the  soul.  It  is  even  prob- 
able that  this  opinion  may  have  produced  a  doubt  in 
some  whether  they  had  any  soul  at  all  distinct  from 
their  body,  since  upon  inquiry  they  could  not  find  they 
had  an  idea  of  it.  That  an  idea  which  is  inactive,  and 
the  existence  whereof  consists  in  being  perceived, 
should  be  the  image  or  likeness  of  an  agent  subsisting 
by  itself,  seems  to  need  no  other  refutation  than  barely 
attending  to  what  is  meant  by  those  words.  But,  per- 
haps you  will  say  that  though  an  idea  cannot  resemble 
a  spirit  in  its  thinking,  acting,  or  subsisting  by  itself, 
yet  it  may  in  some  other  respects ;  and  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  an  idea  or  image  be  in  all  respects  like  the 
original. 

138.  I  answer,  if  it  does  not  in  those  mentioned,  it  is 
impossible  it  should  represent  it  in  any  other  thing. 
Do  but  leave  out  the  power  of  willing,  thinking,  and 
perceiving  ideas,  and  there  remains  nothing  else 
wherein  the  idea  can  be  like  a  spirit.  For,  by  the  word 
spirit  we  mean  only  that  which  thinks,  wills,  and  per- 
ceives ;  this,  and  this  alone,  constitutes  the  signification 
of  that  term.  If  therefore  it  is  impossible  that  any  de- 
gree of  those  powers  should  be  represented  in  an  idea,  * 
it  is  evident  there  can  be  no  idea  of  a  spirit. 

139.  But  it  will  be  objected  that,  if  there  is  no  idea 
signified  by  the  terms  soul,  spirit,  and  substance,  they 
are  wholly  insignificant,  or  have  no  meaning  in  them. 
I  answer,  those  words  do  mean  or  signify  a  real  thing, 


*In  the  first  edition,  for  "idea"  in  both  places  in  this  sen- 
tence, we  had  "idea  or  notion."    Compare  section  142. 


ii6  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

which  is  neither  an  idea  nor  like  an  idea,  but  that  which 
perceives  ideas,  and  wills,  and  reasons  about  them. 
What  I  am  myself,  that  which  I  denote  by  the  term  I, 
is  the  same  with  what  is  meant  by  soul  or  spiritual 
subtance.^  If  it  be  said  that  this  is  only  quarreling  at 
a  word,  and  that,  since  the  immediately  significations 
of  other  names  are  by  common  consent  called  ideas,  no 
reason  can  be  assigned  why  that  which  is  signified  by 
the  name  spirit  or  soul  may  not  partake  in  the  same  ap- 
pellation. I  answer,  all  the  unthinking  objects  of  the 
mind  agree  in  that  they  are  entirely  passive,  and  their 
existence  consists  only  in  being  perceived ;  whereas  a 
soul  or  spirit  is  an  active  being,  whose  existence  con- 
sists, not  in  being  perceived,  but  in  perceiving  ideas  and 
thinking.  It  is  therefore  necessary,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent equivocation  and  confounding  natures  perfectly 
disagreeing  and  unlike,  that  we  distinguish  between 
spirit  and  idea.    See  sect.  27. 

140.  In  a  large  sense,  indeed,  we  may  be  said  to  have 
an  idea  or  rather  a  notion  of  spirit;^  that  is,  we  under- 
stand the  meaning  of  the  word,  otherwise  we  could 
not  affirm  or  deny  anything  of  it.  Moreover,  as  we 
conceive  the  ideas  that  are  in  the  minds  of  other  spirits 
by  means  of  our  own,  which  we  suppose  to  be  resem- 
blances of  them ;  so  we  know  other  spirits  by  means 
of  our  own  soul — which  in  that  sense  is  the  image  or 
idea  of  them ;  it  having  a  like  respect  to  other  spirits 
that  blueness  or  heat  by  me  perceived  has  to  those 
ideas  perceived  by  another. 

*In  the  first  edition  the  following  occurred  at  this  point: 
"But  if  I  should  say  that  /  was  nothing,  or  that  /  was  an  idea 
or  notion,  nothing  could  be  more  evidently  absurd  than  either 
of  these  propositions." 

fThe  words  "or  rather  a  notion"  were  inserted  in  the  second 
edition.     See  section  142. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  117 

141.  [The  natural  immortality  of  the  soul  is  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  foregoing  doctrine.  But  be- 
fore we  attempt  to  prove  this,  it  is  fit  that  we  explain 
the  meaning  of  that  tenet.]*.  It  must  not  be  supposed 
that  they  who  assert  the  natural  immortality  of  the 
soul  are  of  opinon  that  it  is  absolutely  incapable  of 
annihilation  even  by  the  infinite  power  of  the  Creator 
who  first  gave  it  being,  but  only  that  it  is  not  liable  to 
be  broken  or  dissolved  by  the  ordinary  laws  of  nature 
or  motion.  They  indeed  who  hold  the  soul  of  man  to 
be  only  a  thin  vital  flame,  or  system  of  animal  spirits, 
make  it  perishing  and  corruptible  as  the  body ;  since 
there  is  nothing  more  easily  dissipated  than  such  a  be- 
ing, which  it  is  naturally  impossible  should  survive  the 
ruin  of  the  tabernacle  wherein  it  is  enclosed.  And  this 
notion  has  been  greedily  embraced  and  cherished  by 
the  worst  part  of  mankind,  as  the  most  effectual  anti- 
dote against  all  impressions  of  virtue  and  religion.  But 
it  has  been  made  evident  that  bodies,  of  what  frame 
or  texture  soever,  are  barely  passive  ideas  in  the  mind, 
which  is  more  distant  and  heterogeneous  from  them 
than  light  is  from  darkness.  We  have  shewn  that  the 
soul  is  indivisible,  incorporeal,  unextended,  and  it  is 
consequently  incorruptible.  Nothing  can  be  plainer 
than  that  the  motions,  changes,  decays,  and  dissolu- 
tions which  we  hourly  see  befall  natural  bodies  (and 
which  is  what  we  mean  by  the  course  of  nature)  can- 
not possibly  affect  an  active,  simple,  uncompounded 
substance ;  such  a  being  therefore  is  indissoluble  by 
the  force  of  nature;  that  is  to  say,  "the  soul  of  man 
is  naturally  immortal." 

142.  After  what  has  been  said,  it  is,  I  suppose,  plain 


*Omitted  from  second  edition. 


ii8  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

that  our  souls  are  not  to  be  known  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  senseless,  inactive  objects,  or  by  way  of  idea. 
Spirits  and  ideas  are  things  so  wholly  different,  that 
when  we  say  "they  exist,"  "they  are  known,"  or  the 
like,  these  words  must  not  be  thought  to  signify  any- 
thing common  to  both  natures.  There  is  nothing  alike  or 
common  in  them  :  and  to  expect  that  by  any  multiplica- 
tion or  enlargement  of  our  faculties  we  may  be  enabled 
to  know  a  spirit  as  we  do  a  triangle,  seems  as  absurd 
as  if  we  should  hope  to  see  a  sound.  This  is  incul- 
cated because  I  imagine  it  may  be  of  moment  towards 
clearing  several  important  questions,  and  preventing 
some  very  dangerous  errors  concerning  the  nature  of 
the  soul.  [We  may  not,  I  think,  strictly  be  said  to  have 
an  idea  of  an  active  being,  or  of  an  action,  although 
we  may  be  said  to  have  a  notion  of  them.  I  have  some 
knowledge  or  notion  of  my  mind,  and  its  acts  about 
ideas,  inasmuch  as  I  know  or  understand  what  is  meant 
by  these  words.  What  I  know,  that  I  have  some  notion 
of.  I  will  not  say  that  the  terms  idea  and  notion  may  not 
be  used  convertibly,  if  the  world  will  have  it  so ;  but  yet 
it  conduceth  to  clearness  and  propriety  that  we  dis- 
tinguish things  very  different  by  different  names.  It 
is  also  to  be  remarked  that,  all  relations  including  an 
act  of  the  mind,  we  cannot  so  properly  be  said  to  have 
an  idea,  but  rather  a  notion  of  the  relations  and  hab- 
itudes between  things.  But  if,  in  the  modern  way,  the 
word  idea  is  extended  to  spirits,  and  relations,  and  acts, 
this  is,  after  all,  an  affair  of  verbal  concern.]* 

143.  It  will  not  be  amiss  to  add,  that  the  doctrine  of 
abstract  ideas  has  had  no  small  share  in  rendering 
those  sciences  intricate  and  obscure  which  are  particu- 

*The  sentences  in  brackets  were  inserted  in  the  second 
edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  119 

larly  conversant  about  spiritual  things.  Men  have 
imagined  they  could  frame  abstract  notions  of  the 
powers  and  acts  of  the  mind,  and  consider  them  pre- 
scinded as  well  from  the  mind  or  spirit  itself,  as  from 
their  respective  objects  and  effects.  Hence  a  great 
number  of  dark  and  ambiguous  terms,  presumed  to 
stand  for  abstract  notions,  have  been  introduced  into 
metaphysics  and  morality,  and  from  these  have  grown 
infinite  distractions  and  disputes  amongst  the  learned. 

144.  But,  nothing  seems  more  to  have  contributed 
towards  engaging  men  in  controversies  and  mistakes 
with  regard  to  the  nature  and  operations  of  the  mind, 
than  the  being  used  to  speak  of  those  things  in  terms 
borrowed  from  sensible  ideas.  For  example,  the  will 
is  termed  the  motion  of  the  soul :  this  infuses  a  belief 
that  the  mind  of  man  is  as  a  ball  in  motion,  impelled 
and  determined  by  the  objects  of  sense,  as  necessarily 
as  that  is  by  the  stroke  of  a  racket.  Hence  arise  end- 
less scruples  and  errors  of  dangerous  consequence  in 
morality.  All  which,  I  doubt  not,  may  be  cleared,  and 
truth  appear  plain,  uniform,  and  consistent,  could  but 
philosophers  be  prevailed  on  to  retire  into  themselves, 
and  attentively  consider  their  own  meaning.* 

145.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  plain  that  we 
cannot  know  the  existence  of  other  spirits  otherwise 
than  by  their  operations,  or  the  ideas  by  them  excited 
in  us.  I  perceive  several  motions,  changes,  and  com- 
binations of  ideas,  that  inform  me  there  are  certain 
particular  agents,  like  myself,  which  accompany  them 

*In  the  first  edition  the  last  part  of  this  sentence  and  section 
reads :  "could  but  philosophers  be  prevailed  on  to  depart  from 
some  received  prejudices  and  modes  of  speech,  and  retire  into 
themselves,  and  attentively  consider  their  own  maning.  But 
the  difficulties  arising  on  this  head  demand  a  more  particular 
disquisition  than  suits  with  the  design  of  this  treatise." 


120  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

and  concui^in  their  production.  Hence,  the  knowledge 
I  have  of  other  spirits  is  not  immediate,  as  is  the 
knowledge  of  my  ideas ;  but  depending  on  the  inter- 
vention of  ideas,  by  me  referred  to  agents  or  spirits 
distinct  from  myself,  as  effects  or  concomitant  signs. 

146.  But,  though  there  be  some  things  which  con- 
vince us  human  agents  are  concerned  in  producing 
them ;  yet  it  is  evident  to  every  one  that  those  things 
which  are  called  the  Works  of  Nature,  that  is,  the  far 
greater  part  of  the  ideas  or  sensations  perceived  by  us, 
are  not  produced  by,  or  dependent  on,  the  wills  of  men. 
There  is  therefore  some  other  Spirit  that  causes  them ; 
since  it  is  repugnant  that  they  should  subsist  by  them- 
selves. See  sect.  29.  But,  if  we  attentively  consider 
the  constant  regularity,  order,  and  concatenation  of 
natural  things,  the  surprising  magnificence,  beauty, 
and  perfection  of  the  larger,  and  the  exquisite  con- 
trivance of  the  smaller  parts  of  creation,  together  with 
the  exact  harmony  and  correspondence  of  the  whole, 
but  above  all  the  never-enough-admired  laws  of  pain 
and  pleasure,  and  the  instincts  or  natural  inclinations, 
appetites,  and  passions  of  animals ;  I  say  if  we  con- 
sider all  these  things,  and  at  the  same  time  attend  to 
the  meaning  and  import  of  the  attributes  One,  Eternal, 
Infinitely  Wise,  Good,  and  Perfect,  we  shall  clearly 
perceive  that  they  belong  to  the  aforesaid  Spirit,  "who 
works  all  in  all,"  and  "by  whom  all  things  consist." 

147.  Hence,  it  is  evident  that  God  is  known  as  cer- 
tainly and  immediately  as  any  other  mind  or  spirit 
whatsoever  distinct  from  ourselves.  We  may  even 
assert  that  the  existence  of  God  is  far  more  evidently 
perceived  than  the  existence  of  men ;  because  the  ef- 
fects of  nature  are  infinitely  more  numerous  and  con- 
siderable than  those  ascribed  to  human  agents.    There 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  121 

is  not  any  one  mark  that  denotes  a  man,  or  effect  pro- 
duced by  him,  which  does  not  more  strongly  evince  the 
being  of  that  Spirit  who  is  the  Author  of  Nature.  For, 
it  is  evident  that  in  affecting  other  persons  the  will  of 
man  has  no  other  object  than  barely  the  motion  of  the 
limbs  of  his  body ;  but  that  such  a  motion  should  be  at- 
tended by,  or  excite  any  idea  in  the  mind  of  another, 
depends  wholly  on  the  will  of  the  Creator.  He  alone 
it  is  who,  "upholding  all  things  by  the  word  of  His 
power,"  maintains  that  intercourse  between  spirits 
whereby  they  are  able  to  perceive  the  existence  of  each 
other.  And  yet  this  pure  and  clear  light  which  en- 
lightens every  one  is  itself  invisible.* 

148.  It  seems  to  be  a  general  pretence  of  the  un- 
thinking herd  that  they  cannot  see  God.  Could  we  but 
see  Him,  say  they,  as  we  see  a  man,  we  should  believe 
that  He  is,  and  believing  obey  His  commands.  But 
alas,  we  need  only  open  our  eyes  to  see  the  Sovereign 
Lord  of  all  things,  with  a  more  full  and  clear  view  than 
we  do  any  one  of  our  fellow-creatures.  Not  that  1 
imagine  we  see  God  (as  some  will  have  it)  by  a  direct 
and  immediate  view;  or  see  corporeal  things,  not  by 
themselves,  but  by  seeing  that  which  represents  them 
in  the  essence  of  God,  which  doctrine  is,  I  must  con- 
fess, to  me  incomprehensible.  But  I  shall  explain  my 
meaning: — A  human  spirit  or  person  is  not  perceived 
by  sense,  as  not  being  an  idea ;  when  therefore  we  see 
the  colour,  size,  figure,  and  motions  of  a  man.  we  per- 
ceive only  certain  sensations  or  ideas  excited  in  our 
own  minds ;  and  these  being  exhibited  to  our  view  in 
sundry  distinct  collections,  serve  to  mark  out  unto  us 
the  existence  of  finite  and  created  spirits  like  ourselves. 


♦"Invisible  to  the  greatest  part  of  mankind,"  in  first  edition. 


122  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

Hence  it  is  plain  we  do  not  see  a  man — if  by  man  is 
meant  that  which  Hves,  moves,  perceives,  and  thinks 
as  we  do — but  only  such  a  certain  collection  of  ideas  as 
directs  us  to  think  there  is  a  distinct  principle  of 
thought  and  motion,  like  to  ourselves,  accompanying 
and  represented  by  it.  And  after  the  same  manner  we 
see  God;  all  the  difference  is  that,  whereas  some  one 
finite  and  narrow  assemblage  of  ideas  denotes  a  particu- 
lar human  mind,  whithersoever  we  direct  our  view,  we 
do  at  all  times  and  in  all  places  perceive  manifest  tokens 
of  the  Divinity :  everything  we  see,  hear,  feel,  or  any- 
wise perceive  by  sense,  being  a  sign  or  effect  of  the 
power  of  God ;  as  is  our  perception  of  those  very  mo- 
tions which  are  produced  by  men. 

149.  It  is  therefore  plain  that  nothing  can  be  more 
evident  to  any  one  that  is  capable  of  the  least  reflexion 
than  the  existence  of  God,  or  a  Spirit  who  is  inti- 
mately present  to  our  minds,  producing  in  them  all  that 
variety  of  ideas  or  sensations  which  continually  affect 
us,  on  whom  we  have  an  absolute  and  entire  depend- 
ence, in  short  "in  whom  we  live,  and  move,  and  have 
our  being."  That  the  discovery  of  this  great  truth, 
which  lies  so  near  and  obvious  to  the  mind,  should  be 
attained  to  by  the  reason  of  so  very  few,  is  a  sad  in- 
stance of  the  stupidity  and  inattention  of  men,  who, 
though  they  are  surrounded  with  such  clear  manifesta- 
tions of  the  Deity,  are  yet  so  little  affected  by  them  that 
they  seem,  as  it  were,  blinded  with  excess  of  light. 

150.  But  you  will  say.  Hath  Nature  no  share  in  the 
production  of  natural  things,  and  must  they  be  all  as- 
cribed to  the  immediate  and  sole  operation  of  God  ?  I 
answer,  if  by  Nature  is  meant  only  the  visible  series  of 
effects  or  sensations  imprinted  on  our  minds,  according 
to  certain  fixed  and  general  laws,  then  it  is  plain  that 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  123 

Nature,  taken  in  this  sense,  cannot  produce  anything  at 
all.  But,  if  by  Nature  is  meant  some  being  distinct 
from  God,  as  well  as  from  the  laws  of  nature,  and 
things  perceived  by  sense,  I  must  confess  that  word  is 
to  me  an  empty  sound  without  any  intelligible  meaning 
annexed  to  it.  Nature,  in  this  acceptation,  is  a  vain 
chimera,  introduced  by  those  heathens  who  had  not 
just  notions  of  the  omnipresence  and  infinite  perfec- 
tion of  God.  But,  it  is  more  unaccountable  that  it 
should  be  received  among  Christians,  professing  be- 
lief in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  constantly  ascribe 
those  effects  to  the  immediate  hand  of  God  that  heathen 
philosophers  are  wont  to  impute  to  Nature.  "The  Lord 
He  causeth  the  vapours  to  ascend ;  He  maketh  light- 
nings with  rain ;  He  bringeth  forth  the  wind  out  of  his 
treasures."  Jerem.  x.  13.  "He  turneth  the  shadow 
of  death  into  the  morning,  and  maketh  the  day  dark 
with  night."  Amos  v.  8.  "He  visiteth  the  earth,  and 
maketh  it  soft  with  showers :  He  blesseth  the  springing 
thereof,  and  crowneth  the  year  with  His  goodness ;  so 
that  the  pastures  are  clothed  with  flocks,  and  the  val- 
leys are  covered  over  with  corn."  See  Psalm  Ixv.  But, 
notwithstanding  that  this  is  the  constant  language  of 
Scripture,  yet  we  have  I  know  not  what  aversion  from 
believing  that  God  concerns  Himself  so  nearly  in  our 
affairs.  Fain  would  we  suppose  Him  at  a  great  dis- 
tance off,  and  substitute  some  blind  unthinking  deputy 
in  His  stead,  though  (if  we  may  believe  Saint  Paul) 
"He  be  not  far  from  every  one  of  us." 

151.  It  will,  I  doubt  not,  be  objected  that  the  slow 
and  gradual  methods  observed  in  the  production  of 
natural  things  do  not  seem  to  have  for  their  cause  the 
immediate  hand  of  an  Almighty  Agent.  Besides,  mon- 
sters, untimely  births,  fruits  blasted  in  the  blossom, 


124  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

rains  falling  in  desert  places,  miseries  incident  to  hu- 
man life,  and  the  like,  are  so  many  arguments  that  the 
whole  frame  of  nature  is  not  immediately  actuated  and 
superintended  by  a  Spirit  of  infinite  wisdom  and  good- 
ness. But  the  answer  to  this  objection  is  in  a  good 
measure  plain  from  sect.  62 ;  it  being  visible  that  the 
aforesaid  methods  of  nature  are  absolutely  necessary, 
in  order  to  working  by  the  most  simple  and  general 
rules,  and  after  a  steady  and  consistent  manner ;  which 
argues  both  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God.  [For, 
it  doth  hence  follow  that  the  finger  of  God  is  not  so 
conspicuous  to  the  resolved  and  careless  sinner,  which 
gives  him  an  opportunity  to  harden  in  his  impiety  and 
grow  ripe  for  vengeance.  (Vide  sect.  57.)  ]*  Such 
is  the  artificial  contrivance  of  this  mighty  machine  of 
nature  that,  whilst  its  motions  and  various  phenomena 
strike  on  our  senses,  the  hand  which  actuates  the  whole 
is  itself  unperceivable  to  men  of  flesh  and  blood. 
"Verily"  (saith  the  prophet)  "thou  art  a  God  that 
hidest  thyself."  Isaiah  xlv.  15.  But,  though  the  Lord 
conceal  Himself  from  the  eyes  of  the  sensual  and  lazy, 
who  will  not  be  at  the  least  expense  of  thought,  yet  to 
an  unbiased  and  attentive  mind  nothing  can  be  more 
plainly  legible  than  the  intimate  presence  of  an  All- 
wise  Spirit,  who  fashions,  regulates,  and  sustains  the 
whole  system  of  beings.  It  is  clear,  from  what  we  have 
elsewhere  observed,  that  the  operating  according  to 
general  and  stated  laws  is  so  necessary  for  our  guidance 
in  the  affairs  of  life,  and  letting  us  into  the  secret  of 
nature,  that  without  it  all  reach  and  compass  of 
thought,  all  human  sagacity  and  design,  could  serve 
to  no  manner  of  purpose ;  it  were  even  impossible  there 


*Omitted  from  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  135 

should  be  any  such  faculties  or  powers  in  the  mind. 
See  sect.  31.  Which  one  consideration  abundantly  out- 
balances whatever  particular  inconveniences  may 
thence  arise. 

152.  We  should  further  consider  that  the  very 
blemishes  and  defects  of  nature  are  not  without  their 
use,  in  that  they  make  an  agreeable  sort  of  variety,  and 
augment  the  beauty  of  the  rest  of  the  creation,  as  shades 
in  a  picture  serve  to  set  off  the  brighter  and  more  en- 
lightened parts.  We  would  likewise  do  well  to  exam- 
ine whether  our  taxing  the  waste  of  seeds  and  embryos, 
and  accidental  destruction  of  plants  and  animals,  be- 
fore they  come  to  full  maturity,  as  an  imprudence  in  the 
Author  of  nature,  be  not  the  effect  of  prejudice  con- 
tracted by  our  familiarity  with  impotent  and  saving 
mortals.  In  man  indeed  a  thrifty  management  of  those 
things  which  he  cannot  procure  without  much  pains 
and  industry  may  be  esteemed  wisdom.  But,  we  must 
not  imagine  that  the  inexplicably  fine  machine  of  an 
animal  or  vegetable  costs  the  great  Creator  any  more 
pains  or  trouble  in  its  production  than  a  pebble  does ; 
nothing  being  more  evident  than  that  an  Omnipotent 
Spirit  can  indifferently  produce  everything  by  a  mere 
Hat  or  act  of  His  will.  Hence,  it  is  plain  that  the  splen- 
did profusion  of  natural  things  should  not  be  inter- 
preted weakness  or  prodigality  in  the  agent  who  pro- 
duces them,  but  rather  be  looked  on  as  an  argument  of 
the  riches  of  His  power. 

153.  As  for  the  mixture  of  pain  or  uneasiness  which 
is  in  the  world,  pursuant  to  the  general  laws  of  nature, 
and  the  actions  of  finite,  imperfect  spirits,  this,  in  the 
state  we  are  in  at  present,  is  indispensably  necessary  to 
our  well-being.  But  our  prospects  are  too  narrow.  We 
take,  for  instance,  the  idea  of  some  one  particular  pain 


126  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES 

into  our  thoughts,  and  account  it  evil;  whereas,  if  we 
enlarge  our  view,  so  as  to  comprehend  the  various  ends, 
connexions,  and  dependencies  of  things,  on  what  occa- 
sions and  in  what  proportions  we  are  affected  with  pain 
and  pleasure,  the  nature  of  human  freedom,  and  the  de- 
sign with  which  we  are  put  into  the  world ;  we  shall  be 
forced  to  acknowledge  that  those  particular  things 
which,  considered  in  themselves,  appear  to  be  evil,  have 
the  nature  of  good,  when  considered  as  linked  with  the 
whole  system  of  beings. 

154.  From  what  has  been  said,  it  will  be  manifest  to 
any  considering  person,  that  it  is  merely  for  want  of 
attention  and  comprehensiveness  of  mind  that  there  are 
any  favourers  of  Atheism  or  the  Manichean  Heresy  to 
be  found.  Little  and  unreflecting  souls  may  indeed  bur- 
lesque the  works  of  Providence  the  beauty  and  order 
whereof  they  have  not  capacity,  or  will  not  be  at  the 
pains,  to  comprehend ;  but  those  who  are  masters  of 
any  justness  and  extent  of  thought,  and  are  withal  used 
to  reflect,  can  never  sufficiently  admire  the  divine  traces 
of  Wisdom  and  Goodness  that  shine  throughout  the 
Economy  of  Nature.  But  what  truth  is  there  which 
shineth  so  strongly  on  the  mind  that  by  an  aversion  of 
thought,  a  wilful  shutting  of  the  eyes,  we  may  not  es- 
cape seeing  it  [at  least  with  a  full  and  direct  view]  ?* 
Is  it  therefore  to  be  wondered  at,  if  the  generality  of 
men,  who  are  ever  intent  on  business  or  pleasure,  and 
little  used  to  fix  or  open  the  eye  of  their  mind,  should 
not  have  all  that  conviction  and  evidence  of  the  Being  of 
God  which  might  be  expected  in  reasonable  creatures  ? 

155-  We  should  rather  wonder  that  men  can  be  found 
so  stupid  as  to  neglect,  than  that  neglecting  they  should 


♦Omitted  from  second  edition. 


OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  127 

be  unconvinced  of  such  an  evident  and  momentous 
truth.  And  yet  it  is  to  be  feared  that  too  many  of  parts 
and  leisure,  who  Hve  in  Christian  countries,  are,  merely 
through  a  supine  and  dreadful  negligence,  sunk  into 
Atheism,*  Since  it  is  downright  impossible  that  a  soul 
pierced  and  enlightened  with  a  thorough  sense  of  the 
omnipresence,  holiness,  and  justice  of  that  Almighty 
Spirit  should  persist  in  a  remorseless  violation  of  His 
laws.  We  ought,  therefore,  earnestly  to  meditate  and 
dwell  on  those  important  points ;  that  so  we  may  attain 
conviction  without  all  scruple  "that  the  eyes  of  the 
Lord  are  in  every  place  beholding  the  evil  and  the  good  ; 
that  He  is  with  us  and  keepeth  us  in  all  places  whither 
we  go,  and  giveth  us  bread  to  cat  and  raiment  to  put 
on ;"  that  He  is  present  and  conscious  to  our  innermost 
thoughts ;  and  that  we  have  a  most  absolute  and  imme- 
diate dependence  on  Him.  A  clear  view  of  which  great 
truths  cannot  choose  but  fill  our  hearts  with  an  awful 
circumspection  and  holy  fear,  which  is  the  strongest 
incentive  to  Virtue,  and  the  best  guard  against  Vice. 

156.  For,  after  all,  what  deserves  the  first  place  in 
our  studies  is  the  consideration  of  God  and  our  Duty  ; 
which  to  promote,  as  it  was  the  main  drift  and  design 
of  my  labours,  so  shall  I  esteem  them  altogether  useless 
and  ineffectual  if,  by  what  I  have  said,  I  cannot  inspire 
my  readers  with  a  pious  sense  of  the  Presence  of  God ; 
and,  having  shewn  the  falseness  or  vanity  of  those 
barren  speculations  which  make  the  chief  employment 


*This  paragraph  read  as  follows  in  the  first  edition :  "sunk 
into  a  sort  of  Demy-Atheism.  They  cannot  say  there  is  not  a 
God,  but  neither  are  they  convinced  that  there  is.  For  what 
else  can  it  be  but  some  lurking  infidelity,  some  secret  misgiv- 
ings of  mind  with  regard  to  the  existence  and  attributes  of 
God,  which  permits  sinners  to  grow  and  harden  in  impiety? 
Since  it  is  downright,"  &c. 


128  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 

of  learned  men,  the  better  dispose  them  to  reverence  and 
embrace  the  salutary  (truths  of  the  Gospel,  which  to 
know  and  to  practice  is  the  highest  perfection  of  hu- 
man nature. 


&- 


UU  bUUIHhHN  HbblUNAL  LIbHAHY   hAI^ILMT 

!l 


A  A  001  409  537  6 


CENTRAL  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
University  of  California,  San  Diego 


DATE  DUE 

MAR  1  4  197? 

MAR  2  3  1973 

9IAR  t  ^  ^^^^ 

1975 

^§ll«W 

MARIS  SEC!) 

i^T  2  5  1979 

OCTM  1979 

Mhv 

UCU  ^^  WCrt 

'■^^UL  Oft  l^^h 

*^*^'-   i»  Q  J^C  J 

C/  39 

UCSD  Libr. 

